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ABSTRACT 
The Constitution bestows upon the president the right to make 
appointments "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" to 
federal posi tiona at home and abroad. Over the passage of time, through 
free use of this power and the implied power of removal, the several 
chief executives constructed a vast patronage system, ot which one 
primary goal was to reward the party tai thf'ul for their services. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to determine how well Andrew Johnson, 
the unexpected successor of Abraham Lincoln, used the seemingly powerful 
patronage weapon. and the reasons why he used it as he did. 
Prior to his elevation to the presidency, Johnson had been a 
Jacksonian Democrat with a great faith in the wisdom of the masses of 
people. As such, he had subscribed to the spoils system with its attend­
ant principles of loyalty to the party and rotation in office. There is 
little evidence to indicate that he subsequently changed his views, 
despite the tact that they were of questionable validity in the unbal­
anced postwar political context of 1865-1869. 
Andrew Johnson was also a decided individualist, a characteristic 
which showed itself on several occasions during his presidential career . 
This trait at times overshadowed his political co�victions and, increas­
ingly during the course of his presidency, dictated his actions . Nowhere 
was this tact more clearly evident than in his use of the patronage . 
As president, Johnson initially was allowed a tree patronage hand, 
but as he and the dominant element of the Republican party, the Radicals ; 
ii 
81:Jl62 
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increasingly clashed on the issues of reconstruction, the latter moved 
to wrest control of the system trom him. Seeking endorsement for his 
policies, he appealed to the people in the 1866 congressional campaign. 
Many of his supporters urged that he use the federal patronage to affect 
the outcome of the elections , and a number of changes were made, but the 
Radicals emerged victorious. Some observers, both at that time and 
later, charged that this result occurred because Johnson misused his 
patronage powers , but he probably realized that he could not have changed 
the outcome of the elections regardless of how he might have used his 
powers of removal and appointment. 
Having failed to win popular support for his position, Johnson 
then faced the alternative of either turning to the Democratic party and 
bolstering it with the federal patronage or becoming politically isolated. 
The leaders of that party .both expected and encouraged him to return to 
the fold, but the chief executive steadfastly refused to do so. The 
people had not elected a Democratic president in 1864 and Johnson's 
integrity and honesty dictated that they were not to receive one against 
their will. 
While becoming increasingly politically isolated, Johnson sought 
to reward those who had remained faithful to him. Close supporters were 
appointed to office, and despite demands from Democrats that changes be 
made, he refused to remove loyal cabinet members from their posts. At 
the same time, however, the president would not tolerate disloyalty. 
Wh�n his secretary of war proved unfaithful, Johnson, defying Radical 
legislative �fforts to secure Edwin M. Stanton in his position, removed 
him-from office. This move led to the chief executive's impeachment 
iv 
and trial, a process which the Radicals unsuccessfully attempted to turn 
into a condemnation of his entire patronage policy. 
Both primary and secondary sources were used for this study. 
Heavy dependence was placed upon certain manuscript collections, parti­
cularly those of Andrew Johnson, Senators John Sherman and Lyman Trum­
bull, and Representative Elihu B .  Washburne. The Congressional Globe, 
the United States Senate Executive Journal, and the official account·of 
the impeachment trial were also of considerable value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two clauses of the Constitution relate to the subject of executive 
patronage . The first provides that the president 
shall nominate , and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate , shall appoint Ambassadors , other public Ministers and 
Consuls , Judges of the supreme Court , and all other Officers 
of the United.States , whose Appointments are not herein other­
wise provided for , and which shall be established by Law : 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers , as they think proper , in the President 
1 alone , in the Courts of Law , or in the Heads of Departments .  
While the Constitution thus gave the president an extensive role 
in the process of appointment to federal office , it ·failed to make any 
provision for removals . Under what circumstances and by whom were 
removals to be made? This question became the center of a prolonged 
discussion in·the First Congress when the bill establishing the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs (later State Department ) came before that body 
in June , 1789 , with the provision that the secretary was "to be removable 
by the President . "  During the course of the debate in the House of 
Representatives several greatly variant ideas were aired, but the central 
issue for the maj ority of the members was whether the right to remove 
was an � officio power of the president or an incident of the power to 
2 appoint and therefore to be shared by the president and the Senate . 
!united States Constitution , Article II , Section 2, Clause 2. 
The only restriction placed on this provision was that incumbent congress­
men could not hold other federal offices . Ibid. , Article I ,  Section 6 , 
Clause 2. -- · 
2virtually unsupported was the position of William Smith of South 
Carolina who insisted that the only provision made by the Constitution 
1 
2 
The latter view was presented clearly by Alexander White of 
Virginia , who maintained that , since the Constitution divided the power 
of appointment between the president and the Senate , "they ought also to 
be associated in the dismission from office . "3 In support of the view, 
John Page , a fellow Virginian , gave expression to a thought which undoubt-
edly also was troubling some of his colleagues .  Arguing that leaving 
the power of removal with the president alone would encourage the growth 
of an organization of civil servants loyal to him, Page warned that "con-
ferring this power , so far from making the President more responsible , 
diminishes his responsibility , and inclines to establish him an independent 
monarch . "
4 
The chief spokesman for the president ' s  right to remove from 
office was James Madison , who had argued in an earlier House discussion 
on this subject that to divide the removal power between the president 
and the Senate would have the effect of diminishing the president ' s  
responsibility for the actions of those officials under him. 5 He now 
summarized his position : 
for removal was impeachment , thereby implying that offices were to be 
held during good behavior or at least for terms fixed by law. Annals 
of Congress , First Congress , 475 . A view receiving some moderate sup­
port was presented by Sherman of Connecticut , who maintained that office 
was the creation of Congress and therefore within the limits of the Con­
stitution could be regulated in any manner Congress saw fit . Ibid . , 511 .  
3 
4 
Ibid . '  473 . 
Ibid . ' 540-41 .  
5!bid . , 387 , 394-95 .  
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the President , 
and you abolish at once that great principle of unity and 
responsibility in the executive department , which was in­
tended for the security of liberty and the public good . If 
the President should possess alone the power of removal from 
office , those who are employed in the execution of the law 
will be in their proper situation , and the chain of depend­
ence be preserved; the lowest offices , the middle grade , and 
the highest , will depend , as they o
�
ght , on the President , 
and the President on the community. 
Events came to a climax on June 22. The second clause of the 
bill was amended to provide that the chief clerk of the department , who 
was to be appointed by the secretary and assigned such duties as he saw 
fit; would assume temporarily the secretary ' s  duties "whenever the said 
principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the 
3 
United States" or in case of vacancy of that office for any other reason . 
This amendment carried by a vote of 30 to 18 . The words "to be removable 
by the President" then were deleted from the bill by a vote of 31 to 19 .  
These actions implied that the power of removal already rested with the 
president , thus making the original wording unnecessary . 7 In this manner , 
the champions of executive removal scored a safe but not overwhelming 
victory . 
In the Senate , the body most vi tally concerned in the matter , the 
result was much less decisive . Although not entered for the public rec-
ord , the debate raged for four days , July 15-18 , and finally resulted in 
a nine to nine tie . Vice-President John Adams then broke the deadlock 
8 by casting his vote for executive removal . 
6 Ibid . ' 518 . 7Ibid. ' 600-8 . 
8Charles Francis Adams (ed . } ,  The Works of John Adams , Second 
President of the United States (10 vols . ,  Bostoii':" 1850-1856) , I ,  449-50 .  
4 
This action by Congress , or the 11decision of 1789" as it often 
was called , received varied treatment in the judicial opinions of the 
first half of the nineteenth century. John Marshall , in Marbury�· 
Madison (1803 ) ,  tended to favor the view that office was to be held dur­
ing good behavior , an opinion soon discarded. 9 While approving of the 
association of the Senate with the president in the appointment procedure , 
the American jurist James Kent (1763-1847 ) was ambiguous on the question 
10 of removal . His contemporary , Joseph Story (1779-1845 ) ,  recalling the 
early view of Alexander Hamilton , argued that the power to remove was 
an incident of and inseparable from the power to appoint and stated that 
it "would be a most unjustifiable construction of the Constitution , and 
of its implied powers , to hold otherwise . "11 In reference to the 
11inferior Officers" mentioned by the Constitution , Story maintained that 
the 11remedy for any permanent abuse is still within the power of Congress , 
by the simple expedient of requiring the consent of the senate to removals 
in such cases . "12 
9united States Senate , The Constitution of �United States of 
America: Ana1ysis and Interpretation (Washington , 1952} ,  457-58 .  
10James Kent , Commentaries on American Law (9th ed . ; 4 vols . , 
Boston , 1858 ) ,  I ,  309-10 . 
11Joseph Story , Commentaries £!!.the Constitution of �United 
States with �Preliminary Review .2f. the Constitutional HistoTt of the 
Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution th ed. ; 
2 ¥ols. , Boston , 1873 ) , II , 351-52 . Alexander Hamilton had assumed in 
Federalist #77 that senatorial approval would be necessary for removal 
as well as for appointment . Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and 
John Jay , The Federalist Papers (Mentor ed . ;New York , 1961 ) ,  459 . 
12story , Commentaries , II , 356 .  The majority decision of the 
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Hennen (1839 ) seemingly tended to support 
5 
The other clause of the Constitution pertaining to presidential 
patronage states: "The President shall have Power to fill all vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate , by granting Commissions 
which shall expire at the End of their next Session . "13 
The key word in this statement was "happen . "  As early as 1823 , 
the attorneys-general were interpreting it to mean "happen to exist" and 
14 such was the meaning which generally came to be accepted. The implica-
tion of this interpretation could be quite far-reaching . A person 
appointed to any office by the president would be entitled to hold that 
office until the expiration of the next session of the Senate . A vacancy 
then would "happen to exist" and there was nothing to prevent a presi-
dent , if �e so chose , from reappointing the individual . There was also 
the possibility that the chief executive could fail to submit a name at 
all and simply fill the vacancy after the expiration of Congress , thus 
completely nullifying the Senate 's  power . 15 
Story ' s  contention in that it commented , "But it was very early adopted , 
as the practical construction of the Constitution , that this power [ of 
removal ] was vested in the President alone . And such would appear to 
have been the legislative construction of the Constitution." Richard 
Peters , Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in � Supreme Court of the 
United States : January Term, 1839 (Philadelphia,  1839) , 259 . The impli­
cation apparently was that Congress had the right to change the said 
construction at any time . 
13united States Constitution , Article II , Section 2 , Clause 2 . 
14 . Senate , The Constitution , 455 . 
15carl Russell Fish , The Civil Service and the Patronage (Cambridge , 
1904 ) ,  192 . Although he frequently pursued the first alternative as out­
lined , not even the hard-pressed Andrew Johnson was inclined to follow 
the latter course . The possibility , however , supplied excellent grist 
for alarmists 1 mills . 
The first six presidents of the United States tended to pursue 
patronage policies which were remarkably uniform. The aristocratic 
George Washington ( 1789-1797 ) and John Adams (1797-1801 ) believed that 
the government should be run by the affluent and that the best families 
should encourage their most capable sons to enter public service . 16 
Appointments to office were made on the basis of such considerations as 
personal integrity, community standing, and place of residence . 17 Few 
removals were made by the two and most of those made were for such 
6 
things as neglect of duty or mismanagement of public fUnds . Although as 
early as 1792 there was emphasis upon the importance of political con-
formity in the filling of vacancies, Washington apparently made no 
removals and Adams very few on the basis of political considerations . 18 
There was a sharp increase in removals from office during the 
early part of Thomas Jefferson 's  administration .  Inheriting a civil 
service completely dominated by Federalists, the Republican Jefferson 
felt it necessary to make changes in one-fourth of those offices where 
appointment by the president and confirmation by the Senate was required. 19 
16Fritz Morstein Marx (ed . ),  Elements of Public Administration 
(2nd ed . ; Englewood Cliffs, N .J . ,  1959), 18 .--
l7Leonard D. White, The Federalists : A Study in Administrative 
History, 1789-1801 (New York, 1948}, 257-68 .  The stress on place of 
residence meant an attempt at geographical apportionment for the more 
important national offices and local residence for lesser positions . 
18 Ibid. ,  271-78, 271-78, 284-85, 287 . 
l9o .  Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration ( 5th ed. ; New 
York, 1962 ), 30 .  
Following this transition period, Jefferson and his three immediate 
successors--James Madison (1809-1817 ), James Monroe ( 1817-1825 ), and 
John Quincy Adams ( 1825-1829 )--while confining their choices for office 
7 
to adherents of the Republican party , generally followed the practice of 
their Federalist predecessors . Being of much the same social class, 
they too apparently tended to confine their appointments to the better 
classes . Like them also, they emphasized integrity, respectability, and 
the importance of geographic apportionment and local residence in the 
filling of public offices . 20 
The elevation of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1829 wit-
nessed the introduction of a quite different patronage arrangement, a 
scheme which was to become known as the spoils system. Jackson himself 
set the theme during the course of his first annual address . Warning 
that continuation .in office tended to produce indifference to public 
interest, he noted, 
The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit 
of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence 
may readily qualify themselves for their performance ;  and I 
can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance 
of men in office than is generally to be gained by their 
experience . 21 
Jackson ' s  call for rotation in �ffice was not an entirely new 
idea . That theory had received strong impetus in 1820 with the passage 
20Leonard D .  White, The Jeffersonians : A Sgugy in Administrative 
History, 1801-1809 (New York,"""i951), 355-57, 360- 2, 368 . 
21James D .  Richardson (comp. ), A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols . ,  Washington, 1896-1899), 
II, 448=49- .  -
of the Four Years Law, a measure which provided for four-year terms for 
such federal officials as district attorneys, naval officers, army p�-
masters, collectors of customs, and others who were in charge of public 
funds . Although later modified, this act greatly aided the institution 
8 
of the spoils system by giving Jackson a legal basis for making desired 
removals, regardless of the competence of the officials being replaced. 22 
With the introduction of the equalitarian attitudes of Jacksonian 
democracy and the ascendancy of the common man, the spoils system became 
the w� of life in the administration of the federal government . General 
proscription was the expected result of any change in party control . 
Party affairs were lett largely to professional politicians who in return 
for their faithful labors expected reward in the form of office and/or 
patronage when their side gained control of the reins of government . 23 
The pre-Civil War attitude toward the spoils system was one of 
widespread acceptance . Such complaints as were made were usually those 
of the "outs" and these objections had a w� of disappearing once the 
"outs" became the "ins . "  Thus, the opponents of the system generally 
tended to be of Federalist-Whig-Republican origin, since they were more 
often out of office than in during the ante-bellum period . 24 
Whatever else Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) m� have been, he 
difinitely was not a civil service reformer . His elevation to the 
2�arx, Elements of Public Administration, 19. 
23stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 31-32. 
24Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils : A History of the Civil 
Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana, 1961) , 7 .  
- --
9 
presidency was followed by perhaps the most complete turnover of federal 
officeholders in the entire history of the spoils system. Only those 
whose efficiency made them virtually indispensable were spared. The 
number of removals during this transition from Democratic to Republican 
control of the federal government varied from department to department . 
Removals were relatively few in the State Department but were wholesale 
in the Treasury Department , which was headed by Simon Cameron , a hearty 
spoils system proponent . 25 
The patronage position of the president thus was theoretically 
awesome as of 1865 . The accepted interpretations of the pertinent con-
stitutional passages favored the chief executive . The spoils system had 
placed at least as much emphasis upon the removal power of the president 
as upon his appointive role . 26 James Madison ' s  11chain.of dependence" 
had become an actuality and almost daily became more lengthy . At the 
close of the Civil War , the seven administrative departments which ran 
the government employed approximately 53 ,000 persons who were collecting 
a total annual payroll of about $30 ,000 ,000 . Of first importance was 
the Post Office Department , with employees in almost every town and 
hamlet in the United States . Second in size was the Treasury Department , 
with a large number of positions in Washington to fill , as well as in 
custom houses and internal revenue agencies throughout the country . 
25Harry J .  Carman and Reinhard H.  Luthin , Lincoln and the Patron­
age (New York , 1943 ) ,  331-32 . 
26 Leonard D .  White , The Jacksonians : A Study in Administrative 
History , 1829-1861 (New Yor�l954) , 33-34 .  
10 
By virtue of its Land, Patent, Indian , and Pension Bureaus, the Interior 
Department was also worthy of considerable patronage attention .  Remain-
ing federal positions were divided among the War, Navy, State, and Justice 
Departments . 27 
The president chose the heads of the seven divisions and these in 
turn normally made the appointments to office in their respective depart-
ments . Important appointments, such as chief clerks and major field 
officers , customarily were cleared with the president and on some occa-
sions were dictated by him. Subordinate positions were left to the heads 
of the local offices, who made the formal appointments after clearance 
with the head of the department . 2
8 
Although the entire federal patronage system was thus theoretically 
in control of the president by 1865 ,  his power was limited by certain 
practical considerations . There were traditional sources of advice to 
be consulted on the subj ect of appointments and/or removals . Senators 
were to be consulted on all moves for and from their respective states . 
27Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 1-2 . If Hoogenboom' s  figures 
are accurate , the passing of the war apparently allowed the government to 
make considerable retrenchment . By 1868, there were 41 ,588 persons in 
federal positions drawing a total annual salary of $21,180,736 . 87 . 
United States Senate, Trial of Andrew Johnson ( 3 vols . ,  Washington, 1868 ) , 
I ,  736 . It should be noted that, of this large number , very few actually 
held presidential offices , i . e . ,  those filled by the joint action of the 
president and the Senate in the manner set forth by the Constitution . 
In 1859, this total stood at 1,520; in 1869, 2,669 . Carl R .  Fish, 
"Removal of Officers by the Presidents of the United States ," American 
Historical Association Annual Report (1899 ) ,  81 ,  83 .  The remainder were 
appointed in the way described in the body of the text . 
28White, The Jacksonians , 395-96 . 
11 
Local changes usually were made with the consent of the congressmen 
concerned . Also to be given careful attention were the recommendations 
of governors of important or pivotal states, heads of departments, and 
certain powerful political bosses, such as Thurlow Weed of New York . To 
deviate from the normal channels of patronage advice was to risk the 
anger of hundreds along the party line who were dependent upon the party 
and its successes for their place in the community . 29 
The political situation caused by the Civil War added its own 
peculiar limitation to executive patronage . Prior to the coming of the 
war, Americans had become accustomed to functioning with a two-party 
political system in which patronage was used to bolster the power of the 
group in office . During the course of that conflict, however, party 
affiliations became blurred. While the bulk of the Democratic party 
favored a negotiated settlement, many Democrats labored by the side of 
Republicans in the task of preserving the Union . This coalition was 
represented on a national ticket in 1864 which put forth a Republican 
for president and a Democrat for vice-president . The venture was rewarded 
with success, but within six months of the election, the former was dead 
and the latter, as the new chief executive, was in control of the immense 
�ederal patronage system. The question was, with a fitful peace restored 
to the country by mid-1865, for and against whom was it to be used and 
for what purpose? 
29Ibid . , 123-124 ;  Carman and Luthin, Lincoln and lli Patronage, 
333 ; W. R .  Brock, An American Crisis : Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-
1867 (Harper Torchbook edition ; New York, 1963) ,164. --
12 
In sum, the opinion of the president ·had never carried such 
weight in patronage matters as·it did in 1865 , but the risks of total 
political disaster for him were. also _great . Th�s·was the delicate . posi� 
tion into which a former Tennessee tailor was thrust by an-.assassin' s  
bullet in April of that fateful year. 
CHAPTER I 
PATRONAGE: THE PRE-PRESIDENTIAL VIEW 
Andrew Johnson was born in Raleigh , North Carolina, on December 
29 , 1808 . His father ,  a likable tavern porter , died when the lad was 
only three , and his mother , a laundress and seamstress ,  later apprenticed 
him to a local tailor . Some time af'terward , be ran away , leaving an 
angry employer who offered a reward for his return . He returned to 
Raleigh in: 1825 but shortly t bereaf'ter moved westward , settling finally 
at Greeneville , Tennessee . Here be married Eliza McCardle , the father-
less daughter of a shoemaker , started a family , and worked at his trade . 
By thrif't and hard labor , he gradually acquired some modest wealth and , 
according to some.accounts , with the help of his wife the basic elements 
of an edu�ation which largely had been denied him earlier in life . 1 
Deeply interested in politics , the young man advanced rapidly 
upon entering the political arena. In the short period from 1829 to 1841 ,  
be served successively as alderman and mayor of Greeneville , state repre­
sentative , and state senator . 2 His earliest political leanings were 
confused. 0 .  P .  Temple , an opponent of Johnson in a later congressional 
campaign , much later recollected that be was considered a Whig in 1835 
1This resume is based primarily upon the treatment of Johnson ' s  
life given by Robert W. Winston , Andrew Johnson , Plebeian and Patriot 
(New York , 1928 } , 3-25 passim, and the brief summary in the Biographical 
Directory of � American Congress , 1774-1961 (Washington , 1961 ) , 1122-23 . 
2Ibid. ; Winston , Andrew Johnson , 26-39 . 
13 
14 
and continued to be so considered by the Whigs until about 1839 . 3 Be 
that as it mey, his stint in the Tennessee Assembly apparently crystal-
lized his views, and he became a Democrat "of the Jackson kind, not a 
Democrat in the party sense but a universal Democrat, looking to demo­
cracy to cure all the evils of life . "4 
In 1842, Johnson moved to the national scene by securing election 
as a Democrat to the Twenty-eighth and the four successive Congresses 
(March 4, 1843-March 3, 1853) . 5 Shortly after his initial election, he 
made it amply clear that he endorsed rotation in office, the fundamental 
doctrine of the spoils system. In a letter published in the Jonesboro 
Whig in February, 1843, Johnson and some friends wrote to Aaron V .  Brown, 
a Middle Tennessee Democratic congressman (1839-1845) and future governor 
(1845-1847), urging that William Dickson, the long-time Greeneville post-
master, be replaced . As one of their arguments , they stated: "That the 
doctrine of rotation in office we believe to be correct and that it is a 
30liver P .  Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee from 1833 to 1875: 
Their Times and their Contemporaries-(New York, 191�367-68- . - The party 
situation in Tennessee in the mid-1830's was in a state of flux and 
Johnson for a time seemingly hesitated between the Whigs and the Demo­
crats . LeRoy P .  Graf and Ralph W .  Haskins (eds . ), The Papers of Andrew 
Johnson (1 vol. to date, Knoxville, 1967- ), I, xxiv-xxv . 
4 Winston, Andrew Johnson, 26 . Johnson was prone on occasion to 
declare this loyalty in soaring terms . Illustrative was a remark he 
buried in the middle of a lengthy address to the people of his congressional 
district in October, 1845: "A belief in the pure and unadulterated prin­
ciples of Democracy, is a belief in the religion of our Savior, as laid 
down while here upon earth himself--rewarding the virtuous and meritorious 
without any regard to station, to wealth, or distinction of birth." 
Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 240 . 
5Biosraphical Directory, 1123 . 
15 
violation of a fundamental principle of the Republican party to continue 
a man in office during his life • • • •  " Also cited as a major indictment 
was their belief "that the Post Office at this place will be used as an 
engine to promote the pretensions of persons to office who are opposed 
to the present Administration. 116 Such a practice constituted another 
cardinal violation of the spoils system . 
The Tennessee congressman did not hesitate to express his Jackson-
ian patronage attitudes in Washington . In a speech before the House on 
January 21, 1845, Johnson called for apportionment of federal offices . 
Noting that there were at least seven or eight hundred such positions in 
Washington and abroad, he declared that there was not one congressional 
district "but what can furnish its proportionable number of officers, as 
well qualified and equally as pure and incorruptible as those hangers-on 
about this city . "  After a person bad held an office for a time, there 
was no reason why be should not be removed and another allowed to benefit 
as be had.7 Approximately a year later, he presented to his colleagues 
seven resolutions which among other things affirmed as "one of the cardi-
nal tenets in a Republican form of Government" rotation in office, 
demanded terms of no more than eight years for all federal offices and 
their apportionment among the congressional districts, and called for 
due consideration of "farmers and mechanics" in filling governmental 
6 J obnson, M .  Lincoln, and others to Aaron V .  Brown, December 6, 
1842, Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 108 . 
7congressional Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess . ,  Appendix 220 . 
16 
•t• 8 pOSl. J.Ons . He offered almost verbatim the same resolutions to the 
Thirtieth and Thirty-second Congresses . 9 The Tennessean was unable to 
get his associates to adopt his version of the spoils system . 
Like any congressman, Johnson had a deep and abiding interest in 
obtaining and controlling federal patronage for his district and state, 
an interest which led him into conflict with President James K .  Polk . 
Both men were Tennesseans and Democrats, and Johnson at first tended to 
support him . In his speech to the House on January 21, 1845, Johnson 
vehemently denied that the South was promising support for Polk's poli-
cies in return for executive positions . It was "still a greater slander 
to say that James K .  Polk • • • was capable of using such unworthy means 
to obtain support for his administration . "10 
Representative Johnson soon discarded such a view of the new 
president as be found himself increasingly in disagreement over Polk's 
8Ibid . ,  29 Cong., 1 sess . ,  192-93 . As one student of nineteenth 
century Tennessee politics has noted, Johnson at times was accused of 
demagogism, but his continuing concern for the mechanic and farmer was 
great and sincere . Thomas P .  Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in 
Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, 1932), 312 . 
-
9 . Cong . Globe, 30 Cong . ,  1 seas . ,  457; 32 Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  1164 . 
Another example of Johnson's beliefs in apportionment and rotation in 
office came on May 31, 1848, when he unsuccessfully tried to amend a 
bill regulating clerical appointments in the executive departments by 
inserting two sections calling for apportionment of offices among con­
gressional districts and eight-year terms for the officers appointed . 
Ibid . ,  30 Cong . ,  1 seas . ,  800-02 . 
10 Ibid . ,  28 Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  App . 220 . In making this statement, 
Johnson apparently was choosing to. gloss over the fact that patronage was 
used as a means of party rewards while making a heated defense of southern 
integrity . Another representative earlier had indicated his conviction 
that a few well distributed offices would make the tariff more acceptable 
to the South . The Tennessean replied to this notion by declaring that 
patronage policies . In a diary entry dated July.21, 1846, Polk traced 
17 
Johnson's opposition to him to some appointments made in East Tennessee 
with which the congressman was "dissatisfied . "11 Whatever the cause, 
Johnson bad been quick to press his attack on the chief executive . On 
March 9 be bad declared in reply to a question concerning Tennessee's 
share of executive appointments that Pennsylvania "had more of those 
12 appointments in one county than the whole state of Tennessee put together. "  
On June 10, 1846, his reply to a remark by Stephen A .  Douglas of Illinois 
to the effect that the president had more important things to do than 
"the pitiful business of scattering spoils among minor officers" bad been 
a sarcastic "Is he not now?"13 The dSir after Polk had confided his 
opinion to his diary, Johnson wrote to his friend Blackston McDannel, a 
Greeneville Democrat, concerning Polk's appointments: 
Take [them] all and all and they are the most damnable 
set that were ever made by any president since the government 
was organized, out of Tennessee as well as in it-- . • • There 
is one thing I will say, that is, I never betrayed a friend 
.2!:. [�] guilty of the black sin of ingratitude--I fear Mr. 
Polk cannot say as much-- 14 
In a practical sense, Johnson was the loser in this running argu-
ment because Polk made careful note of Johnson's opposition to him and 
it was "a slander on southern reputation to se:y that she can be bought 
by any office in the gift of the executive . "  Ibid . 
1�io M .  Quaife (ed . ), The Diary of James K .  Polk during his 
Presidency, 1845 to 1849 (4 vols . ,  Chicago, 1910), II, 37 . 
12 13 Cong . Globe, 29 Cong . , 1 sess . , 472 . Ibid . , 954 .  
14Johnson to McDannel, July 22, 1846, Graf and Haskins, Johnson 
Papers, I, 332 . 
18 
simply ignored him in making appointments in Tennessee . 15 Although the 
representative ceased his attacks upon the president after realizing 
that his attitude almost led to his defeat in the congressional campaign 
of 1846, Polk could not forgive his fellow Tennessean . On January 1, 
1849, the chief magistrate bitterly confided to his diary, 
Professing to be a Democrat, he [Johnson] has been politi­
cally if not personally hostile to me during my whole time . 
He is very vindictive and perverse in his temper and conduct . 
If he had the manliness or independence to manifest his opposi­
tion openly, he knows he could not be again elected by his 
constituents . l6 
A Tennessee legislature dominated by Whigs "gerrymandered" Johnson 
out of Congress in 1851 by passing a bill adding Johnson's home county of 
Greene to a solidly Whig district . 17 He therefore did not stand for 
re-election in 1852, but he still retained a vital interest in federal 
patronage . Writing to anAbingdon, Virginia, Democratic newspaper editor, 
he noted concerning the incoming Pierce administration that what was 
needed to correct the abuses and corruptions prevalent throughout the 
various departments of the government was an ample and skillful use of 
the "pruning knife . "  With typical Jacksonian logic, he noted that the 
Whigs should expect removal with the Democrats returning to power, but 
that those pseudo-Democrats who had managed thus far to retain office 
205 . 
15charles A .  McCoy, Polk and� Presidency (Austin, 1960), 180, 
16Quaife, Diary, IV, 265 . George Fort Milton, The Age of Hate: 
Andrew Johnson and� Radicals (New York, 1930), 83 . Polk was not 
entirely correct in these remarks, since Johnson after their rift over 
patronage gave particularly strong support to Polk's Mexican war policy. 
Cong. Globe, 29 Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  39-40 . 
l7Winston, Andrew Johnson, 42, 68-69 . 
should be removed among the first, since they tended to "change their 
political complexion with as much ease as the camelion [sic] changes 
the hues of its skin. "18 
19 
While thus expecting, the Pierce administration to make the usual 
sweep of offices which occurred with every change of party control, 
Johnson saw little hope for his home state to receive its share of 
offices "on account of behaving so badly in-the late election . "19 
Tennessee's failure to support the Democratic ticket had to be punished 
because loyalty to party was one of the prime requisites of the spoils 
system. Johnson's attempts to secure offices from Pierce for some 
fellow Tennesseans seemingly reflected his belief that such loyalty was 
necessary in order to obtain office . In recommending one S. C .  Pavatt 
for a charg� d'affaires position, his letter stated, "His long devotion 
to democratic principles, and his willing sacrifice of time and means 
18Johnson to Leonidas Baugh, December 1, 1852, Leonidas Baugh 
Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina ), 
copy in Johnson Papers . Johnson's acceptance of the spoils system axiom 
that some changes must occur even merely with a change from one chief 
executive to another of the same party can be seen in a letter written 
in 1850 to the Greeneville postmaster, William Lowry . Millard Fillmore, 
a Whig, had recently succeeded Zachary Taylor, another Whig, as presi­
dent and, in his note to Lowry, Johnson warned that offices in Tennessee 
probably would be swept clean as the new postmaster-general intended "to 
do the work thorough. " Johnson to Lowry, August 12, 1850, Graf and 
Haskins, Johnson Papers, I, 584. 
19Johnson to David T. Patterson, December 3 ,  1852, Andrew Johnson 
Papers (Andrew Johnson Project, University of Tennessee ) .  Unless other­
wise noted, the originals of the papers in the project's Johnson collec­
tion are in the Library of Congress . Tennessee was one of only four 
states to cast its electoral vote for the Whig ticket of Winfield Scott 
and William A .  Graham . The Tennessee vote was 58,898 to 57,018 . Edward 
Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 (New York, 1898 ), 
257. 
20 
for the cause & success of his party induce us to solicit for him one of 
the positions he desires • • • •  "20 The one outstanding qualification 
of Colonel D .  H .  Cummings of Knoxville which recommended him to be gover-
nor of Washington Territory was the fact that he was "a sterling 
Democrat . "21 
First elected in 1853, Andrew Johnson served two terms as governor 
of Tennessee . The bitter gubernatorial campaign of 1855 produced the 
one major instance in which he had serious difficulty with patronage . 
His opponent was Meredith P .  Gentry, an old-line Whig and the endorsed 
candidate of the American, or Know-Nothing, party . Although the governor 
was successful in his re-election bid, the Know-Nothings, with the help 
of the Whigs, initially were able to control both houses of the General 
Assembly by a narrow margin . 22 The State Senate subsequently refused 
to confirm Johnson's nominations for various state boards and the peni-
tentiary inspectors . In addition, bills were introduced into the Assembly 
designed to remove many of the governor's appointive powers and to place 
in the hands of the legislature the appointment of the board of directors 
of the Bank of Tennessee, the keeper of the penitentiary, and the 
20 Johnson and others to Franklin Pierce, March 1, 1853, Johnson 
Papers (original in National Archives} . 
21Johnson and others to Pierce, February 17, 1853, ibid . (original 
in National Archives} . 
22stanley J .  Folmsbee, Robert E .  Corlew, and Enoch L .  Mitchell, 
History of Tennessee (4 vols . ,  New York, 1960), II, 10-12 . The party 
division in the Assembly stood: Senate: 12 Democrats, 12 Know-Nothings, 
2 Whigs; House: 36 Democrats, 36 Know-Nothings, 1 Whig . Philip M .  Hamer 
(ed . }, Tennessee: A History, 1673-1932 (2 vols . ,  New York, 1933}, I, 
503 . 
commissioner of roads . These changes apparently were being sought in 
21 
order to fUlfill previous promises made to certain individuals regarding 
these positions . Whatever the reason for the attempts, they failed 
because of an anti-Know-Nothing majority which developed in the House. 23 
Johnson had survived the test and continued to make his appointments with 
an objective which he seems always to have had, the furthering of his 
own political ends . 24 His ambitions were rewarded with his election to 
the United States Senate upon expiration of his second gubernatorial 
term in 1857 . 25 
The ex-governor could not have been returning to the national 
scene at a more critical time . The 1850's had witnessed an increasing 
rift between the North and South, one which came to a climax in 1860 . 
The presidential campaign of that year, one of the most dramatic in 
American history, witnessed the division of the Democratic party, a 
23w . M .  Caskey, "The Second Administration of Governor Andrew 
Johnson, " East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, II (1930), 
45 . 24 This interpretation of Johnson as pre-eminently politically 
inspired was suggested in the Washington National Republican by an anony­
mous contemporary writer . 1865 scrapbook, Johnson Papers . 
25Robert G .  Russell, "Prelude to the Presidency: Election of 
Andrew Johnson to the Senate, " Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XXVI 
(Summer, 1967), 148-76 . According to this source, Johnson's success in 
gaining the Senate seat was part of his grand design in a move toward 
the presidency . In order to make this step, he actively and successfully 
campaigned for a friendly legislature in the 1857 elections . This effort, 
coupled with the rising star of the Democracy in Tennessee and the fading 
of the combined Whig-Know-Nothing forces, gave him the seat . Neither 
Russell nor any other source consulted ventured so far as to conjecture 
that Johnson's patronage had anything to do with his 1857 success, but 
things being what they were in the mid-nineteenth century, it probably 
would be safe to assume that patronage did play some role, however minor, 
in this victory . 
22 
four-man race, and the emergence of a pluraJ.i ty president, Abraham 
Lincoln. B,y the time of his inauguration, the Union had been diminished 
by the seven states which comprised the Lower South . 26 
Treading a moderate path, Tennessee in the 1860 presidential 
canvass had voted for John Bell, a long-time Tennessee Whig leader .  The 
state had no Republican party organization, but Bell's conservative Con-
stitutional Unionist faction seemed to occupy a position close to that 
of the Republicans . Many Tennessee Unionists in early 1861 therefore 
assumed that the channel of federal patronage would be through that group . 
This assumption began to wilt, however, when Lincoln selected Montgomery 
Blair, a former Jacksonian Democrat, over Henry Winter Davis, an old-line 
Whig, for postmaster-general . Since the latter part of Bell's political 
career had been distinguished by anti-Jacksonianism and the Post Office 
Department was the single largest source of federal positions, the Con-
stitutional Union forces thus were eliminated from serious patronage 
consideration . 27 
As Bell's chances of becoming Lincoln's chief patronage dispenser 
for Tennessee faded, the suspicion grew among conservatives there that 
the new president was referring inquiries for federal positions in 
Tennessee to that state's strong-willed, pro-Unionist senator, Andrew 
26south Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas . 
27 J .  Milton Henry, "The Revolution in Tennessee, February, 1861 
to June, 1861," Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XVIII (June, 1959}, 105-
06, 108 . 
23 
28 Johnson . This man, who equated secession with treason, was a natural 
choice for such a role, and what little doubt Tennessee Unionists may 
have held about his selection undoubtedly was shattered when one of John 
Bell's recommendations was sent to Johnson for his approval . 29 The Bell 
adherents had defeated Breckinridge in 1860, but they now had to turn to 
. . 
30 a Breckinridge Democrat for Federal positions . This realization so 
disheartened them that they abandoned their struggle to save Tennessee 
for the Union, leaving that task to Johnson and his friends . 31 
28Ibid . ,  107 . Johnson's erstwhile opponent 0 .  P .  Temple later 
suggested that the reason Johnson was so strongly pro-Union was that he 
at first believed that Tennessee would remain loyal, but that even if 
the state did leave the Union, his political chances would be brighter 
in the North . His declaration of loyalty to the Union while other 
southern senators were moving away would elevate him to prominence and 
possibly to the presidency . Temple, Notable Men, 394-96 . If Russell is 
correct in his thes� (see above, n .  25), such reasoning as Temple here 
suggests would appear feasible . It is difficult to believe, however, 
that Johnson was so completely politically motivated . Is·it not possible 
that he sincerely believed in the Union cause and was willing to take a 
stand on this conViction alone? 
29on March 11, the first assistant postmaster-general forwarded 
to Johnson a recommendation by John Bell that James Turk be made mail 
agent from Chattanooga to Knoxville . The notation read, "I am instructed 
to inquire whether the enclosed suggestion meets your approval . "  John A .  
Kasson to Johnson, March 11, 1861, Johnson Papers . For other indications 
of Johnson's influence, see the following letters to him in the Johnson 
Papers: S .  P .  Chase, March 13, 1861; J .  L .  Williams, March 20, 1861; 
George Harrington, March 26, 1861; George C .  Whiting, March 16, 1861 . 
30Johnson made no apologies for having voted for Breckinridge in 
1860 . As he put it in a speech in Cincinnati on June 19, 1861, he be­
lieved there had been "no disagreement between Republicans, Bell men, 
Douglas men, and Breckinridge men, as regards the preservation of the 
Union of States . " Frank Moore ( ed . ) , The Rebellion Record: A Diary of 
American Events (11 vols . ,  New York, 1861-1868), II, 148-51 . -
--
.... 
31Henry, "Revolution in Tennessee," 113-14 . 
24 
Saving Tennessee for the Union and the incoming Lincoln adminis-
tration was not an easy assignment. Johnson had been deluged with let-
ters inquiring about federal positions since early 1861, and not all of 
them had been encouraging. A letter from West Tennessee informed him 
... 
that M. C. Galloway, the Memphis postmaster, was resigning effective 
March 5 in order to "throw upon the postmaster appointed the odium or 
prejudice of accepting office under Lincoln."32 The Nashville postmaster 
wrote on February 22 to inform Johnson of his decision to retire because 
he did not want to hold office under the new president.33 The United 
States marshal for Middle Tennessee frankly expressed to Johnson his 
sentiments: "I am a Southern man in my feelings, and if a separation 
does take place, I want Tennessee to go with the South."34 An applicant 
for that position declared his qualification to be the fact that he was 
"probably the only man in Middle Tennessee that voted for him [Lincoln]."35 
Despite the manifestations of hostility toward Lincoln and 
expressions of the desire to see Tennessee leave the Union, there were 
many opportunists who were eager to obtain federal positions from the 
hated Black Republican, Abraham Lincoln. Andrew Johnson's mail was filled 
with pleas that he intercede with the incoming chief executive for 
32 E. W. M. King, William Brown, and J. Knox Walker to Johnson, 
February 18, 1861, Johnson Papers. 
33s. R. Anderson to Johnson, February 22, 1861, ibid. 
34J. B. Clements to Johnson, March 1, 1861, ibid. 
35John Newman to Johnson, March 5, 1861, ibid. 
situations ranging from Judge to postmaster to mail agent . One of the 
25 
many seeking to be appointed marshal for Middle Tennessee assured John-
son that any influence he exerted on his behalf with the Lincoln admin­
istration would be "duly appreciated."36 The incumbent postmaster at 
Athens requested the senator to "intercede in my behalf with the incoming 
administration . "37 Another writer, recommending a friend for a route 
agent's position, noted that he himself did not know Johnson personally 
but was aware that he had more sway with the new administ�ation "than 
any man in the state . "38 
Some of those actively seeking office from a Republican president 
were, like Johnson himself, Democrats . Under ordinary circumstances, 
this could not have been expected, but these were not normal times . As 
one Democratic incumbent who was seeking to retain his post reasoned, 
"I take it for granted that Mr . Lincoln is under no particular obligation 
to either of the political parties in Tennessee--as he received no direct 
support from Tennessee. tt39 Others, while declaring their past 
Democratic convictions, also avowed their loyalty to the federal govern-
ment . One Johnson correspondent stated that he had bee.n a Democrat since 
36T .  C .  Ramsey to Johnson, February 21, 1861, ibid . 
37w .  G .  Horton to Johnson, February 23, 1861, ibid . 
38E .  H .  Dunn to Johnson, March 2, 1861, ibid . Any perusal of the 
Johnson Papers for February and.March of 1861 will reveal that a large 
portion of Johnson's correspondence in these months concerned patronage . 
Those cited are intended to be merely illustrative of such petitions . 
39J. B.  Clements to Johnson, February 18, 1861, ibid . 
26 
the time of Jackson but added that he was "now a Union man .  "40 
As was to be expected, Johnson's work was complicated by the fact 
that there were several much coveted places . The federal marshalships 
for the eastern and middle divisions of the state were in this category, 
with each being sought by at least nine aspirants. The postmasterships 
of Memp;his, Nashville, and Knoxville also had wide appeal, particularly 
41 the one in Nashville which had a minimum of eight seekers . 
An astute politician, Johnson was not slow in making use of his 
advantageous situation. As friend and former foe alike sought placement 
through him and as he passed judgment upon their applications, he appar-
ently allowed party considerations and personal attitudes to sway him. 
He seemingly believed that the one sure way to insure Unionism in 
Tennessee was to build a party around himself.42 At least some individ-
uals realized that this was what the senator was attempting to do. 
Recommending Lewis Tillman for the middle Tennessee marshalship, one 
40william Smith to Johnson, February 18, 1861, ibid. 
41-'-�e eastern post ultimately went to Blackston McDannel, a long-
time Johnson friend, while E .  R. Glascock received the middle one. The 
Knoxville postmastership was retained by the incumbent, C. W. Charlton, 
and Nashville went to W. D. McNish, who had been recommended by the out­
going postmaster. These appointments are to be found in the Secretary 
of the Interior, Register of Officers and Agents, Civil, Military, and 
Naval, in the Services of the United States on the Thirtieth September 
1861 (Washington, 1862 )-.- Apparently because of widespread southern sym­
pathy in West Tennessee, situations there generally were not filled. 
With Tennessee's withdrawal from the Union in mid-1861, those appoint­
ments already made in the eastern and middle divisions in effect were 
negated . 
42Henry, "Revolution in Tennessee, " 110; LeRoy P .  Graf, "Andrew 
Johnson and the Coming of the War, " Tennessee Historical Quarter1y, XIX 
(September, 1960), 220 . 
27 
correspondent noted that his candidate was a "Johnson man on principle" 
and added that the securing of this post for him would be "the best thing 
you can do towards Johnsonizing Midale Tennessee."43 Regardless of his · 
personal political ambitions at this point, Johnson failed to achieve 
his main purpose. Tennessee withdrew from the Union in mid-1861.44 
Tennessee's desertion from the ranks of the Union left Andrew 
Johnson for all practical purposes a senator without a state to repre­
sent.45 His continued loyalty to the Union cause, however, undoubtedly 
inspired Lincoln to call upon him to go to Nashville as military governor 
after Union forces had liberated portions of the state with victories at 
46 Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February of 1862. His assignment was 
to construct a loyal civil government in Tennessee and to restore that 
state as rapidly as possible to its proper relations with the Union.47 
As his chief aides, he selected Edward H. East (secretary of state), 
Joseph S. Fowler {comptroller), Horace Maynard (attorney-general), and 
43william S. Speer to Johnson, March 12, 1861, Johnson Papers. 
44For particulars, see J. G.  Randall and David Donald, The Divided 
Union (Boston, 1961), 184-86. 
45Tennessee's other senator, A. 0. P. Nicholson, withdrew from 
the Senate at the conclusion of the Thirty-sixth Congress. Biographical 
Directory, 172. Of the state's ten-man congressional delegation, only 
three served in the Thirty-seventh Congress (March 4, 1861-March 3, 1863), 
while all its seats in both the Senate and House were vacant for the 
duration of the Thirty-eighth Congress (March 4, 1863-March 3, 1865). 
Ibid. , 175, 181. 
46Randall and Donald, The Divided Union, 186, 202-4. 
47Milton, Age of Hate, 108; Winston, Andrew Johnson, 222-23. 
48 Edmund Cooper (private secretary and confidential agent.) 
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The announcement of Johnson's appointment was followed immediately 
by correspondence requesting positions under his military governorship. 
While a few petitioners desired posts of considerable importance, others 
were much more humble in their requests. A former resident of the Nash-
ville vicinity who had been driven from his farm asked for a clerkship 
in the Nashville post office "so that I can earn a living until I can 
fall back on my trade again."49 Another wanted "some position in the 
gift of the government sufficiently remune:rative to support a family."50 
A few coveted placement simply because of the adventure which they appar-
ently felt would be involved. In that vein was a letter from a twenty-
eight year-old clerk in the Capitol Bakery who wrote, "I want to go to 
Tennessee with you, I do not care in what capacity, so that I .£!!!. � 
!2_."51 A former resident informed the new governor that he had "a desire 
48clifton R. Hall, Andrew Johnson, MilitG Governor of Tennessee (Princeton, N. J., 1916), 42. East later (1892 �an for governor of 
Tennessee as the Prohibition candidate and polled about 500 votes. 
Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, History of Tennessee, II, 161, 162n. 
Cooper, a former state representative and presidential elector, later 
served in the Thirty-ninth Congress and then as Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury during the Johnson administration. Biographical Directory, 
735. Fowler, a lawyer and teacher, played an especially active role in 
the reconstruction of the state government and then served in the United 
States Senate (1866-1871). Ibid., 910. Maynard, likewise a teacher and 
lawyer, served in the Thirty-fifth, Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh 
Congresses (March 4, 1857-March 3, 1863) and later in the Thirty-Ninth 
and four succeeding Congresses. He was also postmaster-general during 
the last year of the Hayes administration. Ibid. ,  1280. 
49George Gould to Johnson, March 3, 1862, Johnson Papers. 
50w. P. Jones to Johnson, March 5, 1862, ibid. 
5�illiam H. Mitchell to Johnson, March 7 ,  1862, ibid. 
to revisit my native Tennessee . I have considerable acquaintan[ c]es 
with men and things in Middle Tennessee and could probably make myself 
useful . "52 
Upon assuming his duties, Johnson was advised by a prominent 
Tennessee lawyer and jurist, who like many other Unionists had been 
29 
forced from the state, that a central element of his program must be to 
"place a Union man in every official position in the state, from the low­
est to the highest . "53 In a proclamation addressed to the people of 
Tennessee on March 18, 1862, the governor made it amply clear that this 
was exactly what he intended to do . Positions in the state and county 
governments, he declared, would be filled by "persons of probity and 
intelligence, and bearing true allegiance to the Constitution and Govern-
ment of the United States . "  Once these people had been appointed, their 
authority was to be "accordingly respected and observed . "54 
The state's new chief executive was not long in taking action . 
On March 25, 1862, he demanded that the Nashville m�or, Richard B.  
Cheatham, and the city council members take the oath of allegiance to the 
Union. When they refused to do so on the grounds that such an act was 
not required of corporation officials, Johnson removed them from office 
and replaced them with men loyal to the Union. 55 
5� . S. Northcott to Johnson ., March 8, 1862, ibid . 
53R .  J .  Meigs to Johnson, March 15, 1862, ibid . 
54Andrew Johnson, "Appeal to the People," Records, Office of 
Secretary of War, copy in ibid . 
55winston, Andrew Johnson, 225; Hall, Johnson, Military Governor, 
42-43 . 
30 
As the Nashville incident indicated, stauch and unswerving loyalty 
to the Union became the major prerequisite for holding office in Tennessee 
under Andrew Johnson . All offices were filled with such men . 56 When 
Johnson at last felt in March, 1864, that some local elections could be 
held he demanded that those voting take an extremely rigid oath in which 
they swore to uphold and defend the Constitution and promised to seek 
and work for the success of Union arms . 57 It has been charged that by 
making the oath so rigid Johnson deprived himself of the aid, advice, and 
influence of many undoubtedly loyal individuals . Johnson, however, hav-
ing expeienced months of frustration and lack of co-operation, apparently 
was content to finish his work with the help of the few very dedicated 
people who had chosen to stand with him . 58 
Lincoln's military governor was determined to be the real authority 
in Tennessee and in this he had the full support of his superiors in 
Washington.59 He was given virtually a free hand in Tennessee matters . 
One writer who had petitioned the War Department for an officer's commis-
sion in a proposed East Tennessee regiment told Johnson that he had been 
informed by his own father, who was in Washington at the time, that 
"every thing connected with such appointments, for Tennessee, had been 
56winston, Andrew Johnson, 225. 
57Jonathan T .  Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson: 
Restoration of the Confederates to their Rights and Privileges, 1861-1868 
(Chapel Hill, 1953 ), 51. 
58Hall, Johnson, Military Governor, 216-17 . The process of 
restoration of civil government to Tennessee was not completed in fact 
until very shortly before Johnson took the oath as vice-president in 1865 . 
Winston, Andrew Johnson, 241-42 . 
59Ibid. ,  238-39 . 
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referred to you and that your recommendation would be necessary to 
obtain a commission . n60 A petition signed by several officers in Tennes-
see military units requesting the promotion of a fellow officer to the 
rank of brigidier general stated that the signees were asking Johnson to 
present the man's case to Washington "knowing as we do that the War 
Department looks to your recommendation alone for the promotion and 
advancement of Tennessee officers . "61 Another man wrote that he had 
called upon the president that day and "on your letter he gave me an 
order for an appointment . "62 According to one of Johnson's biographers � 
those who dared to oppose him were removed from the scene � including 
Generals Buell and Rosecrans . 63 
Although in a powerful position � Johnson apparently had no qualms 
about advising against the appointment of even a friend, if he felt that 
he was not qualified . Learning that John B .  Rodgers wanted to become a .  
federal judge for Tennessee, the governor wrote Maynard in Washington, 
"You know that my personal feelings toward him are kind, but am compelled 
to say that he has not the first qualification for the appointment and 
especially so at this time . "  To Lincoln himself, he declared, "Rodgers 
60E .  C .  Trigg to Johnson, April 28, 1862, Johnson Papers . 
61w .  C .  Pickens and others to Johnson, January 30, 1864, ibid . 
62James H .  Woodard to Johnson, November 23, 1864, ibid . 
63winston, Andrew Johnson, 239 . Winston probably was overstating 
the case because the major reason for the removal of the generals was 
apparently their inactivity as military commanders rather than clashes 
with Johnson . 
is my personal friend, but he will not do for Judge at this time . I 
64 hope he will not be put upon us ." 
32 
As Johnson continued his efforts to restore Unionism in Tennessee, 
the 1864 presidential campaign began to occupy the North's attention . 
What appeared to many as a stalemated war had placed Lincoln's re-election 
in doubt . In an effort to add wider appeal to the Republican ticket, the 
party name was dropped in favor of the title National Union, and Lincoln 
began to search for a vice-presidential candidate who would be politically 
more appealing than Hannibal Hamlin. Having a well established Democrat 
from a border state would give the ticket more than a sectional appeal . 
Joseph Holt of Kentucky was being considered, but Andrew Johnson was also 
a prime possibility . A loyal Unionist who had fought secession in his 
own state, the latter always had been a friend of labor and possessed 
an admirable record as military governor . These considerations finally 
led Lincoln to select the Tennessean as his running mate . 65 
In accepting the 1864 vice-presidential nomination, Johnson made 
no secret of his Democratic convictions . After stating his firm Unionist 
sentiments, Johnson, in his concluding remarks, made an open appeal to 
64 Johnson to Maynard, July 6, 1862; Johnson to Lincoln, July 6, 
1862, Johnson Papers . 
65winston, Andrew Johnson, 254; Robert H .  White, Messages of the 
Governors of Tennessee (7 vola . to date, Nashville, 1952- ), IV ,  507 . 
Holt (1807-1894), a Kentucky jurist, had served successively under the 
Buchanan administration as commissioner of patents, postmaster-general, 
and secretary of war . An avowed War Democrat, he was made judge-advocate 
general by Lincoln in 1862 . He later prosecuted the accused assassins 
of Lincoln . Mary B .  Allen, "Joseph Holt," Dictionary of American Bio-
graphy (22 vols . ,  New York, 1928-1958), IX, 181-83 . 
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his old party to stand fast to the task of preserving the Union . He 
declared: 
In accepting the nomination, I might here close, but I 
cannot forego the opportunity of .. seying to my old friends of 
the democratic party proper, with whom I have so long and 
pleasantly been associated, that the hour has now come when 
that great party can justly vindicate its devg�ion to true 
democratic policy and measures of expediency . 
With no deceptions as to his political stance, Andrew Johnson 
occupied the vice-president's position on the ultimately successful 
National Union ticket and then succeeded to the presidency following 
Lincoln's assassination, April, 1865 . As his political career to that 
point testified, he was a Democrat of the Jacksonian stripe . In the 
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realm of patronage, being of that persuasion meant a firm belief in the 
spoils system with its insistence upon such things as rotation in office, 
equal consideration of all men, and loyalty to party as an important 
qualification for office. As he assumed the duties of his . new office 
there was nothing to indicate that Johnson believed otherwise . 
At the same time, Johnson was also a decided individualist and 
tended at times to be inconsistent . Although he had followed the Demo-
cratic lead on major issues in the pre-war period, he had not alweys 
been a party man and had often found himself in opposition to the party 
leaders . 67 One of his antagonists later observed that party was 
66John Savage, The Life and Public Services of Andrew Johnson, 
Seventeenth President of the United States (New Yor� 1866), 300 . 
67winston, Andrew Johnson, 26 ; Graf and Haskins, Johnson Papers, 
I, xxviii-xxix . 
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important to Johnson only in that it allowed him "to mount upon the 
shoulders of his followers and thus rise to power . "68 A more sympathetic 
observer has maintained that Johnson was a decided follower of Andrew 
Jackson and a dedicated Democrat, and that he never fundamentally changed 
his stance, although, like any astute politician, he did know how to 
modify details "to fit circumstances . rr69 
Be that as it may, it was true that, despite an apparent adherence 
to the idea of party loyalty, he had labored as hard at times in the past 
to build a following loyal to himself as he had to further the Democratic 
cause . This may have been because, as in 1853 when he ran for governor 
against the wishes of the party leadership, he felt himself to be repre­
sentative of the true Democracy, the party of · the masses . 70 · It may have 
been because, as in 1861 when he had served as Lincoln's chief patronage 
dispenser for Tennessee, he equated himself with something more important 
than party . 
Whether or not one or both of the above was the case or his incon-
sistency was primarily because he merely desired to advance his own 
political fortunes by whatever means available remains very much open to 
68Temple, Notable Men, 380 . One disappointed 1861 Tennessee 
office-seeker presented a similar view to Secretary of State William H .  
Seward . See Felix A .  Reeve to Seward, April 16, 1861, Johnson Papers 
(original in National Archives) . 
69Abernethy, Frontier to Plantation, 310 . 
70In 1853, the Democratic leadership, largely drawn from the upper 
classes, had not favored Johnson ' s  candidacy for the governorship . B,y 
way of mass meetings held in many counties, Johnson had illustrated his 
support among the common people and ultimately secured the party nomina­
tion. His subsequent victory at the polls in turn gave him control of 
the Democratic party in Tennessee . Ibid . ,  314-15 ; 317 . 
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questio� . Jacksonian Democrat , ambitiO\lS individualist, or an enigmatic 
combination of both, Johnson . now was faced with the complex problems of 
reconstructio� . Not the . leas� of these . problems arose from the enormous 
federal patro�age .. suddenly at · his disposal, an inheritance which could 
prove to be either a great blessing or a ter.rible curse to his political 
future . 
CHAPTER II 
A TIME OF CONSENSUS 
The initial reaction in the North to the sudden elevation of 
Andrew Johnson to the presidency was mixed . The mourning of northerners 
for their fallen leader was not to be alleviated by the gradual realiza-
tion that, in the hour of triumph, a southerner had been thrust into the 
captain's position . The prevailing mood was thus one of sorrow mixed 
with apprehension, suspicion, and distrust . 1 
This atmosphere did not last long . Because he at first appeared 
as all things to all men, Johnson initially was able to command the sup-
port of factions which were essentially hostile to one another . To 
southern Unionists, he was one of their own. Northern Conservatives 
hoped he would soften his hard wartime stand and follow the lenient re-
construction policy which Lincoln had appeared to be following at the 
time of his death . Radicals expected him to lead their cause . Only 
former Confederates were fearful of what was to come . 2 
Among the first to rush to the support and aid of the new chief 
executive were the Radicals . Johnson's continued insistence that 
1Winston, Andrew Johnson, 299; Rembert W .  Patrick, The Reconstruc­
tion of the Nation (New York, 1967), 26 . 
�ilton, Age of Hate, 181-82. The Radicals were so sure that 
Johnson was their kind of man that the attitude of at least some of them 
toward Lincoln's death was virtually one of rejoicing . Kenneth M .  
Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-!§ll. (New York, 1965), 50-51 . 
36 
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secession was treason and that treason must be made odious was sweet 
music to Radical ears . In a letter endorsing Johnson's stance, Lincoln's 
first vice-president, although not of the Radical persuasion himself, 
sent to his successor some thoughts which reflected that attitude : 
We have no true men with us who are not delighted with your 
course . Adhere to your course • • •  and you will be sure to 
make your Administration cherished and respected by all good 
men; and you will thus give it a place in history second to 
none other . 3 
Johnson's first oral pronouncements served both to reinforce 
Radical expectations and to offer a raf of hope to those who favored a 
more lenient policy . As the days passed, it became increasingly clear 
that the president had drawn a line between the secession leaders and 
those who had merely followed their lead . While continuing to insist 
that those in high authority had to be punished, he promised to the 
masses of southerners, who he believed had been deceived and misled, 
mercy, conciliation, and amnesty . 4 
As long as Johnson was able to refrain from any decisive policy 
moves, all went well, but such a situation could not continue indefinitely . 
On May 29, 1865, he issued two proclamations . One of them dealt with 
amnesty and, as the preamble stated, was a continuation of Lincoln's 
amnesty proclamations of December 8, 1863, and March 26, 1864 . The 
stated purpose of the Johnson proclamation was "that the authority of 
the Government of the United States maf be restored and that peace, 
3Hanni bal Hamlin to Andrew Johnson, Maf 3, 1865, Johnson Papers • 
4Milton, � of Hate, 182-83 . 
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order, and freedom mS¥ be established . 11 Amnesty and pardon were granted 
to all vho had 11directly or indirectly participated in the existing 
rebellion" and vho nov would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the 
Constitution and the Union . There were fourteen specific classes exempted 
from this generous grant, including civil and diplomatic and high ranking 
military officers of the Confederacy, Confederate governors, and those 
rebels with taxable property with an estimated value of more than $20,000 . 
Those affected by these exemptions could receive pardon by special 
application to the president . 5 
The second proclamation of MS¥ 29 vas issued in order "to organize 
a State government whereby justice mS¥ be established, domestic tran-
quillity insured, and loyal citizens protected in all their rights of 
life, liberty, and property . 11 The state in question vas North Carolina, 
and William W .  Holden vas appointed provisional governor . His duty vas, 
• •
• at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such 
rules and regulations as mS¥ be necessary and proper for convening 
a convention composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion 
of the people of said state vho are loyal to the United States, 
and no others, for the purpose of altering or amending the con­
stitution thereof . 
Holden vas given authority "to exercise within the limits of said State 
all the power necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the 
State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional rela-
tions to the Federal government . 11 The proclamation also provided for 
the restoration of federal laws and courts, the re-opening of treasury 
5Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 310-12 . For the Lincoln 
proclamations, see ibid . ,  213-15, 218 . 
and post offices throughout the state, and the appointment of men to 
fill these positions . 6 
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William Woods Holden ( 1818-1892 ), the new provisional governor of 
North Carolina, had at one time been a Whig, but he became a Democrat 
after assuming editorship of the North Carolina Standard in the mid-1840's . 
Making that paper a Democratic journal of powerful influence throughout 
the state, he favored in the 1850's the doctrine of secession . In the 
late years of that decade he was defeated first for the governorship and 
then for the United States Senate . After supporting Breckinridge for 
the presidency in 1860, he served as a member of the state secession 
convention and voted in favor of such a move . Rapidly cooling toward 
the southern cause, he made an unsuccessful bid for governor in 1864 on 
an anti-Jefferson Davis ticket and then maintained silence until his 
appointment to office by Johnson in May, 1865 . 7 
Within a few weeks and on the basis of the North Carolina recon-
struction plan, President Johnson had appointed provisional governors 
for the remaining six heretofore unreconstructed states of the former 
Confederacy . 8 On June 13, William L. Sharkey (1798-1873 )  was designated 
6Ibid. ,  312-14 . The loyal persons referred to in the proclamation 
were defined specifically to be those who could take the oath of amnesty 
and who were qualified as voters by North Carolina law in effect immedi­
ately prior to that state's withdrawal from the Union. 
7J . G .  DeR . Hamilton, "William Woods Holden," D .  A .  B . ,  IX, 138-
39; Hugh T .  Lefler, History of North Carolina (2 vols�, New-York, 1956 ), 
I, 335, 349-50, 387-88 ; II, 484-85, 529-30, 536-38 . 
8without formal declaration, the Johnson administration recognized 
as legitimate governments organized by Lincoln in Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Tennessee . On May 9, 1865, Francis H .  Pierpoint, who had claimed 
to bead the Mississippi government. A native East Tennessean who 
40 
received some of his schooling at Greeneville, Sharkey had served under 
Jackson at New Orleans in the War of 1812. Moving to Mississippi, he 
was admitted to the bar in 1822 and served in the state legislature in 
1828 and 1829. Elected in the early 1830's to the high court of errors 
and appeals, be served in that capacity for many years, while declining 
cabinet positions in both the Taylor and Fillmore administrations. A 
states-right Whig early in his political career, Sharkey gradually bad 
modified his stand. Serving as president of the controversial Nashville 
Convention of 1850, be effectively worked to block attempts of southern 
extremists to gain control . B,y 1861, be was an active anti-secessionist 
and in 1863 took an oath of allegiance to the Union. Sent as a member 
of a commission appointed in the dying hours of the state's Confederate 
administration to negotiate with Johnson on Mississippi reconstruction, 
be subsequently received the provisional governorship appointment . 9 
On June 17, Georgia and Texas received their provisional governors 
in the persons of James Johnson and Andrew J. Hamilton respectively. A 
lawyer, Johnson (1811-1891) bad served as a Unionist in the Thirty-second 
Congress but bad failed in his reelection attempt. Prominently associated 
jurisdiction over a small portion of Virginia since the early days of 
the war, was recognized by executive order as that state's governor. 
William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 1865-
1877, 36. For particulars on the development of the Virginia situation, 
see Randall and Donald, The Divided Union, 240-41. 
9charles S. Sydnor, 11William Lewis Sharkey,11 D. A.  B . ,  XVII, 21-
22 ; William C. Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi (Baton 
Rouge, 1967), 17, 40-41. 
with the Georgia Know-Nothings in the late 1850's, he had reluctantly 
followed Georgia into secession . 10 
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A lawyer and native of Alabama, Andrew Jackson Hamilton (1815-
1875) had been appointed attorney-general of Texas in 1849 . Serving in 
the state legislature in 1851-1853, he entered Congress in 1859 where, 
as a Unionist, he labored to effect conciliation between North and South. 
Regarded as a traitor after the start of the war, he escaped from Texas 
by way of Mexico and went to Washington . Given the rank of brigidier 
general and made provisional governor of Texas by Lincoln, he spent most 
of the remainder of the war in New Orleans awaiting the chance to assume 
his position . Johnson, therefore, simply was reaffirming an earlier 
Lincoln decision in appointing Hamilton provisonal governor in 1865 . 11 
The next state destined for a provisional government was Alabama, 
but by that time, Johnson's reconstruction pattern was clear and his 
mail began to contain some suggestions concerning gubernatorial appoint-
ments for the remaining states . According to one correspondent, the 
qualifications of William H .  Smith for the Alabama post included not only 
his ability, integrity, firmness, and awareness of the evils of slavery, 
but also the fact that he had been forced from his home in 1863 because 
of his "unflinching adherence to the Union."12 Two other correspondents 
10Biosraphical Directory, 1126 ; Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, A His­
!2!Z. of the United States Since the Civil War ( 5 vols . , New York, 1917 ) , 
I ,  34; "James Johnson, " National c;-clopaedia of American Biography (49 
and A-K vols . ,  New York, 1893- , I ,  227-28. 
1�obert G .  Caldwell, "Andrew Jackson Hamilton, " D .  A .  B . ,  VIII ,  
182-183. 
12J .  A .  Stewart to Johnson, June 9, 1865, Johnson Papers . 
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admitted that their candidate for the place, John J .  Seibels, had served 
for about a year as a Confederate colonel but also maintained that he 
had been firmly opposed to secession and had . given in only after it was 
beyond his power to resist . Since the war, his name had become the 
"rallying point" for the Union men of Alabama . 13 
The appointment did not go to Seibels, but on June 21 one of the 
men pushing his candidacy did receive it . Lewis E .  Parsons (1817-1895) 
had apparently devoted his efforts in the 1850's toward the preservation 
of the Unio� . As a delegate to the Baltimore convention in 1860, he 
supported Douglas as the Democratic candidate, and although he submitted 
to the verdict of the majority and followed Alabama into secession, he 
never gave wholeharted support to the Confederacy, despite the fact that 
he had two sons who served in its army . 14 
Johnson next turned his attention to the first of the states which 
had withdrawn from the Union, South Carolina . Several names for the pro-
visional governorship had been suggested by his correspondents . A 
Buffalo, New York, writer, identifying himself as a native and long-time 
resident of South Carolina forced from that state by the war, recommended 
that Judge John Belton O'Neale or Benjamin F .  Perry be · selected for the 
post . Both of these men, he declared, had stood firmly for the Union 
until forced into silence "by the tyranny that made all individual effort 
13L .  E .  Parsons and Joseph C .  Bradley to Johnson, June 10, 1865, 
ibid . 
14Hallie Farmer, "Lewis Eliphalet Parsons," D .  A. B . ,  XIV , 268-69 . 
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hopeless . "15 Four South Carolina citizens declared that William Aiken, 
16 James L .  Orr, or Henry Brist would be "very acceptable . "  Another name 
submitted was that of William W .  Boyce, who was identified as being of 
the "very highest order of Statesmanship, fixed in purpose ; conservative 
in sentiment ; and truly loyal in feeling . "17 From these possibilities, 
Johnson ultimately selected on June 30 Benjamin F .  Perry as the man for 
the task of reconstructing the bellwether state of the late conflict . 18 
An ardent nationalist, Perry (1805-1886) had opposed vehemently 
the policy of nullification in the 1830's . Defeated on three occasions 
for Congress, he frequently served in the state legislature in the period 
1836-1862 . While viewing secession as foolish, he had followed his 
state's lead and served in several Confederate offices . 19 
15J .  C .  Thornton to Johnson, June 8, 1865, Johnson Papers . 
16 Augustin L .  Taveau and others to Johnson, June 17, 1865, Augustin 
Taveau Papers (Duke University Library), copy in ibid . 
17 W .  R .  Robertson, James L .  Orr, and others to Johnson, June 29, 
1865, Johnson Papers . 
18Exactly why Johnson chose Perry is not clear . Shortly after 
his appointment, Perry himself asked the president how he came to select 
him . According to the governor's biographer, Johnson simply replied, 
"I lived only one hundred and twenty-five miles from you, and of course 
knew all about you . " Lillian A .  Kibler, Ben.lamin F .  Perry : South Caro­
lina Unionist (Durham, N .  C . ,  1946), 385. 
l9J .  G .  DeR . Hamilton, "Benjamin Franklin Perry, " D .  A .  B . ,  XIV ,  
483 . 0 .  P .  Temple maintained that there was evidence that Johnson had 
worked for a short time in Greeneville, South Carolina, in his early 
life, and that while there he had met Perry, then a young lawyer, and 
had borrowed books from him . Temple, Notable Men, 357, 361 . However, 
Perry's principal biographer gives no indication that such a meeting 
ever took place . See Kibler, Benjamin F .  Perry. 
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The appointment of Perry to the South Carolina post left only 
Florida outside the process of reconstruction . Johnson's correspondents 
seem to have been agreed that William Marvin was the man for the situ-
ation . Several citizens of that state, in signing a letter requesting 
Marvin's appointment, presented him as one who had been "from the begin­
ning and all along a steady unfaltering Union man . "20 AnQther group of 
petitioners agreed with this sentiment, viewing Marvin as an able selec-
tion because of his "exceedingly cautious and prudent temperament united 
with his great learning and acquirements together with his popular and 
n21 pleasing manners , and his great private worth . On July 13, Marvin 
became Florida's provisional governor . 
A native of New York, William Marvin (1808-1902) had been 
appointed United States district attorney for the southern district of 
Florida by Andrew Jackson in 1835 . After Florida's admission to the 
Union, Polk had appointed him judge of the district, an office which he 
held under the protection of United States forces until mid-1863, when 
he returned to New York City for the duration of the war . 22 
The men chosen to lead presidential reconstruction encountered 
two major difficulties during their respective terms of office, namely, 
their relationship with the military governors of their areas and the 
20H .  W .  Brooks and others to Johnson, July 5, 1865, Johnson Papers . 
21A .  A .  Low and others to Johnson, July 6, 1865, ibid . 
22"William Marvin, " National Cyclopaedia, XI , 379; Oberholtzer, 
History of the United States, I ,  35; Kevin E. Kearney (ed . ), "Autobio­
graphy of William Marvin, " Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVI (January, 
1958), 198, 207, 214-15 . 
appointment of loyal men to office. In the complex postwar situation, 
the War Department under the direction of Edwin M. Stanton in effect 
divided the regular Ar� into two separate forces. One was given the 
normal duties of the era: patrolling and maintaining order along the 
Mexican and Canadian borders, fighting Indians, and handling peacetime 
duties in the eastern areas; the other was stationed in the South, and 
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it was this one which became very much involved in the political issues 
of the d�.23 
The provisional governments were among other things an attempt 
to combine military and civil administrations in the southern states . 
While the governors appointed by the president were laboring to restore 
loyal state governments, the military governors, appointed by Secretar,y 
of . War Stanton and General-in-Chief U .  S .  Grant, were to command the 
24 military forces and to enforce martial law when necessary. The problem, 
however, was that the exact function of the army in the presidential 
reconstruction process was never defined by either Johnson or the War 
Department. 25 In the proclamation of M� 29, which organized the North 
Carolina government and also served as the basic formula for the other 
states, Johnson had described the role of military commanders as being 
23Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant: A Reconsidera­
tion of the Army's Role in the Events Leading to Impeachment," American 
Historical Review, LXVI {October, 1960), 86-87. 
24 Patrick, Reconstruction, 31; James E .  Sefton, The United States 
� and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 {Baton Rouge, 1967), 16-17. 
25Harris, Presidential Reconstruction, 61. 
one of assistance to the provisional governors and directed that they 
were "to abstain from in any way hindering, impeding, or discouraging 
the loyal people from the organization of a State government as herein 
authorized . "26 The chief executive reinforced this in a telegram to 
Major General George G .  Meade, the commander of the Division of the 
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Atlantic, in which he made it clear that military officials were not to 
interfere with the work of Governor Perry in South Carolina unless John­
son himself specifically directed them to do so . 27 
In the absence of any explicit, positive instructions, clashes 
were to be expected . The sharpest one occurred in Mississippi over the 
touchy. issue of organization of local militias . The last months of the 
war had witnessed a drift toward anarchy in that state and this continued 
to be the case after the coming of peace . Crime was rife throughout the 
state . Weak local governments, particularly in the interior, needed 
milita.I7 assistance to maintain law and order, but the army generally 
was reluctant to take the initiative . Governor Sharkey thus received 
numerous pleas to do something about the lawless white groups operating 
in many areas , but his appeals for military aid were confounded by a 
scarcity of troops and the wholesale substitution of blacks for whites 
who were being rapidly mustered out of the service . This impasse in 
turn led to a lack of co-operation between the civil and military 
authorities and to racial tension and conflict . 28 
26Richardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 313 . 
27Johnson to Meade, August 31, 1865, Johnson Papers . 
28Harris ,  Presidential Reconstruction, 66-70 .  
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White lawlessness and threats of Negro violence caused Sharkey to 
attempt to re-establish militia units in counties not being protected 
adequately by Federal forces . On August 17, 1865, he issued a proclama-
tion calling for the organization of local militia units to aid in sup-
pressing lawlessness and particularly urging former Confederate soldiers 
to enroll their acquired military talents in this task. 29 
The governor's action immediately aroused the suspicion and 
hostility of the military authorities . General Henry W. Slocum, command-
ing officer of the Department of Mississippi, ordered a cessation of 
organizational activities and informed the president of Sharkey' s  actions . 
Carl Schurz, a special presidential envoy who was touring the South on a 
fact-finding mission, happened to arrive on the scene at this point and 
30 sent a despatch to the chief executive supporting Slocum . 
President Johnson's initial reaction to Sharkey ' s  activities was 
to advise against the move because of possible unfavorable reaction in 
the North, instructing him rather to rely upon the military for the 
necessary armed support to enforce law and order . Sharkey in turn wrote 
to Johnson outlining the reasons for his actions, and Johnson, in a dra-
matic reversal of his former stand, had an order issued to Slocum in-
structing him to allow the militia organization to continue . He then 
sharply reprimanded Schurz for his intervention in the affair, informing 
him that he was to aid in advancing the governmental policy in the South, 
29Ibid . ,  71-72 . 
30Ibid . ,  73; Eric L .  McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 
{Chicago,-r§64), 193 . 
and allowed Sharkey to publish the rebuke on the questionable premise 
that it would increase southern confidence in the president . 31 
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Although there were other conflicts of various kinds, the ar� on · 
the whole sought to have peaceful contacts with the civil authorities . 
After surveying the relations between the military and provisional gov-
ernors, one qualified student of the era has concluded that as of Decem-
ber, 1865, the South had definitely made progress toward rejoining the 
Union and that the � had assisted in this progress by enabling the 
interim governments to function effectively . 32 
The second major problem encountered in restoring loyal govern-
menta in the South concerned the matter of appointing loyal men to office . 
The secretary of the treasury and the postmaster-general had been in-
structed to select loyal local residents and, if such could not be found, 
to appoint persons from other districts or states . 33 These officials 
immediately encountered difficulties which were outlined clearly by Sec-
retary of the Treasury High McCulloch in an extensive letter to Johnson 
in March, 1866 . The major problem was finding officials who' could take 
the loyalty oath required to hold federal position . McCulloch predicted 
continuing difficulty because of this point and the reason was obvious: 
31Harris, Presidential Reconstruction, 73-75 ; McKitrick, Andrew 
Johnson, 193-194 ; Sefton, � � Reconstruction, 27-28 ; Johnson to 
Schurz, Augu�;Jt 30, 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
32 . Sefton, &:!!!;L � Reconstruction, 37, 59 . In a chapter entitled 
"Working With (and Against ) the Provisional Governors , " Sefton gives an 
adequate survey of the problems which occurred during the period in ques­
tion in the attempt to merge civil and military governments. 
3�ichardson, Messages and Papers, VI, 314 . 
In the progress of the rebellion very few persons of 
character and intelligence in most of these States failed , in 
some way or other , to participate in the hostilities , or to 
connect themselves with the insurgent government . This is 
almost universally true of the young men who are expected to 
fill clerkships and other inferior places in the revenue 
service . 
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Yet the only alternative was to appoint outsiders to these posts . While 
admitting that the government could appoint northern men , McCulloch 
advised against such a move : "I deem it my duty further to remark that 
I do not consider it advisable for the government to attempt to collect 
taxes in the Southern States by the hands of strangers . "34 
Although the secretary probably was correct in his assumption , 
the fact still remained that , as the Nation concluded ,  the difficulty of 
finding qualified men in the South was "insurmountable . "35 One of the 
persons having trouble qualifying was the candidate for judge for the 
United States District Court in North Carolina. Robert P .  Dick , 
34McCulloch to Johnson , March 19 , 1866 , Hugh McCulloch Papers 
(Library of Congress ) .  The oath to which McCulloch was referring was 
the so-called Iron-Clad Oath which had been enacted by Congress in July , 
1862 . The latter part was a swearing of allegiance to the United States , 
but the first half was the strong part , "I , A .  B .  , do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United 
States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily 
given no aid,  countenance ,  counsel or encouragement to persons engaged 
in armed hostility thereto ; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor 
attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever , under any 
authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States ; that 
I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government , 
authority , power or constitution within the United States , hostile or 
inimical thereto . "  Wal.ter L .  Fleming , Documentary History of Reconstruc­
tion ( 2 vol.s . ,  New York , 1950 ) ,  I ,  191-92 . 
35"Congress , "  Nation , January 11 , 1866 , p .  36 .  
50 
Governor Holden ' s  nominee , boldly stated the dilemma in a letter to the 
president : 
If I cannot hold office in North Carolina no one else can , 
who remained at home in the midst of the storm. • • • If I 
cannot hold office , then every federal appointment must be made 
from the Northern States . Nine tenths of our people are earn­
estly desirous of returning to the Union with their whole soul , 
--but foreign tax gatherers and northern judicial officers will 
necessarily greatly try their patience and retard the restora­
tion of genuine fraternal feeling[ . J36 
An accompanying letter from Holden asserted that William S .  Mason , his 
nominee for United States District Attorney , was experiencing the same 
problem but that to bar such men from office meant the probable necessity 
of filling federal offices with outsiders . 37 Faced by such circumstances 
as these letters outlined, some of the cabinet members involved simply 
appointed men of ability regardless of their former sentiments and 
despite the fact that this was in defiance of an act of Congress . � · 
Apparently , whenever possible , they selected people who were resident 
in each state to fill positions there , a practice that was continued 
even after Congress took control of southern reconstruction in early 
36nick to Johnson , June 29 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
37William W.  Holden to Johnson , June 29 , 1865 , ibid .  
38Milton , Age of Hate , 249 . It should be noted that Johnson , in 
less specific terms , had instructed the secretaries of state , interior , 
navy , and the attorney-general to resume their functions in these states . 
In ·SO doing, they were bound to encounter some of the same difficulties 
as the secretary of the treasury and the postmaster-general . 
39For evidence ,  see particularly the judiciary and treasury 
reports in the 1865 and 1867 editions of United States Register £t 
Officers and Agents . 
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In filling local and state offices , the provisional governors 
met the same problems , and their solution was much the same . On July 20 ,  
1865 , Governor Parsons of Alabama issued a proclamation retaining those 
who were in office as of May 22 , the date on which the Confederate state 
government had ceased to function. He further ordered that these offi-
cials were to take the oath of amnesty as provided in the presidential 
proclamation of May 29 ,  and that those who could not were to surrender 
their places . He also reserved the right to remove anyone for "disloyalty 
40 or for improper conduct in office , or neglect of its duties . "  Provi-
sional governments in other states were organized in much the same 
41 fashion . 
Such tactics , however , caused many to complain that loyal Union 
men were being passed over in favor of former secessionists . B,y a cir-
cular telegram dated August 22 , 1865 , the president called these charges 
to the attention of his governors and requested their replies . Parsons 
denied that any Unionist had been neglected in favor of a secessionist 
and noted that he always tried to find a "reasonably qualified" Union 
man and , failing to find one , filled the office in question with those 
"least objectionable . "42 Sharkey of Mississippi felt that in a few 
minor instances secessionists "may have been accidently appointed , but 
never from design . "43 Holden likewise stated that such unintentional 
4°Fleming , Documentary History, I ,  17 4-75 . 
41 Ibid . , 174 . 
42 Lewis E .  Parsons to Johnson , August 24 ,  1865 , Johnson Papers . 
4'L -w. L .  Sharkey to Johnson , August 25 , 1865 , ibid . 
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appointments undoubtedly had been made in North Carolina, but , on the 
44 whole , such was not the case .  South Carolina ' s  Governor Perry touched . 
on a sore spot when he asserted : 
So far as I am concerned , all my sympathies are with the 
Union men but there are many now seeking office as Union men who 
were never heard of as such in the rebellion . Their latent 
Unionism has been brought to light by the hope of office . 45 
In a later note , Perry declared that in much of the state there existed 
a decided lack of Union men and noted that in this situation he had 
tended to favor those who were familiar with the duties of the respective 
offices , if they had taken the oath and had been pardoned .  He cited the 
governors of Mississippi , Alabama, and Georgia as having f�llowed the 
46 same course .  These replies and those of his other governors apparently 
satisfied the president because he did not choose to pursue the matter 
further . 47 
Apart from the appointment of provisional governors , Johnson , 
like Lincoln before him, had numerous other federal offices to distribute . 
In fact , the end of the war opened positions which Lincoln bad not had 
44w.  W.  Holden to Johnson , August 26 ,  1865 , Index to the Senate 
Executive Documents , 39 Cong. , 1 ses s .  ( 2 vols . , Washington -;-1866 ) , I ,  
No . 26 , 222 . Johnson ' s  telegram and several of the replies to it are 
reproduced in this source . 
45B.  F .  Perry to Johnson , August 28 ,  1865 , Johnson Papers . 
46Perry to Johnson , August 29 , 1865 , ibid. 
47For the other answers , see the following letters in the Johnson 
Papers : J .  Johnson , September 2 , 1865 ; A .  J .  Hamilton , September 23 , 
1865 . For some reason , Governor Marvin of Florida apparently did not 
reply to the presidential query . 
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at his disposal and added to this was a reorganization of the � 
following the war which made available approximately two thousand regular 
48 officer places . The Nation declared the amount of patronage at the 
disposal of the chief executive to be "prodigious" and affirmed that it 
had never been greater . 49 
The new president also discovered that he had a prodigious amount 
of advice as to what to do with this newly acquired power . Some urged 
that the president do nothing in their particular areas for the time 
being. Thurlow Weed , the prominent New York state political leader , 
observed to his friend and associate , Secretary of State William H .  
Seward, "We are all right in the State , and only need to be let alone . "50 
Simon Cameron, Lincoln' s  first secretary of war and a key Pennsylvania 
figure , urged that no changes be made in Philadelphia,  at least not until 
after the October elections . "It me¥ be close ,"  he noted , "and we cannot 
afford any disturbing elements in the contest beyond those that recon­
struction will produce . "51 
There were others who wanted the president to make changes . 
Fearing some possible temporary congressional opposition to Johnson ' s  
reconstruction policy , Governor Oliver P.  Morton of Indiana declared 
48Fish , Civil Service , 189 . 
49"Congress , "  Nation , January 11 , 1866 , p .  36 . 
5°weed to Seward , September 29 , 1865 , William H .  Seward Papers 
(University of Rochester Library ) .  
51cameron to Johnson , July 21 , 1865 , Johnson Papers ( original in 
National Archives ) .  
that a "resolute wielding of your patronage in favor of your friends � 
inside the Union party� cannot fail to build you up with the people and 
disarm the opposition in Congress . "52 A New York newspaper man urged 
that Johnson consider War Democrats �  "men after your � heart � "  in 
filling positions in New York . 53 John Cochrane , a Democrat who desired 
the lucrative position of collector of the New York Custom House , main-
tained that in considering candidates for the position , Johnson should 
appoint "the fittest and most capable person , who is your friend. Grind 
your � � upon your � grind stone . " 54 Parke Godwin of the New York 
Evening � wrote to assure the president of his support and to urge 
that federal offices , particularly in New York , 
be filled by men who comprehend your own ideas in this respect . 
Young men , not identified in any manner with the old factions or 
cliques , but willing to do justice to all , accustomed to busi­
nes.s ,  and capable of discerning and moulding the future , are 
the men now needed. Officials of this character will rally 
around them, from all the old parties , a powerful and enthusi­
astic support . 55 
Confronted with advice that might be well-intentioned or motivated 
by mere selfish ambition , the chief executive proceeded in a careful man-
ner in dealing with patronage matters . Continuing well into 1866 , the 
few pronouncements on this subject to groups or individuals were cautious , 
highly proper , and somewhat vague . In response to a telegram from one 
5�orton to Johnson , December 7 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
53H .  C .  Page to Johnson , December 22 , 1865 , �· 
54cochrane to Johnson , February 4 ,  1866 , ibid .  
55Godwin to Johnson , December
.
25 , 1865 , ibid.  
of his Ohio advisers concerning the truthfulness of a certain office-
seeker , Johnson asserted grandly : "Our desire is to appoint good and 
55 
honest men who are capable , faithful to the Constitution , and for the 
preservation of the Union . "56 To a committee representing the Virginia 
legislature , he maintained that in a state attempting to resume normal 
relations with the Union "all the responsible positions and places ought 
to be confined distinctly and clearly to . men who are loyal. u57 The only 
clearly defined guideline which he set down came in an executive direc-
tive dated April 7 ,  1866 , in which he ordered that , in filling federal 
positions and in making promotions , preference should be given to former 
soldiers and sailors who had served honorably .  Those who had suffered 
wounds or who had other service-connected disabilities were to be given 
special attention . 58 
Such evidence as exists concerning Johnson ' s  patronage policy in 
the early months of his presidency indicates that he consulted the normal 
sources of advice dictated by the spoils system in making his appoint-
ments , i . e . , cabinet members , congressmen , governors , prominent state 
political figures . Apparently , the new president initially used the 
communication channels set up by his Republican predecessor . He soon 
would find this approach impractical as postwar national politics and 
56aeorge W. Morgan to Johnson , May 31 ,  1866 ; Johnson to Morgan , 
May 31 ,  1866 , ibid . 
57 Edward McPherson , The Political History of the United States of 
America during the Period of Reconstruction (Washington , 1880 ) ,  57 . 
58Richardson , Messages and Papers , VI , 439-40 .  
the 1864 National Union party came to be dominated by the Republicans , 
who in turn would fall overwhelmingly under the leadership of the Radi-
cals , a faction which increasingly was dissatisfied with the new chief 
executive . 
However , this turn of events was yet in the future . The one major 
problem in the Tennessean ' s  early months in office was identifying those 
persons on the state level whose advice should be sought and followed. 
The key states of New York and Pennsylvania apparently presented the 
most difficulty for Johnson in this area . In New York , the question 
revolved around whether the Seward-Weed forces represented the element 
which should be entrusted with the patronage in that state . This faction 
had received a large share of the appointments in the state during the 
Lincoln administration ;59 but there were naturally opponents to this 
group and they made their presence known . John Cochrane , obviously 
deeply influenced by Dean Richmond , the Democratic boss in New York , 
wrote to Montgomery Blair , Lincoln' s  first postmaster-general and a key 
Maryland political personage , stating that the loyal Democrats of New 
York would unite with that faction of the National Union party opposed 
to Seward and . Weed if one of their men was appointed to the New York 
collectorship . He strongly implied that the two , "who falsely assume 
59carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 63-64 ,  245 , 262 , 
279-80 . Johnson , like Lincoln , apparently continued to follow generally 
the lead of this faction in New York throughout his administration . 
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conservatism , "  were not the true friends of Johnson . 60 Another corre-
spondent recognized that the pair "largely controlled the wires"  of the 
political organization , but he pressed the point that they did not con-
trol the "sentiments nor the judgments of the people" and cited as evi-
dence of this the small majority returned by New York for the Lincoln­
Johnson administration . 61 
In Pennsylvania, the question was whether to listen to the voice 
of Simon Cameron or the anti-Cameron forces headed by John W. Forney , 
editor of the Philadelphia Press , and Andrew G .  Curtin , Pennsylvania ' s  
governor . As already noted , Cameron was urging a cautious approach . 
Curtin and Forney desired changes . The governor wanted the Philadelphia 
postmaster , C .  A. Walborn , whom he charged with trying to undermine him, 
62 removed .  Forney , backing Curtin ' s  effort , declared that his personal 
desire was to protect the president from "the influence of wrong counsels" 
and . urged him to follow the lead of the Union members in Congress from 
Philadelphia,  for to do otherwise "would be most unfortunate for the 
60cochrane to Montgomery Blair , November 19 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
Blair , a former Democrat turned conservative Republican , forwarded the 
letter to Johnson on November 21 .  The leaders of the Radical opposition 
to Seward and Weed were New York Evening Post poet-editor William Cullen 
Bryant , Tribune reformer-editor Horace Greeley , attorney Hiram Barney , 
and prominent merchant George Opdyke . Barney was a son-in-law of the 
noted abolitionist and philanthropist Lewis Tappan and served as collector 
of New York from 1861 until he became a political liability to Lincoln 
and was forced from the position in 1864 . Opdyke served as m�or of New 
York from 1862 to 1864 . Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 
21-22 ; William Hartman , "Custom House Patronage and Lincoln ,"  New York 
Historical Society Quarterly, XLI (October , 1957 ) ,  440-57 passiiii:'" 
--
6�homas J .  Sizer to Johnson , December 18 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
62 Curtin to Johnson , June 22 , 1865 , ibid. 
interests of the common cause . "63 The chief executive subsequently 
received letters from advocates of both camps , asserting that he was 
64 unwisely following the other . 
Also in line with the dictates of the spoils system, Johnson 
58 
allowed relationship and friendship to guide some of his patronage poli-
cies during his early days in office . While stating his opposition to 
appointing relatives to office , he made his son Robert assistant secre-
tary to the president and gave his brother William, who died shortly 
after he assumed the duties of the office , the position of surveyor of 
the port of Velasco , Texas . 65 At the request of one of his old East 
Tennessee cronies , Sam Milligan , he appointed Horace Maynard to the 
66 Board of Visitors to the Naval School at Newport . He nominated Lewis 
D .  Campbell , one of his Ohio political friends , as minister to Mexico ,67 
while Joseph A. Wright , another Midwest political associate , became 
minister to Prussia. 68 
On the whole , President Johnson ' s  first months in office must be 
considered a success , and this is nowhere more true than in his patronage 
63 Forney to Johnson , July 5 ,  29 , 1865 , ibid. 
64william A. Babcock to Johnson , August 15 , 1865 ; A. B .  Sloanaker 
to Johnson , November 2 , 1865 , ibid.  Apparently Johnson initially fol­
lowed the advice of the Forney element . 
65Milton , � of Hate , 232 ; Winston , Andrew Johnson , 292 , 494 ;  
Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers , I ,  4n . 
66Milligan to Johnson , May 12 , 1865 ; Johnson to Maynard, May 16 , 
1865 ; Maynard to Johnson , May 19 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
67Milton , � of Hate , 141 ; William Seward to Henry Sanford , 
December 23 , 1865 , Seward Papers . 
68 Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers ,  I, 146n . 
policy . His appointments to the provisional governorships had been 
generally well received . Even the Radical Republicans , who became in-
59 
creasingly restive throughout the summer and fall of 1865 because of the 
rapidity of Johnson ' s  reconstruction policy , accepted the president ' s  
provisional governor appointees at that time . 69 As the New York Times 
concerning this period later noted , 
In the choice of Provisional Governors , in appointments to 
subordinate offices , in the terms passed upon the Loyal legis­
latures , and in a hundred other wey-s , he exerted himself to 
secure expression and to impart authority to the. loyal element . 
He selected men in whom, until lately , the Radicals found no 
fault . 70 · 
In sum, one scholar of the period asserts that , during the first 
months of Johnson ' s  administration , he proved himself "a virtuoso of 
politics . "  While retaining wide support among moderate Republicans , 
northern Democrats , and the large majority of Southerners with his ambigu-
ous and vague pronouncements on thorny reconstruction problems , he held 
appointments and removals at a minimum in order to keep from being iden-
tified with one particular element or another . "Had Andrew Johnson died 
in January , 1866 , "  concludes David Donald , "he would have gone down in 
69Howard K .  Beale , The Critical Year : A Study of Andrew Johnson 
and Reconstruction (New York , 1958) , 39 . Of Johnson ' s  various guber­
natorial appointments ,  Holden seems to have aroused the most opposition 
within the state to which he was appointed . For accounts of the mixed 
reaction concerning Holden see R .  J .  Powell to Johnson , October 21 ,  
1865 ; H .  M .  Watterson to Johnson , June 29 , 1865 , Johnson Papers ;  James 
Roy Morrill , III , "North Carolina and the Administration of Brevet Major 
General Sickles ,"  North Carolina Historical Review , XLII (Summer , 1965 ) ,  
291 .  It is of some interest to note that of the seven men whom Johnson 
appointed as provisional governors , one , Holden , later declared in favor 
of congressional reconstruction , while two others , Perry and Parsons , 
were active participants in the pro-Johnson National Union movement of 
1866 . 
70Editorial , New York Times , September 8 ,  1866 . 
60 
our history books as one of our most politically astute Presidents . "71 
The point is that he did not die and the political conse�sus which had 
prevailed up to that point was soon to disappear under the weight of the 
increasing complexities of reconstruction .  
7lnavid Donald, The Politics of  Reconstruction ,  1863-1867 .(Baton 
Route , 1965 ) ,  23-24 � - - --
CHAPTER III 
FOR WANT OF A POLICY 
The president was allowed a free patronage hand during his early 
months in office , but that situation soon changed. To understand why , 
one must briefly examine the 1865 positions of Johnson and Congress on 
reconstruction , the problem which was destined to become the central 
issue of the Johnsonian presidency . 
The proclamations of May 29 , 1865 , contained the basic ideas of 
presidential reconstruction , and although his plan was somewhat ambigu-
ous , the chief executive did have a policy and that was more than could 
be said for Congress , which was in recess at the time Johnson assumed 
office . Perhaps the new national leader should have called for a special 
session to deal with the problems of reconstruction ,  but even if he had 
done so , it is unlikely that Congress would have accomplished much be-
cause there was no general agreement among its members as to what should 
1 be done . As it was , Johnson apparently hoped to achieve such an out-
standing success with his reconstruction effort that the tide of public 
opinion would be in his favor by the time the national legislators met 
in December . 
1 At least one recent authority on the subj ect of reconstruction 
argues that Johnson should have called Congress into special session . 
See Brock , An American Crisis , 29 . 
61 
62 
The president ' s  position was enhanced by the fact that there were 
differences of opinion among Republicans as to the proper course to pur­
sue concerning reconstruction . Moderation was the watchword of the 
majority of that party in 1865 , and in dealing with the South , this 
meant compromise , tempering justice with mercy , and co-operation with 
the president ' s  efforts to rehabilitate that region . The one point upon 
which they all generally agreed was that guarantees of some sort that 
the events of recent years would not be repeated at a future date should 
be exacted from the southern states as the price of their readmission to 
the Union . Because the chief magistrate had not indicated otherwise , 
they assumed that his policy was an experiment . in this direction , that 
his mind was open to possible alternatives, and that no final decisions 
had been made . Prominent among the moderates. were Senators William Pitt 
Fessenden of Maine , Edwin D .  Morgan of New York , James W. Grimes of Iowa , 
John Sherman of Ohio , Lyman Trumbull of Illinois ,  and William M .  Stewart 
of Nevada . In the House of Representatives were James G .  Blaine of 
Maine , Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts ,  James A. Garfield , John Bingham, 
and Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio , and Elihu Washburne of Illinois .  In 
the cabinet were Postmaster-General William Dennison , Attorney-General 
James Speed , and Secretary of the Interior James Harlan. On the state 
level , Governors Oliver P .  Morton of Indiana and John A. Andrew of 
Massachusetts occupied moderate ground , as did such prominent nonofficial 
figures as the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher and editors George William 
63 
Curtis of Harper ' s  Week1Y and E .  L .  Godkin of the Nation . 2 
Those men who had become recognized as Radical Republicans , 
initially because of their opposition to Lincoln ' s  experimental soft 
line toward the South , had no organization in 1865 ,  and the only mutual 
bond which tended to unite them was suspicion that Johnson ' s  lenient 
policy was courting disaster . Even that feeling was not universal among 
the Radicals , and a number of them were able to persuade themselves 
until well into 1866 that the president was sound in his stand and that 
he was the man they had considered him to be at the time he assumed the 
presidency . While such persons as Thaddeus Stevens , Charles Sumner , Ben 
Wade , Ben Butler , George Boutwell , and Henry Wilson began to be a little 
uneasy about the president ' s  policy during the summer and fall of 1865 ,  
the only clear voice of Radical opposition at that time was that of 
Maryland congressman Henry Winter Davis--and he would be dead before the 
year was out . 3 In brief , the idea that some Radical plot against Johnson 
and his reconstruction policy was formed even before the reconvening of 
�cKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 77-79 ;  Patrick , Reconstruction ,  51-52 ; 
Brock , An American Crisis , 45 .  Actually , Dennison , Speed , and Harlan 
were probably about as close to the Radical camp as they were to the 
moderate . For pertinent comments concerning their re�pective positions , 
see Chapter V .  
1McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 54-64 passim ;  Patrick , Reconstruction , 
51 . Davis died on December 30 , 1865 ,  after having served as a Know­
Nothing in the Thirty-fourth Congress and a Republican in the Thirty­
fifth and Thirty-sixth Congresses . He failed in his re-election bid in 
1860 but was elected to the Thirty-eighth Congress . He did not stand 
for re-election in 1864 . Biographical Directory, 783 . 
4 
Congress in December , 1865 ,  appears to be incorrect . 
64 
The one thing which virtually all Republicans were determined to 
see before agreeing to readmission of the former Confederate states to 
their full rights and privileges within the Union was a truly repentant 
South . Unfortunately , there was little evidence of such repentance as 
members of Congress met for the first session of the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress . They were greeted by delegations from several of the southern 
states seeking admission as representatives of the southern people . 
Among them were nine former high-ranking Confederate military officers--
four generals and five colonels--and many ex-civil officials . On the 
state level were governors and legislators who had faithfully served the 
Confederate cause . Many of the states were busy enacting the so-called 
Black Codes which were designed to deny the freedman any voice in the 
new state of affairs . Were these acts to be considered repentance? The 
Republican majority in Congress thought not and denied the southern 
representatives their seats . The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was 
organized to investigate presidential reconstruction and southern read­
mittance would have to await the outcome of that investigation . 5 
4
There were a few prominent Republicans who never were a part of 
either the moderate or Radical faction of the party . Among these were 
cabinet members Welles , McCulloch , and Seward , former Senators Thomas 
Ewing of Ohio and Orville Browning of Illinois ,  former Attorney-General 
Edward Bates , General William T .  Sherman , and Senators James R .  Doolittle 
of Wisconsin , Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania , and James Dixon of Connecticut . 
They were for immediate readmittance of the southern states and would 
continue to support steadfastly Johnson and his restoration efforts .  
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 80-81 .  
5Patrick , Reconstruction , 60 ,  65 .  
President Johnson did not question the right of Congress to pass 
upon the qualification of its members , but he did not believe that Con-
gress had any constitutional right to question the legality of the south­
ern state governments which had been formed under executive direction .
6 
In contrast , the �adical Republicans seemed to feel that- reconstruction 
was properly the domain of Congress and resented what they considered to 
be presidential encroachment on that right . Most Republicans , however , 
while believing that the final reconstruction decisions must rest with 
Congress , apparently did not feel that the chief executive had acted 
improperly during the recess and did not consider themselves opposed to 
him during the early weeks of the session . 7 
February of 1866 proved to be the turning point for moderate 
Republican support of the Johnson administration . At that time , the 
president and Congress were deadlocked over the issue of the legality of 
the southern governments .  Moderate Republicans desired to protect the 
persons and rights of the freedmen during this stalemate _and an extension 
of the time and power of the Freedmen ' s  Bureau,  which had been created 
originally in March , 1865 ,  to give aid and relief to former slaves and 
needy southern whites , seemed to be the best means to accomplish this 
obj ective . Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced the measure and it easily 
passed through Congress .  Believing that Johnson saw the need to protect 
the freedmen , moderate Republicans confidently expected the president 
6
Ibid . , 63 .  
7Brock , An American Crisis , 97 . 
to sign the bill . Much to their surprise and dis� , he vetoed the 
66 
measure on February 19 , arguing among other things that , in the absence 
of the southern states , the right of Congress to legislate for them was 
questionable . The veto was sustained by one vote in the Senate , but it 
was to be the last on a major issue which would be allowed to stand.
8 
The president followed this move by making an intemperate speech 
to a large group of serenaders at the White House on Washington ' s  Birth-
day . In it , he roundly condemned the Radicals for their obstruction of 
his reconstruction policy and singled out some of their leaders for par-
ticular mention .  This tactic thoroughly alienated the Radicals and the 
two actions together proved something of a turning point for the moder-
ates . From this time onward , they deserted the president ' s  cause in 
increasingly large numbers . Johnson had succeeded in uniting the 
Republican . party--against himself. 9 
Seeing the increasing hostility of the maj ority of the Thirty-
ninth Congress , Johnson began to look forward to the congressional elec-
tions of 1866 in the belief that the people would sustain him at the 
polls by electing representatives friendly to him. One way of assuring 
a favorable result appeared to be through the use of the seemingly awe-
some powers of the federal patronage . There were more than 40 ,000 
8Patrick ,  Reconstruction ,  66-67 .  
9Ibid . , 69 ;  Brock , An American Crisis , 106 , 110-ll . Trumbull had 
also introduced a Civil Rights Bill to protect the Negro once military 
forces were withdrawn from the South . Johnson ' s  veto of this measure in 
March , 1866 , was overridden in Congress and the moderates increased their 
desertion of him. 
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federal appointive positions scattered throughout the various departments 
10 of the government . If these positions , or at least the key ones , could 
be filled with Johnson sympathizers , the outcome of the 1866 elections 
conceivably could be swayed greatly . 
In his desire to appoint to office those whose loyalty to the 
Union was unquestionable , Lincoln had filled many federal positions , 
particularly the important ones , with those who came . to identify them­
selves with the Radical cause . 11 As Congress , increasingly dominated by 
the Radicals , made it clear that presidential reconstruction was not 
acceptable , demands by Johnson proponents that federal offices be swept 
clean of Radical incumbents became ever greater . This pressure came 
from Democrats and Republicans alike . A New Hampshire Democrat , declar-
ing that the president had Democratic support in that state "from prin-
ciple , without hope or expectation of office , " urged that Johnson make 
it known that "support of your policy is the condition �:>n which they 
[ R�publicans] can hold office under your Administration . 1112 From Nevada , 
a writer began his letter by announcing that federal patronage in that 
state was completely in the possession of those hostile to Johnson and 
warned that support for the president could not be sustained unless the 
situation were altered. 13 From San Francisco came a similar warning . 
1°For more precise figures , see Introduction , footnote 27 . 
11Beale , Critical Year , 118 ; Carman and, Luthin ,  Lincoln and the 
Patronage , 329-30 . 
--
-- --
12 Edmund Beebe to Johnson , March 5 ,  1866 , Johnson Papers . 
13E .  R .  Chase to Johnson , March 22 , 1866 , ibid . 
To receive support in that area, Johnson must not allow all of his 
patronage to remain in the hands of his "un friends , as it now is . "1
4 
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A Johnsonian friend and associate in Ohio , Lewis D .  Campbell , had "reli-
able information" that "every Revenue Collector in Ohio except perhaps 
one or two , are bitterly opposing you. Your Assessors and Postmasters 
ditto . "15 From Hartford, a Gideon Welles correspondent informed the 
secretary that the president ' s  appointments were being used in behalf of 
the Radical cause and called for the appointment of none but "open , 
earnest Johnson men . "1
6 
From friendly newspapers came much the same advice which the 
president was receiving through the mail . Typical was the New York 
Herald , under the direction of James Gordon Bennett . On April 23,  he 
urged the removal of Radical officeholders and the bestowal of their 
posts upon Administration friends . The re�;�ult of such a move would be 
"such a revolution by next fall that the radical disorganizers will be 
defeated in the election, and the Johnson party thus formed m&¥ hope to 
be the party of the future .  "17 On April 25 came another appeal : 
Let the President • • • use all the legitimate means at his 
command , in the dispensation of patronage , to strengthen his 
position and encourage his supporters within the lines of the 
14J .  McCormick to Johnson , April 21 , 1866 , ibid. 
15campbell to Johnson , April 25 , 1866 , ibid. 
16 Alfred E .  Burr to Welles , June 10 , 1866 , Gideon Welles Papers 
(Library of Congress ) . 
17New York Herald , April 23 , 1866 , cited by McKitrick ,  Andrew 
Johnson , 365 .  
Union war party. The Johnson republicans everywhere , under 
this encouragement , can go i
g
to the Congressional contest with 
every assurance of success . l 
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Prodded by the urgent appeals of his supporters , Johnson apparently 
began to make a few removals , and reports of his actions soon began to 
reach members of Congress . A Peoria correspondent informed Illinois 
Senator Lyman Trumbull that the postmaster there , a "working Republican , 
radical , and a man who stands by Congress every time ,"  had been replaced 
by Isaac Underhill , a well-to-do individual who associated with the 
Republican party only when he desired office . 19 From Cairo , Trumbull 
and his fellow Illinois Senator , Richard Yates , learned that Assessor 
Dewitt C • Barbee , a "good & true man ,"  had been replaced by a man of 
"known Copperhead proclivities and associations . "20 Senator John Sherman 
was informed by the Circleville , Ohio, postmaster that there was a plot 
in the making to remove him from office and that every indication now 
existed that Johnson "means to coerce every . Postmaster , and all other 
18New York Herald , April 25 , 1866 , ibid . , 378. Johnson later was 
warned by a member of the Herald staff that he must either make some 
decisive moves in the direction being urged by Bennett or lose the sup­
port of the Herald because of Bennett ' s  tendency to support what . he con­
sidered the strongest position . W. B. Phillips to Johnson , May 20 ,  1866 , 
Johnson Papers . As Phillips predicted , the president did lose the sup­
port of the newspaper in question when Bennett saw that the election 
tide was running against the president . See Phillips to Johnson , Sep­
tember 16 , 1866 , ibid .  
l9G .  Martin to  Trumbull , April 19 , 1866 , Lyman Trumbull Papers 
(Library of Congress ) .  
20 John Olney and others to Trumbull and Yates , May 3 , 1866 , ibid. 
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Federal officers , into the support of his policy , and in antagonism to 
that of Congress . "21 Remarking that several agents had been removed 
recently , as he understood , "upon express order of the President , " a 
Columbus pension agent also conveyed to Sherman his fear of impending 
22 removal . 
Reports such as these to Trumbull and Sherman obviously were 
being received by their colleagues because , early in May , the Senate 
became locked in a serious discussion concerning the possibility of 
limiting the president ' s  patronage powers . On April 30 , Trumbull had 
introduced an amendment to a post office appropriation bill which would 
have had the effect of holding up salary payments to persons appointed 
during the recess of Congress until the Senate had confirmed their 
appointments . 23 The fiction was initially maintained that the amendment 
was being submitted to give uniformity to already established practice 
and that it had nothing to do with the feud between Congress and the 
President . As the debate progressed , however , tempers began to warm and 
the real issue came to the surface . In expressing his support for the 
Trumbull amendment , John B .  Henderson of Missouri declared : 
I am not afraid to take my position on this subj ect . I have 
nothing to ask from the present Executive in the way of patron­
age ; and I can safely express the opinion here that if I had the 
. 2� . H .  P .  Denny to Sherman , May 7 ,  1866 , John Sherman Papers · 
(Library of Congress )  • 
. 22Joe � . · Dwyer to Sherman , � 25 , 1866 , ibid.  
23 . Excluded were appointments to vacancies which occurred as the 
result · of death , resignation , or expiration of term. Cons. Globe , 39 
Cong . , 1 sess . ,  2274 . 
President would not grant it . I am satisfied from various 
appointments that have been made in � own State , and from 
appointments that I understand are to be made in that State�4 that nothing I could say would have any influence whatever . 
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Reporting on newspaper despatches that removals were in the wind , Senator 
Timothy Howe of Wisconsin professed his bafflement : "We are subsequently 
told that the ax is in motion . The ax is in motion for what? To hew 
down and appropriate the spoils to the victors? Who are those victors 
that are gathering in the spoils , and when and where did they achieve 
the victory? " He noted that the only victory that Johnson bad achieved 
of which he knew had been that of 1864 , when he was elevat�d to the vice- · 
presidency . "If he has achieved a victory since then , " Howe innocently 
declared , "I have omitted to read of it in the papers and I have not 
been informed of it in any way . "25 In response to a remark by Luke 
Poland of Vermont to the effect that he had no definite knowledge of 
presidential plans to make removals , Trumbull heatedly stated : 
But the Senator tells us he has no knowledge that the Presi­
dent designs making any removals .  • • • Well , sir , I have some 
knowledge that removals are being made throughout the country . 
It is not proper to speak here of removals which have been made 
and are now pending in executive session ;  but if it was , I 
think I could bring to the notice of the Senator quite a number 
of cases . But , sir ,  outside of executive session , I have seen 
it stated in newspapers of the country that the marshal of the 
western district of Pennsylvania has been removed , that the 
collector of internal revenue in the district of Pittsburg has 
been removed , that the postmaster in Pittsburg has been removed.  
Sir , I have heard of a number of removals ,  which are also 
noticed in the papers of my own State . Yes , sir , I have heard 
of a letter written to a man holding an insignificant office in 
Illinois from one of the Departments ,  informing him that , having 
taken part in a meeting which passed resolutions sustaining 
Congress ,  he would have an opportunity to explain the matter� The Senator seems not to have heard of any of these things . 2 
24Ibid . , 2308 .  25Ibid. , 2337 . 2
6
Ibid. , 2420. 
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One of the underlying currents of the debate and one especially 
irritating to the senators was the fact that many of them were not being 
consulted concerning impending removals in their respective states , 
while other people were . Henderson indicated his displeasure at this 
tactic in his speech of May l .  Henry Wilson of Massachusetts made it 
even clearer on M� 8 in remarks concerning some events in New Jersey : 
Now what would you think of a letter written by a public 
officer to another public officer in New Jersey s�ing , "The 
Secretary of the Treasury directs me by the order of the Presi­
dent to say to you that you must remove a certain man in your 
employment , and in filling his place consult Mr. [ James M. ] 
Scovel?"  It is well known and understood that Mr. Scovel struts 
over New Jersey claiming to control the public patronage in that 
State , and we have nominations before the Senate now of his 
dictation .  27 
The debate raged from April 30 to May ll and during this period 
of time much the same ground was plowed concerning the president ' s  right 
and power to remove as had been covered during the First Congress . 28 
Throughout the debate , President Johnson had his supporters in the per-
sons of such men as James R .  Doolittle of Wisconsin and Reverdy Johnson 
27Ibid. , 2452 . In his speech , Wilson also recalled how he and 
several of his colleagues remembered that Scovel had been in Washington 
earlier bragging that he would elect a senator from New Jersey opposed 
to the president . Such was probably the case because Scovel was presid­
ing officer in the upper house of the New Jersey legislature and held 
the deciding vote in the election of a senator to represent the state . 
Having been won to the Johnson cause by promises of controlling federal 
patronage in the state , he prevented a joint session of the legislature 
and thus the election of a man hostile to the administration . He later 
in 1866 deserted the Johnson cause to allow the election of a man who in 
1868 would vote against Johnson in the impeachment trial . David Miller 
Dewitt , The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (Madison , Wisconsin , 
1967 ) ,  79,"""""158. 
2�L lMany of the same arguments would be heard once again the follow-
ing year in relation to the passage of the Tenure of Office Act . 
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of Maryland. 29 There were also those who , while not necessarily favoring 
the executive cause ,  believed the amendment to be unnecessary because , 
as Senator Sherman put it , the president , in making removals merely to 
gain support for his policy , "would lose more votes by the exercise of a 
power of that kind • • • than he could gain . I do not believe that the 
power of appointment would affect political opinion in this country one 
iota. "30 Still , many others felt as Senator Howe did when he argued that 
to vote down Trumbull ' s  amendment would cause the president to "think it 
justifiable to insist upon making vacant all places filled by those who 
do not sustain his policy and to supply their places by those who do. "31 
The final vote taken on May 11 resulted in a 23 to 16 victory for those 
who opposed the Trumbull amendment and the issue of curbing the executive 
removal power was temporarily laid to rest . 32 
The entire episode concerning the Trumbull amendment was a kind of 
tempest in a teapot . The comments of the participants such as Henderson 
and Trumbull concerning removals of which they had heard made it appear 
that large numbers of removals already were being made . Indeed , the 
29on May 1 ,  Johnson inquired as to the true purpose of the pro­
posed amendment and then answered his own question by rather propheti­
cally surmising that it must be to place before the Senate "some grolind 
upon which the other branch of Congress may impeach the President of the 
United States . " Cong. Globe , 39 Cong. , 1 sess . , 2310 . 
30Ib . d  _J._. ' 2280 .  
31Ibid . , 2453-54 . 
32Ibid . , 2559 . The amendment originally passed the Senate on 
May 2 by a vote of 19 to 11 with 19 absent , but on the following day , 
Senator Poland , apparently encouraged by others , moved to reconsider the 
measure . There was some subsequent vote-switching on May 11 and 10 
absences with the result of the defeat of the measure . See ibid . , 2339 , 
2358 , 2429 . 
Nation reported that the measure had been introduced because of the 
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"many recent removals of postmasters , internal revenue collectors , etc .  
of the radical Republican order . "33 In realitY. , the entire affair appar-
ently was inspired by fervent Johnsonians who had been warning federal 
officeholders that failure to subscribe to the president ' s  policies 
would mean removal as soon as Congress adjourned rather than by actual 
widespread removals . The New York Times labelled the Senate ' s  attempt 
to . limit the chief executive ' s patronage powers "wholly unprovoked. "3
4 
The ho.stile New York Tribune . refrained from attacking Johnson for having 
actually made office changes , being content to "fervently trust that the 
President will do nothing calculated to widen the breach between him and 
Congress . "35 
As the debate over alleged presidential removals progressed in 
the Senate , Johnson adherents were doing more than merely demanding the 
purge of Radicals from public offices . There was increasing sentiment 
among such persons to organize a national movement to sustain the presi­
dent ' s  policy . In March , 1866 , a National Union Club was organized in 
Washington under the leadership of Assistant Postmaster-General Alexander 
W. Randall for the purpose of supporting the Johnson administration . 
Such prominent conservative Republican figures as Thurlow Weed , Seward,  
Welles ,  McCulloch , Cowan , Dixon , Doolittle , and Browning backed the 
effort , and similar clubs sprang up in various parts of the 
33"congress , " Nation , May 1 ,  1866 , p .  546 . 
34Editorial , New York Times , May 4 ,  1866 . 
35Editorial , New York Tribune , May 5 ,  1866 . 
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36 nation . B,y the late spring , a national organization was a definite 
possibility . In June , the call for a general convention was issued and 
the meeting took place in mid-August in Philadelphia. Amid a great deal 
of enthusiasm and excitement , the National Union party was launched . 37 
Following the Philadelphia convention , the pressure upon Johnson 
to purge Radicals from office became more intense . 3
8 Friends and advis-
ers urged change and,  as Johnson procrastinated in the days and weeks 
immediately after the convention , they must have felt as one Brooklyn 
writer who complained to Weed on August 24 , 
We have had so many rumors of their [Johnson enemies ] removal 
resulting in no official announcement of the fact , that many of 
your earnest supporters begin to doubt whether they will be 
removed at all , and so obj ectionable are they to every conserva­
tive , that many are becoming indifferent to the coming canvass . 39 
Perhaps even more illustrative of their attitude would have been the 
anguished cry of another individual in early August , " ' How long , Oh Lord 
40 how long ! ' " 
36Roy F .  Nichols , "A Great Party Which Might Have Been Born in 
Philadelphia, " The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography , LVII 
(October , 1933 ) , 361 .  
37McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 403-17 passim ;  Milton , Age of Hate , 
350-53 passim. 
38Lloyd Paul Stryker ,  Andrew Johnson : A Study in Courage (New 
York , 1929 ) ,  329 . 
39Edward J .  Lowber to Thurlow Weed , August 24 , 1866 , Thurlow Weed 
Papers (University of Rochester } . 
40Joseph H .  Geiger ( Columbus , Ohio ) to Johnson , August 2 ,  1866 , 
Johnson Papers . For examples of other pleas for the removal of Johnson 
enemies from office made in and around the time of the Philadelphia meet­
ing , see the following letters to Johnson in his papers : George Bartlett 
(Binghamton ,  N . Y . ) , August 7 ;  R .  Emmet Monaghan (West Chester , Pa. ) , 
76 
Secretary McCulloch testified to the intensity of the pressure 
being placed upon the president to make changes in officeholders . In an 
August 22 letter to Senator William Pitt Fessenden , he declared that the 
demand upon the chief executive to make changes was so great "that it 
will be out of the question for me to save from decapitation all the 
Government officers in the first and second Districts in Maine . "
41 To 
Elihu Washburne , an Illinois congressman , he wrote on September 14 that , 
while no revenue office changes had been made in Washburne ' s  district to 
that point , the upcoming elections were causing such a stir that patron­
age moves were hard to resist . 42 
Johnson had either intentionally or inadvertently declared war on 
the Radicals on February 22 and it subsequently had blossomed into a 
struggle with Congress . Now, with a national movement sustaining him in 
this battle , the chief magistrate was almost compelled to give his sup-
porters aid in the form of public offices . The New York Times reported 
that he had pledged such support to a New Hampshire delegation that had 
called upon him in the wake of the Philadelphia convention . It quoted 
the president as replying to their request for removal of officeholders 
opposed to him by stating that "we have now a policy and principles 
August 14 ; A .  D .  Rock { San Francisco ) ,  September 10 ; William J .  Allen 
{Cairo , Ill . ) , September 21 ; G .  Busteed {Boston ) , September 29 ; D .  M .  
Leatherman (Paris , France ) , October 4 , 1866 . 
4
�cCulloch to Fessenden , August 22 , 1866 , William Pitt Fessenden 
Papers (Library of Congress ) . 
4
�cCulloch to Washburne , September 14 , 1866 , Elihu B .  Washburne 
Papers (Library of Congress ) .  
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recognized and laid down by the most intelligent , able , and patriotic 
body of men that has been convened since the days of the Declaration of 
Independence . " He then declared that those who received patronage from 
the government would have to adhere to the principles set forth at Phil-
adelphia,  since it was now "a duty the Administration owed itself that 
strength and power should be given to those who . maintain the principles 
declared by that great body of national men . "
43 
Whether or not the chief executive actually gave this pledge , the 
evidence seems to indicate that he still was hesitant to make office 
changes . This was undoubtedly true in part because there were certain 
problems connected with the use of patronage , particularly in the set of 
circumstances in which Johnson found himself , of which his fervent fol-
lowers may or may not have been aware . One of the difficulties concerned 
the matter of how extensive removals should be . Should there be a gen-
eral proscription of offices or only removal of key Radical figures? 
There were those who urged the former course upon Johnson , but others 
who advised caution . In a letter to a brother in Washington who had 
access to Johnson , Hugh Ewing , who had served as chairman of the Kansas 
delegation to the Philadelphia convention , neatly summarized the dilemma 
which faced Johnson nationwide when he remarked concerning those in Kan-
sas who wanted wholesale removals : "They are too anxious to at once 
remove every Federal office holder in the state and are very injudicious 
in indiscriminately recommending successors • . In a letter to 
43News item in the New York Times , August 18, 1866 . 
44 
Hugh Ewing , H .  S .  Sleeper , and James L .  McDowell to Thomas 
Ewing , Jr . , September 11, 1866, Ewing Family Papers (Library of Congress ) . 
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McCulloch , Samuel J .  Tilden , a key New York politician and future 
presidential candidate , warned against making indiscriminate changes , in 
that the . giving of Federal offices as "mere personal benefactions • • •  
would be suicide on the part of the President and a betrayal of his sup­
porters and his cause . "
45 From Des Moines , John A.  Kasson , who had 
served under Lincoln as first assistant postmaster-general , informed 
Montgomery Blair that a few specific changes could be made , but that 
wholesale removals would serve to create among the ousted "open working 
enemies , where now they are half-disposed friends . "
46 
From experience with such removals as he already had made , Presi-
dent Johnson probably was aware of exactly what Kasson meant . The mail 
of many congressmen indicated the hostility which had been aroused by 
such attempts to turn Radicals out of office . One removed postmaster 
declared to Senator Lyman Trumbull :  "I should have felt badly if it had · 
been based on charges . I aimed to do my duty but all the Post Offices 
in Illinois could not buy me to the support of A Johnson . "
47 One of 
John Sherman ' s  correspondents commented that rightly or wrongly each 
person removed from office "now is rather looked upon as the victim of 
45Tilden to McCulloch , September 17 , 1866 , John Bigelow (ed. ) , 
Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J .  Tilden ( 2 vols . ,  New York , 
1908 ) , I ,  203 . Apparently foreseeing Johnson as the Democratic candidate 
for president in 1868 , Tilden actively labored on Johnson ' s  behalf during 
the 1866 campaign and attempted to build a coalition party of Democrats 
and Republicans in New York . Alexander C .  Frick , Samuel John Tilden : A 
Study in· Political Sagacity (New York , 1939 ) , 153-55 . 
--
46 
Kasson to Blair , August 28 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .  
47H .  S .  Thomas to Trumbull , Ma;y 19 , 1866 , Trumbull Papers . 
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Executive vengeance . "48 An officeholder ,  obviously expecting a Radical 
victory , informed his congressman that it would be "for my future advan­
tage • • •  to be turned out of the office I hold . "
49 While requesting 
his representative to save his position for him if possible , an Ohio 
federal employee defiantly added , "Well if I must die I will die with my 
harness on [ . ] I will not desert my friends to hold any position . 
Horace Greeley ' s  anti-Johnson New York Tribune gave its assessment of 
the situation by declaring , "Our friends in office are very quiet and 
u50 
reticent . Kick them out , and they will be lively as skinned eels in hot 
vinegar . "51 Fessenden calmly gave much the same opinion to the secretary 
of the treasury : "Turning our friends out of office any where only un-
ties their tongues , and intensifies the activity of energetic and influ-
ential men . If the President will do it to gratify such flunkies as 
Doolittle and Cowan , he must take the consequences . "52 That removals 
were not to be made lightly was a fact undoubtedly obvious to the presi-
dent , if not to his followers . 
Another problem involved in federal office distribution was the 
often conflicting advice which Johnson had to weigh in making patronage 
48
N .  S .  Jones to Sherman , June 13 , 1866 , Sherman Papers . 
49Frederick Brown to Elihu Washburne , June 19 , 1866 , Washburne 
Papers .  
5°Horace C .  Beebe to James Garfield , July 26 , 1866 , James A.  Gar­
field Papers (Library of Congress ) . 
5�ditorial , New York Tribune , July 18 , 1866 . 
52william Pitt Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , August 15 , 1866 , 
McCulloch Papers . 
decisions . The more important the position , the greater the problem. 
An outstanding example of this fact can be seen in connection with the 
8o 
position of collector at the New York Custom House . Chauncey M .  Depew, 
himself a disappointed candidate for that coveted post in 1866 , later 
described its importance :  
It was a position of great political power because of its 
patronage . There being no civil service , the appointments 
were sufficiently numerous and important to largely control the 
party in the State of New York , and its political influence 
reached into other commonwealths . It was an office whose fees 
were enormous , and the emoluments far larger than those of any 
position in the country . 53 
Twice within a period of a few months ,  Johnson had to make an 
appointment to this key position . In August , 1865 , he had selected for 
that office a personal friend, former New York Senator Preston King , a 
Democrat turned Republican and acceptable to the influential Weed-Seward 
combination . In November , King , either by accident or design , fell from 
a ferryboat into New York harbor and drowned . 54 Following this tragic 
death , various New York factions began to push their candidates for the 
53chauncey M .  Depew , � Memories of EightY Years (New York , 1922 ) ,  
46 . 54Whether King ' s  death was an accident or suicide is open to 
question . James G .  Blaine later charged that King was in reality a Radi­
cal whom Johnson wanted to remain conservative . Caught in the middle 
between his personal friendship with Johnson and his convictions that to 
remain in office was to forfeit the good will of the many who had faith 
in his integrity , he decided to commit suicide . "From the anguish which 
his sensitive nature could not endure , "  Blaine later explained , "he 
sought relief in the grave . "  James G .  Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress : 
� Lincoln to Garfield ( 2 vols . ,  Norwich , Connecticut , 1886T, II , 187 .  
For particulars concerning King ' s  appointment , see John H .  and LaWanda 
Cox , Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 1865-1866 : Dilemma of Recon­
struction America (Glencoe , New York , 196�68-70 . 
now vacant position . War Democrats favored either General A .  Dix or 
General John Cochrane , both Democratic Johnson supporters in New York. 
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Prominent regular state Democrats--such men as S .  L .  M .  Barlow and Dean 
Richmond--favored either Sanford E. Church , a McClellan Democrat who 
nonetheless had supported the war , or Judge William D .  Shipman , a Connec-
ticut Democrat . Other possibly acceptable candidates of the New York 
Democracy were John Van Buren , Martin Van Buren ' s  son and a prominent 
party strategist , and General Henry W. Slocum, who had been the unsuc-
cessful Democratic candidate for governor of New York in 1865 .  Both 
regular and War Democrats definitely opposed the appointment of a Weed-
Seward man , and both sought the support of presidential adviser Mont­
gomery Blair . 55 
The Weed-Seward forces had ideas of their own . This faction 
included not only the secretary of state and the prominent New York 
Republican political boss , but also such figures as Senator Edwin D .  
Morgan and New York Times editor Henry J .  Raymond , who was at that time 
also the leader of Johnson Republicans in the House of Representatives . 
This combination favored H .  H .  Van Dyck , who like King was a Democrat 
turned Republican , but they also had a number of other acceptable candi-
dates to suggest . Weed initially would have accepted a War Democrat 
such as Colonel Henry G .  Stebbins , a former congressman , but after 
Johnson ' s  veto of the Freedmen ' s  Bureau Bill and his February 22 speech , 
he hardened his position on the grounds that any Democratic appointment 
55Ibid . , 113-17 . Blair himself favored the regular Democratic 
cause and urged this course upon the president . Ibid . , 116 . 
would be taken by Johnson ' s  opponents as evidence that he had deserted 
the Union party . A March 16 conference between Weed and upstate Demo-
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cratic boss Richmond resulted in a compromise candidate in the person of 
DeWitt Littlejohn , a former Republican speaker of the state legislature . 
B.y this time , however ,  Senator Morgan was favoring Chauncey Depew , former 
New York secretary of state , a possibility which Weed somewhat reluctantly 
endorsed . 5
6 
Outside influences also were brought to bear upon the harried 
chief executive . Senator James Dixon of Connecticut , one of the few 
strong Johnson Republicans yet remaining in the Senate , was pushing the 
cause of Judge Henry E .  Davies of the New York Court of Appeals . Davies 
was a Republican of doubtful loyalty , but even more important , generally 
was considered anti-Weed. B.y March , Secretary McCulloch was also favoring 
Davies , and despite efforts of both Morgan and Van Dyck to discredit him, 
Davies appeared to be Johnson ' s  favorite .  To make matters worse for the 
Seward-Weed faction , when Congress in April overrode Johnson ' s  veto of 
Trumbull ' s  Civil Rights Bill , both Senator Morgan and Representative 
Theodore M .  Pomeroy , the congressman from Seward ' s  home district , voted 
for the measure . Montgomery Blair , a consistent Seward foe , promptly 
presented this turn of events as evidence of Seward ' s  disloyalty . 57 
B.y late March , yet another man was being urged for the coveted 
position--Henry A .  Smythe , president of the Central National Bank of the 
City of New York and a presumed Republican possessed of an uncertain 
56rbid. , 118-21 .  57Ibid. , 121-23 . 
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political past . Charles Halpine , a War Democrat and editor of the New 
York Citizen , urged Smythe ' s  appointment on the grounds that he would 
find wide acceptability . He further assured the president that Smythe ' s  
only concern would be "to find out your wishes & do all in his power to 
advance your interests by the political influence of the Custom House . "58 
Another Smythe advocate , Robert J .  Walker , a former Mississippi senator 
and now a close banking associate of Smythe , presented his candidate ' s  
appointment as necessary in order to make the state of New York "certain 
for the Union policy . "59 Senator Johnson of Maryland assured the chief 
executive that Smythe ' s  appointment would be certain of acceptance by 
the Senate , and the fact that he was a well-known businessman would make 
60 him acceptable to the merchant class with which a collector must deal . 
Yet another prominent figure who was pushing Smythe ' s  candidacy was 
61 William S .  Huntington of J� Cooke and Company . 
In mid-April President Johnson announced Smythe ' s  appointment as 
collector . Weed earlier had urged upon his colleague in the cabinet the 
importance of a Republican ' s  being appointed to the position in order to 
58charles G .  Halpine to Johnson , March 21 , 1866 , Johnson Papers .  
59walker to Johnson , April 14 , 1866 , ibid. B.y this statement , 
Walker apparently meant that Smythe would work for Johnson ' s  policy. In 
an earlier communication ,  he had presented Smythe as a Republican Johnson 
supporter . Walker to Johnson , March 30 , 1866 , ibid. 
60�everdy Johnson to Johnson , April 15 , 1866 , ibid .  
61cox , Politics , Principle , � Prejudice , 125 . 
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62 assure Republican ascendency in New York . Therefore , while Smythe was 
not the choice of the Weed-Seward group , be undoubtedly was preferable to 
either Davies or a Democrat , and Weed worked for his confirmation . 63 
By appointing Smythe , the president bad made it clear that he 
intended to determine his own patronage policy . As Senator Morgan wrote 
to Weed in early May concerning Smythe ' s  confirmation : "I shall vote 
for him and make the best of the appointment . It is the President ' s  
appointment . "64 There are , however , always problems in charting one ' s  
own way, and perhaps the biggest problem which the chief executive encoun-
tered in deciding his own patronage course was what to do about professed 
Democratic support . Being out of power , the members of that party were 
eager to give support to Andrew Johnson , a former Democrat whose soUthern 
policy promised a rapid restoration of the South to the Union and thereby 
a rebirth of the power of the Democracy . The problem for Johnson was that , 
while the party bad bad its faction {War Democrats ) which actively bad 
supported the Union cause during the war , it also bad bad another group 
{Copperheads ) which just as actively bad worked for a negotiated or 
62weed to Seward , February 28 ,  1866 , Seward Papers .  By this 
declaration , be meant conservative Republican ascendancy . 
63cox, Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 125 . 
64E .  D .  Morgan to Weed, May 5 , 1866 , Weed Papers . Smythe ' s  
appointment generally was received quite well . As the Nation declared 
concerning the new collector : "He is beyond question an honest man , and 
has had no training in the working of party machinery , and will there­
fore , if let alone , make the New York Custom House a credit to the coun­
try , which it can hardly be said to be at present . "  "Topics of the Day , "  
Nation , May 14 , 1866 , p .  609 . 
compromise settlement with the South . This effort branded them as 
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traitors in the minds of true Union supporters , and at the same time led 
many , particularly Radical Republicans , to equate the view of the entire 
Democratic party with that of the Copperheads .
65 
Under these circumstances , Johnson could not afford to encourage 
or accept Democratic aid without laying himself open to charges that be 
was consorting with traitors and that he , like President Tyler in the 
1840 ' s ,  was deserting the party which had placed him in power .
66 
Yet 
the Democrats , without repudiating their extreme Copperhead wing , were 
determined to support him. Despite the efforts of such conservative 
Republican leaders as Doolittle , Cowan , Dixon , and Raymond to prevent 
it , the Democrats dominated the Philadelphia convention and took charge 
of the National Union movement . The extremism created by the war which 
called into being such creatures as Copperhead Democrats and Radical 
Republicans would not allow the establishment of a conservative , middle­
of-the-road party in 1866 .
67 
65The majority of the Democratic party bad aligned themselves in 
one degree or another with the Copperhead sentiment . Thus , there was a 
tacit willingness by many Democrats to allow Radicals , whom they in turn 
equated with the entire Republican party , to brand them as Copperheads . 
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 409-10 . 
66
cox, Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 110 . 
67McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 405-17 passim. On the eve of the 
New York elections , the Times predicted that Johnson ' s  cause would be 
defeated. It would not be because the president ' s  policy had been un­
sound : " • • •  it will be due , in a very large degree , to the fact that 
this policy has become identified , in the public mind , with the Demo­
cratic Party and the secession sentiment in the . South--and that its 
success at the polls involves the return of the Democratic Party , as 
organized and directed during the war , to place and power . • • • The 
Having been unable to prevent a Democratic take-over of the 
National Union movement , Johnson ' s  conservative Republican supporters 
could not stop a Democratic effort to obtain public offices . Johnson 
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had been plagued with this problem before the convention and it became 
worse afterward.
68 Under continuous pressure , he apparently weakened 
and either willingly or unwillingly appointed some Democrats to office .
69 
This move quite naturally called forth unhappy comments from Republicans . 
Senator Fessenden warned Secretary McCulloch : 
Sweat , the Copperhead Candidate For Congress in this Dist . 
with others of his kidney , will probably try to persuade Mr .  
Johnson that i f  he c an  control the offices i n  this Dist . he can 
be elected , and will support him. Let not the President be de­
ceived. Sweat is totally untrustworthy . We shall whip him to 
issue is between these two parties . There is no National Union organi­
zation in the field ; there are no candidates representing the National 
Union movement . The Philadelphia Convention has disappeared from the 
contest . " Editorial , New York Times , October 8 , 1866 . 
68 The papers of John Sherman contain many letters charging that 
Copperheads were being appointed or attempting to be appointed to office 
at least as early as May and June , 1866 . An examination of this collec­
tion therefore illustrates the situation which Johnson faced even then . 
See as examples the following letters to Senator Sherman : C .  N .  Locke , 
May 28 ; W .  P .  Nixon , May 28 ; C .  S .  Pyle , June 12 ; James Lewis and others , 
June 22 . 
69Tbe Radical-oriented Nation observed at one point after the 
elections that the president "still makes removals and appointments in 
the interest of the Democratic-Conservative party . " "The Northern Elec­
tions , " Nation , Nov·ember 15 , 1866 , p .  390 . During the campaign ' s  course , 
the hostile New York Tribune noted the recent removal of an unquestion­
ably loyal New York postmaster with many relatives who had served the 
Union faithfully during the war . "So Mr .  Johnson swings round his circle ," 
that organ sarcastically concluded , "rewards loyalty and makes treason 
odious . " Editorial , New York Tribune , September 25 , 1866 . Even the 
Times , whose editor had been one of the principal figures at the Philadel­
phia convention , was forced to warn "the authorities at Washington" that 
every Democratic appointment did "far more harm than ten good ones can 
remedy . " Editorial , New York Times , October 6 , 1866 . 
death with ease , and all the worse if the President makes a 
change in the offices . 70 
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Again , on August 29 , he commented , "I can only regret that the President 
finds himself compelled by his unfortunate complications with bad men to 
remove faithful & competent officers , and to fill their places with cop­
perheads and flunkies . He must take the consequences . "71 A Weed corre-
spondent , while declaring his loyalty to Johnson ' s  cause , dejectedly 
commented concerning the appointment of a Copperhead postmaster : II 
if the good Union men who has [ sic ] stood by the Country in its hour of 
Pearil [ sic ] are to be put [to ] one side to make room for Copperheads 
then I do not know what to say . It will be poor encouragement to fight 
under such circumstances . "72 Another New Yorker , while recognizing the 
necessity of removing Radicals from office , denounced the replacement of 
loyal persons by Copperheads : "Every Loyal man removed to make place 
for Copperhead Democrats , only excites to action the party displaced & 
his friends while before they were disposed to be friendly . "73 A Cali-
fornia man informed Secretary Seward that "to put old Copperheads into 
office because their present professions are sound must utterly destro.y 
all hope of securing popular consideration of the logic of the Executive 
whose practice is so distasteful to the masses . "7
4 
An exasperated New 
Papers . 
70w.  P .  Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , August 17 , 1866 , McCulloch 
7�essenden to McCulloch , August 29 , 1866 , ibid. 
72Aaron Roggen to Weed, August 30 , 1866 , Weed Papers . 
73George W. Ernest to Weed, October 2 ,  1866 , ibid .  
74James W.  Simonton t o  William H .  Seward , September 25 , 1866 , 
Seward Papers . 
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York writer cried , "We cannot stand this , Mr .  Seward , the removal of any 
more loyal men for Copperheads to t8ke their places . "75 In appraising 
the New York situation in late October , Thurlow Weed perhaps unknowingly 
summarized the paradox into which Democratic support had led President 
Johnson , "In many cases where unwise appointments have been made the 
lines are drawn between loyal and disloyal men , with , unhappily , the 
disloyal portion in favor of the President . "
76 
While thus wrestling with complex patronage problems which perhaps 
only he alone fully understood, Johnson made matters worse for himself. 
Re�lizing that if he followed usual patronage practices , the spoils of 
office l� at the disposal of the Radicals , he proceeded to deviate from 
the normal channels of patronage , relying rather upon close friends and 
associates for advice . As one of his biographers has noted, these men 
were neither southerners , nor rebels , nor Copperheads , as the Radicals 
charged , but were conservative Republicans , many of whom had been close 
to Lincoln . They were men like Seward , Welles , McCulloch , Browning , 
Cowan , Dixon , Doolittle , the Thomas Ewing family of Ohio , and the Francis 
P. Blair family of Missouri and Maryland . 77 The best documented example 
of what this reliance meant as far as patronage matters were concerned 
occurred in the instances where Johnson apparently allowed Doolittle a 
voice not only in Wisconsin appointments but also in those in neighboring 
75Elihu G .  Cook to Seward , October 15 , 1866 , ibid. 
76weed to Seward , October 27 , 1866 , ibid. 
77winston , Andrew Johnson , 327 . 
Illinois . 78 Such . a willingness to allow personal advisers to have a 
hand in determining patronage moves , particularly in states not their 
own , was not calculated to ingratiate Johnson on Capitol Hill , regard-
less of the political professions of the men involved .  Some remarks 
89 
made during the debates on the Trumbull amendment were illustrative of 
the discontent felt in Congress concerning this practice . 79 
In addition to relying upon men such as these for advice concern-
ing patronage matters , Johnson also resorted to the use of private agents 
who reported directly to him. One such person was Dan Rice , a famed 
circus clown who had a deep interest in politics . Over the course of 
two months , he recommended that several federal officeholders in west-
ern Pennsylvania and New York be removed and suggested possible replace­
ments . 80 Another presidential spy was located in New York ' s  Third Dis-
tri.ct (Brooklyn ) and forwarded information from there to the chief exe-
cutive upon "your request to me to keep you · advised of your friends in 
81 office and your enemies . "  Yet another informant apparently was sent 
to study the patronage situation in the South . An anguished treasury 
official stationed in Florida complained to his congressman that B .  C .  
78see Anson S .  Miller to Lyman Trumbull ,  June 13 , 15 , 17 , July 6 ,  
1866 ; Trumbull to Miller , June 18 , 1866 ; Trumbull t o  Jason Marsh , June 
21 ,  1866 ; Marsh to Trumbull ,  June 26 ,  July 16 , 1866 , Trumbull Papers ; 
Miller to Elihu Washburne , June 20 ,  1866 , Washburne Papers . 
79see particularly comments of Henderson and Wilson . The Scovel 
affair which came to light during these debates also might be cited as 
a deviation from normal patronage practices in the sense that promises 
seemingly were made to him which ignored the accepted role of concerned 
congressmen . See above , footnote 27 .  
80Rice to Johnson , June 1 ,  23 , July 31 ,  1866 , Johnson Papers . 
81F .  O ' D,rrne to Johnson , April 16 , 1866 , ibid. 
90 
Truman � Johnson ' s  private secretary and also a New York Times corre-
spondent � was in his area boasting that he had the influence to "set up 
82 or knock down just whom he pleases . "  
As the 1866 congressional campaign neared its conclusion � Presi-
dent Johnson seemed determined to make sweeping patronage changes . Such 
was the tone of his remarks during the latter part of his famed " swing 
around the circle . "  In Cleveland on September 3 �  he railed against "this 
gang of office-holders �  these blood-suckers and cormorants , "  as sailed 
congressional attempts to limit his patronage power , and stated his 
thinking to be that the time had arrived "when those who had enjoyed fat 
offices for four years should give way for those who had fought for the 
country . "83 In St . Louis on September 8 ,  he asked how those who had 
"enjoyed the emoluments of office long enough" were to be removed from 
offi ce "unless your Executive can put them out , unless you can reach 
them through the President ? "  He then answered his own question by declar-
ing , 
Well , let me s ay to you , if you will stand by me in this 
action [ cheers ] ,  if you will stand by me in trying to give the 
people a fair chance • • •  to participate in these offices , God 
being willing , I ��11 kick them out . I will kick them out just 
as fast as I can . 
82n .  Richards to Elihu Washburne , June 7 ,  1866 � Washburne Papers . 
8�cPherson , Political History, 136 . 
84Ibid . � 140 . For a discussion of the press ' s  attitude toward 
Johnson ' s  swing around the circle � see Gregg Phifer , "Andrew Johnson 
versus the Press in 1866 ,"  East Tennessee Histori cal Society!:;Publi ca­
tions , XXV (1953 ) ,  3-23 . 
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That wholesale removals was not Johnson ' s  final decision was 
testified to by the fact that in late October a cabinet member still 
could tell a prominent New York politician that the president felt that , 
"in making changes , the greatest care should be exercised . "85 He fol-
lowed this declaration by noting that some appointments had been held up 
because his chief desired "to make as few changes as possible , and none on 
political grounds unless it is clear that the interests of the service 
or the interests of the administration are to be certainly benefited by 
them . "86 In the final analysis , there was apparently not a great change 
in the chief executive ' s  patronage moves after his return from the 
" swing . "  Although the number of changes varied greatly from locality to 
locality , Johnson ' s  actions in September and October , 1866 , were not 
those of a man bent upon general proscription . It cannot be denied that 
he intensified his patronage activities from August onward , but the 
Radical declarations concerning massive removals constituted an obviously 
successful attempt to stampede the loyalties and votes of federal office­
holders and their friends in the Radical direction . 87 The Senate finally 
had to deal with some 526 removals out of an approximate . 2 500 
85Hugh McCulloch to Samuel J .  Tilden , October 22 , 1866 , Bigelow , 
Tilden Letters , I ,  206 . 
86 McCulloch to Tilden , October 26 , 1866 , ibid . , 207 . 
87 An excellent example of the inflammatory nature of Radi.cal 
comments concerning the president ' s  use of the patronage appeared in the 
New York Tribune concerning the upcoming Radical-oriented soldiers con­
vention : "That Mr .  Johnson has issued orders to decapitate all soldiers 
who attend the Pittsburg Convention is stated on good authority [ source 
not indicat ed] . "  Editorial , New York Tribune , September 22 , 1866 . 
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presidential positions . 88 Apparently, little patronage aid was forth-
coming for those who had attended and supported the National Union move­
ment . 89 In sum, as one student of the period has noted, Johnson's 
removals prior to the 1866 elections were anything bu� "free and indis­
criminate . "90 Indeed ·, according to a leading authority on presidential 
removals, of an estimated grand total of 2669 presidential civil service 
officers, Johnson, during his entire administration, removed approxi-
mately 903 . � way of comparison, Lincoln removed 1095 of an estimated 
1520, while Buchanan made 458 changes from about the same number in fol-
lowing an administration of his own party. The Harrison-Tyler adminis­
tration's record was 458 of an approximate 924 . 91 · 
The 1866 congressional elections resulted in a landslide victory 
for the Radical Republicans and a corresponding humiliating defeat for 
88 For an office-by-office count, see Appendix I .  The period 
involved is December 3, 1866, to April 20, 1867 and thus undoubtedly in­
cludes removals made well after the congressional elections and perhaps 
not in connection with them . Two estimates made by senators friendly 
to Johnson during Senate debates on the extent of 1866 removals were 446 
out of 2434 and 440 out of 2450 . Cong . Globe, 39 Cong . ,  2 sess . ,  492, 
1517 . 
89In the weeks following the convention, Johnson received a 
number of letters indicating that the correspondents felt that there was 
a lack of patronage support for the National Union movement . As examples, 
see the following letters to him in the Johnson Papers: Bien Bradbury 
(Washington, D . C . ), August 24; David Wilkin and others (Carson, Nev . ), 
August 27; William J .  Allen (Cairo, Ill .i, Septembe� 21 ; J .  G .  Abbot 
(Boston), September 29; John N .  Cochran (Washington, D . C .), October ?; 
Charles Knap ·(washington, D . C . ), October 27 ;  S .  S.  Henkle (Washington, 
D . C . ), October 28 . The original of the Wilkin letter is in the National 
Archives . 
900berholtzer, History of the United States, I, 438 . 
9lFish, "Removal of Officers by the Presidents, " 77, 81-83 . 
. ] 
the president . Johnson ' s  actions in the hectic weeks and months 
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preceding this outcome seem to indicate that he never developed a defi-
nite patronage policy .  If he ever had one i n  mind , he apparently did 
not reveal it to those friends and associates who subsequently left writ­
ten records for posterity . 92 This close-mouthed approach led at least 
some of his contemporaries to charge that he had failed properly to use 
his executive powers and that he was indecisive . In an August 25 , 1866 , 
diary entry , crusty Gideon Welles lamented the fact that Johnson had not 
acted more promptly . "His delay and the. activity of the Radicals , "  grum­
bled the secretary of the navy , "have weakened his cause • • • •  "93 With 
the advantage of some twenty years hindsight , James G .  Blaine commented , 
The wonder in the political world was , that the President had 
not resorted to this form of attack more promptly , and pursued 
it more determinedly . Hi s delay could be explained only by what 
was termed his talent for procrastination , and to a certain inde­
cision which was fat al to him as an executive officer . 94 
Although the most recent tendency has been to debunk the idea 
that proper use of patronage would have helped Johnson greatly ,95 that 
generation of historians which sympathized with the seventeenth president 
92one of Johnson ' s  cabinet members later commented , "Naturally 
distrustful , he _gave his confidence reluctant ly--never without reserve ; 
he had therefore few constant friends . "  McCulloch , Men and Measures of 
Half � Century: Sketches and Comments (New York , 1888 ) ,To5 .  In com:­
menting on: much the same subj ect , Welles noted , "Many of his most impor­
t ant steps have been taken without the knowledge of any of his Cabinet , 
and: I think without the knowledge of any person whatever . "  Howard K.  
Beale ( ed . ) ,  Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vola . ,  New York , 1960 ) ,  III , 190 . 
93Ibid . ,  II , 587 . 
94Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress ,  II , 267 . 
95For examples ,  see McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 379 ; Brock , An 
American Crisis , 163-65 . 
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felt forced to come to much the same conclusion concerning his use of 
the system as had his contemporaries . Thus , Beale cried, "But Johnson 
did nothing to meet the situation until the fall of 1866 when it was too 
late . "96 Milton wrote of his "faulty judgment , "  of his attempt to change 
his patronage course "too late ,"  and of his "ill-fated procrastination . n9l 
Even Winston CO!!lpla:i,ned of Johnson ' s  "too patient ear" in listening to 
divided counse1 . 98 
Although Johnson seems to have promised much and delivered little 
to his followers as far as patronage was concerned , to charge him with 
indecision is hardly the answer to the question as to why he never devel-
oped a definite policy in the period prior to the 1866 elections . As it 
had been advanced particularly by the Jacksonians and by Lincoln , the 
system of patronage was designed primarily to give recognition to the 
party faithful . The office held was in a sense a badge designating one ' s  
service to his party . The other uses of the system were limited . 
Patronage might be used to tip the balance in favor of one or the other 
faction within a party. Johnson ' s  supporters made the mistake of assum-
ing that it could be used to create an entirely new party completely 
loyal to the president . They failed to realize that it could be of 
value only to an established organization .  
Was Andrew Johnson cognizant of these considerations ? While 
vainly attempting to turn the Radical tide in 1866 , he apparently made 
96Beale , Critical Year , 121 . 
97Milton , � of Hate , 277 , 322 . 
98winston , Andrew Johnson , 353 . 
95 
only such changes in federal positions as he felt absolutely had to be 
made in order to appease in some measure the demands of his followers .  
Did that mean that he did not realize the real power of the patronage 
weapon which he held? Would a policy of general proscription have served 
him better? He .was guilty of departing from the normal channels of 
patronage communication . Would an observance of conventional patronage 
methods have altered the situation which he faced? Would such a move 
have made the Radicals more willing to work with him? Would he indeed 
have been in a better position if he had made no moves whatsoever in the 
patronage arena? In answer to such questions , one recent student of the 
events of 1866 has concluded ,  "In all likelihood patronage would have 
done him little good no matter how he had used it . "99 Perhaps no one in ' 
1866 realized this fact more than did Andrew Johnson himself. 100 
99McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 379 . 
100on April 14 , Johnson bitterly complained to Welles about Senator 
Doolittle and Cowan ' s  urging him to make changes when they themselves 
were not "prepared to t ake or recommend action . "  "These men take upon 
themselves no responsibility ,"  Welles quoted the president as saying , 
"while goading me on to • • • breasting this storm. " He indicated that 
he would t ake action "at the proper time , "  but said that he .must be 
allowed to select that time . Beale , Diary , II , 481 , 483 . The tenor of 
this conversation , as Welles recorded it later , seems to reinforce the 
conclusion that Johnson was aware of the problems involved in making 
patronage changes . 
CHAPTER IV 
LAME DUCK PATRONAGE 
The 1866 elect ions dealt a serious blow to presidential 
reconstruction . Such things as the black codes , the obvious lack of 
repent ance on the part of southerners , and race riots in Memphis in late 
April and early M� of 1866 and in New Orleans on July 30 had convinc ed 
northern voters that the executive program was a failure . Thus , the 
Radicals emerged with an overwhelming maj ority in both houses of Congress 
and with what they considered a mandate to establish a congress ional 
reconstruction policy .  
The first session o f  the Thirty-Ninth Congress had made some steps 
in that direction . By overriding the presidential veto of Trumbull ' s  
Civil Right s · Bill in April , Congress had served notice that it considered 
presidential reconstruction inadequate .  As a first step in establishing 
a feasible alternative , it passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June of 
1866 . The maj or effects of this measure were to make the freedman a 
full citizen of the United States and to bar from political office sev­
eral thousand white southerners who had held prominent positions in the 
Confederacy. 
Congressional leaders implied that ratification of the amendment 
would be sufficient to get southern representations seated in Congress .  
Tennessee promptly approved the measure and in July , 1866 , was restored 
to it s place in the Union . Between October , 1866 , and February , 1867 , 
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the other southern states rejected it , and there the matter stood as the 
second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress {December 3 ,  1866-March 4 ,  
1867 ) was running its course . 1 
While all but one of the former states of the Confederacy were 
rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment , Congress was devising a definite 
reconstruction program. The result was the First Reconstruction Act on 
March 2 ,  1867 , passed over the president ' s  vet o .  Two supplementary meas-
ures followed on March 23 and July 19 . The total effect of these three . 
laws was to reduce the ten unreconstructed states of the South to the 
virtual status of territories . The existing state governments were de-
clared void , the South was divided into five military districts ,  and the 
military commanders were given almost unlimited authority in these areas 
until acceptable constitutions could be drawn up under their direction 
and ratified both by the citizens of the respective states involved and 
2 by Congress . 
At this point , President Johnson could have hindered the congre-
sional effort through his power of appointment . As commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces , it was his responsibility to select the men who were 
to command the five districts . The only stipulation--that the men chosen 
had to hold at least the rank of brigadier general-- as not a serious 
one , since the possibility of appointing men of brevet was well as lineal 
1Patrick , Reconstruction , 74-82 passim.  It ·should be noted that 
the promise of readmiss ion upon ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was implied and was not an official part of the measure . 
· 
2Ibid . , 98-101 . 
rank was not precluded. Thus , Johnson could choose from a hundred or 
more officers , several of whom certainly were sympathetic to . executive 
reconstruction efforts . 3 
Although the opportunity to strike a blow against Congress thus 
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presented itself , Johnson ' s  sense of duty prevailed . He considered the 
First Reconstruction Act to be unconstitutional , but as . chief executive 
he apparently felt that it was his duty to enforce the law until the 
courts decided otherwise . 4 Whatever his reasoning , he made no deliberate 
effort to select officers who would attempt to obstruct the functioning 
of congres sional reconstruction .  
The initial assignment of commanders on March 11 placed maj or 
generals in command of all five districts . John M .  Schofield ; who did 
not prominently display his political colors but who favored lenient 
treatment for the South , had been in charge of Virginia since the preced-
ing August . He remained in control of that stat e , which was designated 
3serton , � and Reconstruction , 115-17 . 
4 Johnson ' s  lack of confidants makes it difficult to determine 
exactly what was his thinking concerning this matter � His seemingly 
faithful execution of . the re construction laws worried .Welles who , in 
trying to explain his chief ' s  moves , wavered from the explanation that 
he simply was doing his duty to one in which he was acting on the erron­
eous theory of Attorney-General Stanbery that under these laws the mili­
tary was a mere police force working under or at least with the civil 
authorities . Beale , Diary , III , 82 , 164 . Secretary of the Interior 
Browning later recorded that Johnson , in response to McCulloch ' s  urgings 
that the military governors be duly appointed in order to forestall any 
impeachment possibility , heatedly declared that he would not be influ­
enced by the impeachment threat but "would go forward in the conscien­
tious discharge of his duty • • • •  " James G .  Randall and Theodore C .  
Pease . (eds . ) , The Diary of Orville .Hickman Browning (2 vola . , Springfield ; 
Ill . , 1925, 19�, II , 135 . 
, 
the First District . The Second District (North and South Carolina ) 
became the domain of Daniel E.  Sickles , a conceited , non-West Pointer 
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who had achieved his rank while serving in the Army of the Potomac during 
the war . Georgia , Florida , and Alabama , the Third District , were given 
to the reluctant George H .  Thomas , who had no desire for the assignment 
and who therefore was replaced on March 15 by John Pope , a man of ques-
tionable suitability for such a delicate task . The Fourth District 
(Mississippi and Arkansas ) was reserved for Edward 0 .  C .  Ord , who had 
been in charge in Arkansas for several months and had proven his accept-
ability for such an assignment . Louisiana and Texas were styled the 
Fifth District and presented to Philip H.  Sheridan , who since the preced-
ing August had been in charge of them plus Florida in a command known as 
the Department of the Gulf . 5 Of the five men , four--Sickles , Sheridan , 
Pope , and Ord--s ided to one degree or another with Congress on the matter 
6 of how to deal with the South . Although it was not clear as to whether 
Johnson or Grant and Stanton had pl�ed the major role in making the 
selections , it was obvious that the chief executive was not allowing 
personal considerations to sway his decision in enforcing congressional 
reconstruction . Concerning these initial choices , the now Radical-
oriented Nation was forced to concede : 
There appears--if we are to judge from the selection of 
generals to command the military districts at the South , under 
the new law , and from the course already adopted by General 
5sefton , �Y and Reconstruction , 18 , 113-15 . 
6 Hyman , "Johnson , Stanton , and Grant , "  93 . 
Schofield , the only doubtful one of them all--to be no di sposi­
tion on the President ' s  part to frustrate or evade the execution 
of the Congressional scheme of Reconstruction • • • •  7 
Whatever his motive for being so co-operative , Johnson had 
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created for himself a dilemma. Having placed in command men who were in 
varying degrees hostile to his program , any subsequent attempts to 
replace them were sure to bring about agitation . In the opinion of the 
president , the need for changes nonetheless soon became apparent . Sheri-
dan proceeded to conduct himself in an arrogant , haughty manner . In 
the wake of the Third Reconstruction Act , which gave the military com� 
manders extensive powers of removal in their districts , he replaced the 
elected governor of Texas and various other lesser civil officials in 
both Texas and Louisiana. Sickles interfered extensively in business 
and commercial proceedings in his area , even in a few cases to setting 
aside court decisions relating to these matters . Pope aroused opposition 
by attempting to control the compos ition of civil juries and to confine 
publication of official state and local governmental announcements to 
newspapers sympathetic to congressional reconstruction . This latter 
action often ran contrary to state law which required that legal notices 
had to be published in local newspapers before the steps to which they 
referred could be taken . He also saw fit to make some removals from 
civil offices and seemingly to try to arrange voting districts for state 
constitutional conventions so as to benefit the Radicals . 8 
7"The Week , "  Nation , March 21 , 1867 , p .  226 . 
8 Sefton , �  and Reconstruction , 144-50 , 158-59 , 166-67 . 
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The commander-in-chief was .not willing to tolerate such continued 
military interference with the . functioning of the civil governments in 
the South . He accordingly determined to remove the offenders from their 
posts . In August � 1867 � the presidential ax fell . Ge�rge H. Thomas was 
ordered to replace Sheridan , but he still was unwilling to become in-
volved in the thorny politics of reconstruction and pleaded ill health.  
In  his stead , he  recommended Winfield Scott Hancock , a man of  strong 
Democratic leanings but acceptable to the chief executive because . of his 
pro-Johnson attitude . Hancock became the new Fifth District commandant . 
At virtually the same t ime , Edward R .  S .  Canby was instruqted to relieve 
Sickles of his command in the Second District . 9 Pope ' s  turn came in late 
December when he was replaced by the more pliable George G .  Meade . The 
same order that placed Meade in command of the Third District also pro-
vided for a new commander for the Fourth District where General Ord was 
10 supplanted by Irvin McDowell . 
Aware of the unrest which had been caus ed by the strong rule of 
Sheridan , Sickles � and Pope , the president probably felt justified in 
making these changes in command . The only thing which his opponents 
could see , however , was that all the friends of congressional reconstruction 
9For official correspondence concerning these assignment changes , 
see Johnson to u .  s .  Grant � August 17 ; Grant to Johnson , August 17 ; 
Johnson to Grant , August 19 ; Johnson to George H .  Thomas , August 2 3 ;  
Johnson t o  Grant , August 26 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .  The original Johnson 
to Thomas letter is in the National Archives . 
'•. .. 
10Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 169 , 173 .  Johnson obviously 
was satisfied with Ord ' s  efforts in Arkansas and Mississippi , but Ord 
himself , for undisclosed personal reasons � requested and received relief 
from his command . Ibid . , 173-74.  
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who initially had been placed in charge in the South had , by the end of 
1867 , been relieved of their posts .  Charges and counter-charges were 
hurled. Conservatives were elated over the removals ; Radicals were 
angry and chagrined . The New York Times summed up the s ituat ion as many 
persons on both sides of the issue saw it by labeling the then impending 
removals as "features of his [Johnson ' s ]  policy as against the policy of 
Congress . They are all parts of his plan for staying the work of 
11 Congress and thwarting its measures of reconstruction . " 
The patronage problems which President Johnson had to face in the 
aftermath of the 1866 congressional elections were much more extensive 
than merely the question of the appointment of military rulers for the 
South . Considering the overwhelming Radical successes , what type of 
policy should be pursued? Should removals continue to be made or should 
he now fall back upon normal channels of patronage and cease all tamper-
ing with the system? Senator William Pitt Fessenden addressed himself 
to these matters immediately following the Maine election : 
The election is now over . No further changes c an  produce the 
least effect , ex�ept to exchange good officers in whom the people 
confide for bad ones , whose appointment s will disgust thinking 
men of all parties . My advice to the President is to turn a deaf 
ear to these fellows when they come about him, talking of 
11Editorial , New York Times , August 7 ,  1867 . It is  interesting 
to note that Congress later retaliated for the removals of the pro­
Congress  generals by exerting pressure to force the removals of Hancock 
and Schofield . See editorial , ibid. , March 27 , 1868 . It perhaps also 
should be noted that , in general , Johnson apparently did little tamper­
ing with the military in patronage matters . As was to be expected , 
charges occurred now and then that anti-Johnson officers were being 
discriminated against , but these were balanced by occasional reverse 
charges by pro-Johnson officers . 
support . All they mean by it is the necessity of - supporting 
them out of the Treasury--not caring how odious they make the 
President and the Secretary . 12 
Although Fessenden probably expressed an opinion held by his 
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moderate . Republipan colleagues in the Senate and House , the chief execu-
• 
tive also was r�ceiving contrary advice . Now thirsting for revenge , 
many of his supporters continued pushing for the removal of his enemies 
I 
from office . A prominent Troy , New York , lawyer declared that it should 
be clear that 11every office holder who . has in this electio� voted against 
your policy of re-construction should be immediately removed & his place 
filled by true and loyal friends of your administration . 1113 In response 
to a Johnson request to inform him of the situatio� in his area , a Mon-.: 
; 
tana supporter' · advised the president that changes should be made in sev-
eral key positions , since most of the appointees to office in that 
territory were "of the Radical school . 1114 Two Freeport , Illinois , 
correspondents urged removal of the Third District assessor on the 
grounds that he was a 11venomous slanderer of Andrew Johnson and abusive 
of his friends . 1115 A Missouri man informed the chief executive that 
the Radicals , by rejecting Johnson men as unqualified for the positions , 
were attempting to regain control of the revenue collectorships of the 
Third and Fifth Districts , which had been made vacant by executive 
12Fessenden to Hugh McCulloch , September 15 , 1866 , McCulloch 
Papers .  
13oavid L .  Seymour to Johnson , November 8 ,  1866 , Johnson Papers . 
14 Thomas E .  Tutt to Johnson , December 24 ,  1866 , ibid . 
l5Thomas J .  Turner and A .  D .  Meacham to Johnson , March 11 , 1867 , 
,!lli, ( original in National Archives ) .  · 
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removal of the incumbents . He noted that they already controlled most 
of the federal offices in the state and warned that they shOuld be content 
only with complete control of the . patronage there . 16 
As the president was pondering the feasibility of making further 
changes , a victorious Congress was turning its attention to those already 
made . While considering whether or not the Johnson appointments made in 
the heat of the congres sional campaigns should be allowed to stand , John 
Sherman , an influential Republican senator and a leading moderate , 
received a number of letters urging confirmation of the Johnson nomina­
tions . 17 A colonel wrote from New York City urging that General Stephen 
McGroarty , a Republican and a disabled veteran with a distinguished war 
record , be confirmed as revenue collector for the Second ( Ohio } District . 18 
A member of the Ohio General Assembly urged that Colonel William E .  
H�es be allowed his position as collector for the Ninth District , in 
16Allen P .  Richardson to Johnson , April 9 ,  1867 , ibid.  Agitation 
for changes was not confined to the immediate aftermath of the 1866 elec­
tions but rather continued throughout most of Johnson ' s  administration .  
Most of these changes continued t o  be urged on the grounds o f  Radical 
domination of offices . For examples of these pressures for removal , see 
the following letters to Johnson in his papers : R. King Cutler , August . 
5 ,  1867 ; R .  D .  Goodwin , October 10 , 1867 ; William Thorpe , October 11 , 
1867 ; Lovell H .  Rous seau ,  December 19 , 1867 ; William M .  Daily , December 
28 , 1867 ; Moses Bates , January 4 ,  1868 ; James Mann , January 9 ,  1868 , Hugh 
McCulloch , June 9 ,  1868 . The original McCulloch letter is in the 
Rutherford B .  Hayes Library . 
17The Sherman papers constitute an extensive collection and many 
of them for this period deal with patronage problems . They therefore 
afford ample examples of support both for and against the presidential 
apppointments of 1866 . 
18Francis Darr to Sherman , December 7 ,  1866 , Sherman Papers . 
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view of his war record and his qualifications for the office . 19 While 
denouncing his activities against the Republican party , another Ohioan 
endorsed Haynes because of his service during the war and because he was 
a 11liberal , gentlemanly , democrat of good habits . 1120 A Cleveland writer 
called for the confirmation of Henry N. Johnson for a collectorship .  He · 
cited Johnson ' s  ability and the fact that he was a loyal Republican as 
reasons why his nomination should be upheld and declared that he knew 
few Republicans who wanted him rej ected . 21 Albert G .  Clark should be 
allowed to have his postmastership , according to one Toledo source , be-
cause he had labored in the Republican party from its inception , actively 
supported the war effort , ably served on the city council , and was capa­
ble of efficiently running the post office . 22 A petition containing 
approximately sixty-three names requested confirmat ion of Brigidier 
General Lewis C .  Hunt as Collector of Customs for the Miami , Ohio , Dis-
trict . A distinguished war record and his reputation as a solid busi­
nessman were Hunt ' s  qualifications for the post . 23 John Hunter should 
be allowed to have his revenue collectorship because , while he did on 
some points follow the presidential policy , he definitely was no Copper-
head, had appointed Republicans to subordinate positions , and was opposed 
ibid. 
l9Frank Sawyer to Sherman , December 18 , 1866 , January 1 ,  1867 , 
20charles Foster to Sherman , December 24 , 1866 , ibid. 
21George A .  Benedict to Sherman , December 29 , 1866 , ibid.  
22John R .  Osborn to Sherman , December 29 , 1866 , ibid . 
23John R .  Osborn and others to Sherman and Benjamin ,  Wade , January 
13 � 1867 , ibid . 
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chiefly by Democrats . 24 The postmaster appointee for Newark , Ohio , 
Thomas J .  Anderson , should . be accepted by the Senate in that , while he 
had been originally a Democrat and then had j oined in the support for 
Johnson , he was a competent officer . 25 A petition containing some 140 
names likewise urged Anderson ' s  confirmation , as did another Newark man 
who confessed that he had never thought that he would want to endorse 
26 any of· the recess appointments made by Andrew Johnson . 
While there were those who recognized the merit of many of 
Johnson ' s  appointees , many others urged rejection . Sherman ' s  correspond-
ence was quite revealing on this point als o .  Several Bucyrus , Ohio , 
writers were urging as early as June , 1866 , that Isaac Bryant , a one-
armed war veteran , not be given the postmastership there because he had 
been a Copperhead supporter . 27 The former postmaster likewise took occa­
sion to denounce Bryant as "one of the dirtiest copperheads . "28 Two 
writers from Upper Sandusky requested that the nominee for revenue asses-
sor of the Fifth District , Theodore E. Cunningham, be rejected by the 
Senate on the grounds that he was an ardent supporter of the Democracy 
24Willia.m T .  McClintock to Sherman , January 25 , 1867 , ibid . 
25James R .  Stanberry to Sherman , December 11 , 1866 , ibid. 
26 James R .  Stanberry and others to Sherman , January 1 ,  1867 , ibid . ; 
James L .  Bickey t o  Sherman , January 16 , 1867 , ibid.  
27James Lewis and others to Sherman , June 22 , 1866 , ibid . 
28 James G .  Robinson to Sherman , October 16 , 1866 , ibid . Bryant ' s  
nomination aroused a considerable storm of protest and as of February , 
1867 , Sherman began to receive several letters urging that he not be 
confirmed . 
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and had filled subordinate offices with Copperheads . 29 Another anti-
Cunningham missive declared that the men he had appointed to office were 
"notorious for their opposition to the Government , during the rebellion , 
and to Congress , in its efforts to restore the Union . "30 A petition 
signed by approximately three hundred citizens of the Ninth District 
called upon the Senate to rej ect all of the changes which had been made 
in that area by the president during the recess of Congress . 31 Another 
Ninth District resident charged that the assessor and collector there 
i• had been replaced by "virulent Copperheads " because they would not "bow 
to Executive dictation and be transferred to the Copperhead camp . "32 
The dismissed collector of the Fourteenth District informed Sherman that 
he and the former assessor had been replaced by men who were substituting 
Copperheads for loyal Union men in subordinate places . 33 
29A .  W .  Brinkerhoff to Sherman � November 2 ,  1866 , �· ; G. W. 
Beery, to She�an , November 2 ,  1866 , �· 
30J .  B .  Rothchild .and others to Sherman , November 3 ,  1866 , �· 
For other letters directed against Cunningham because of hi s Copperhead 
proclivities , see the following in the Sherman collection : Charles H .  
Kurtz and others , December 27 , 1866 ; 0 .  M .  Todd , January 24 ,  1867 ; Porter 
Carlin , Januarh 29 , 1867 ; Porter Carlin and others , February 6 ,  1867 . 
The letter of February 6 constituted a petition by Ohio state legislators 
who had supported Sherman ' s  re-election in 1865 . 
31Charles H .  Preston and others to Sherman , December , 1866 , ill2:.· 
32J .  F .  Dewey to Sherman , December 4 , 1866 , ibid . 
33N .  B • .  Gates to Sherman , December 8 ,  1866 , ibid.  It ·is note� 
worthy that in virtually all the cases cited and in many others. which 
could be noted , the primary charge against the man or men involved was 
that he or they or the people he or they were appointing were Copperhead 
Democrats . The height of such charges must have been a letter from the 
nervous Circleville postmaster who declared that · he . had been informed 
that the president had nominated yet another man for that position . This 
name , like the ones which had been submitted earlier and all others which 
might be submitted in the future ,  was to be rejected because he was a 
Copperhead. See W.  H .  P .  Denny to Sherman , April 6 ,  1867 , ibid. 
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With the Radical Republicans now firmly in the driver ' s  seat , 
there was little question as to whose urgings would . receive the sympathy 
of the Senate . The president had been able to nu,Ute almost any removals . 
which he desired to make prior to the elections , but in the wake of those 
same . elections , obtaining confirmation for the appointments to fill those 
vacated positions proved to be considerably more complex. Be�ween the 
beginning of the second , lame duck session of the Thirty-ninth Congress 
in December , 1866 , and the end of a called session of the Fortieth Con-
gress on April 20 , 1867 , the Senate , while confirming some 1069 nomina-
tions , rejected or tabled approximately 877 others , including 337 post-
masters , 157 internal revenue assessors , and 148 internal revenue col­
lectors . 34 In a letter to a brother who was hoping for confirmation of 
his appointment as a consul , Thomas Ewing , Jr . ,  exclaimed in dismay , "You 
would be surprised to know how the heads of the most gallant officers 
have been struck off by the ultraism of the party leaders . No regard is  
paid to  the[ ir ] fitness or military service--they don ' t  weigh a feather . "35 
In summing up the situation on April 21 , Senator Morgan mildly commented 
to Weed that some of the presidential appointments were either rej ected 
or held over "owing to the practice that has grown up in the Senate of 
permitting Republican members of Congress to control the patronage in 
their Districts . "36 The majority of Republicans in Congress no longer 
34This information is based upon a study of the . U .  �· Senate 
Executive Journal , XV (December 3 ,  1866-November 29 , 1867 ) ,  Index. For 
other figures concerning rej ections and confirmations , see Appendix I I .  
35Thomas Ewing , Jr . t o  Hugh Ewing , February 20 , 1867 , Ewing Papers . 
36Edwin D .  Morgan to Thurlow Weed , April 21 , 1867 , Weed Papers .  
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possessed any confidence in the chief execut ive , and the Senat e , through 
its power of confirmation ,  was determined to deny him use of the patronage 
system. Sniping at the president through thi s means , therefore , contin-
ued on a limited scale throughout the remainder of his administration . 
At least one of Johnson ' s  adherents had given some thought in 
advance to what the president ' s  reaction should be if the Senate should 
choose to follow the course which it ultimately did take .  Writing in 
July , 1866 , to the secretary of the navy , James F .  Babcock , a prominent 
Connecticut Democratic legislator , declared that every act ive Radical 
who would not resign should be removed from office . "If the Senate re-
j ect , "  he added ,  "let them keep rejecting . I would , if President , keep 
them busy at that work . They will soon get t ired of it . "37 There is 
some evidence that the chief executive actually did attempt to follow 
this line of attack , 38 but he soon learned that the Senate could play 
the same game and it was he who apparently first t ired of this fruitless 
activity . As early as February , 1867 , the customs collector at Phila-
delphia, an early Johnson supporter , reported that he had heard that 
37Babcock to Gideon Welles ,  July 12 , 1866 , Welles Papers .  
38out standing examples of this fact are that as of the end of the 
extra session of the Fortieth Congress  on April 20 , 1867 , Johnson had 
submitted five nominees for minister to Austria and none had been 
accepted. Before obtaining confirmations , he was obliged to submit eight 
names for the Cinc innat i postmastership , seven for the Brooklyn post­
mastership , seven for the collector of customs for the eastern Maryland 
district , seven for the Macon City , Missouri , pension agency , and ten 
for the Fifth Wis consin district internal revenue collectorship . Eleven 
nominees each were submitted for the internal revenue as sessorships of 
the Ninth Illinois and Second Indiana di strict s and ten for the Fourth 
Wisconsin district asses sorship and all had been rej ected as of April 20 . 
For these and other examples , see U .  �· Senate Executive Journal , Index. 
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no nominations would be submitted to the Senate if they were likely to 
be rejected . He protested that such a process would deprive the presi-
dent ' s  early friends of "all hopes of official station simply for an 
independent expression of opinion & for active friendship and support" 
. ·� \ �, of him. 39 By mid-1868 , the situation had deteriorated to a point which 
one follower . despondently described to Johnson : "Whenever one of your 
friends applies to you for office , you ask him, can you be confirmed , if 
he answers ,  I don 't  know or , I think I can, you say , bring me evidence 
from leading Senators , that such is the fact , and I will appoint you . "  
He then lamented : 
It places you in the attitude of surrendering your independ­
ence , makes you subject to the control , and dictation of the 
Senate , causes the Senate to make the appointments with your 
consent ; instead of your making them , with its consent , an� 
weakens , if it does not br�ak the cord of attachment , which 
binds your friends to you. 0 
Even if the president indeed had entertained and now was abandon-
· ing the hope of cultivating and supporting a following for himself through 
the use of his patronage powers , he still had a viable alternative to 
surrendering the system to Congress .  Leading members of the Democratic 
party long had been writing to Johnson , assuring him of their support . 
Clearly , any Johnsonian ambition to establish a strong power base within 
the Republican party had been shattered by the outcome of the 1866 elec-
tiona ; why should he not now move in the direction of the Democracy and 
39william F.  Johnston to Andrew Johnson , February 15 , 1867 , 
Johnson Papers . 
4°Felix McCloskey to Johnson , June 13 , 1868 , ibid. 
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use his patronage powers for its benefit? 
Despite the existence of an alternative which was undoubtedly 
personally attractive to the chief executive and which in addition might 
prove quite fruitful , there was little to indicate as the weeks and 
months passed that the president actively was pursuing such a course . 
In the immediate aftermath of the congressional elections , the Nation 
declared that prior to that time , Johnson had proven to be "a faithful 
and humble servant to the Democrats , "  but that publication asserted that 
now the chief magistrate had seen the light : 
Amongst the signs of Mr .  Johnson ' s  conversion is his refusal 
to listen any longer to Democratic applications for offices . 
Delegations of office-seekers and their friends calling atten­
tion to the state of the post-offi�e in their neighborhood are 
now every day sent away sorrowful. 41 
Although the Nation perhaps had overstated the case , the Democrats 
found little more encouragement at the White House than did the Republi-
cans . Many Republican congressmen may have believed, as did Representa-
tive Schenck of Ohio , that their wishes were "not to be regarded at all 
at the other end of the Avenue , "  but they found Democratic colleagues in 
42 the same boat . In some cases , both Democratic and Republican legisla-
tors felt that acceptable executive appointments were being made in their 
districts . 43 While Republicans therefore could not declare that the 
41"This Week , "  Nation ,  November 22 , 1866 , p .  401 . 
4�obert Schenck to John Sherman , March 16 , 1867 , Sherman Papers . 
For an example of Democratic dismay , see James Brooks to Andrew Johnson , 
April 11 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .  
43That such was the case can be seen in the fact that both Demo­
cratic and Republican congressmen in that critical period December , 1866, 
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president had become any more friendly toward them as a result of the 
1866 campaigns , they could not with any honesty flatly charge that he 
had turned the favors of his office toward the Democrats . 
B,y refusing t o  allow the Democracy special access to the privi-
leges of the patronage system, Andrew Johnson must have been aware of 
the damage it would do to him. Like almost any man who has been privi-
leged to hold the high office which he held , Johnson apparently yearned 
for another term ,  a term of his own . His chances of receiving the Repub-
lican nomination were nonexistent , although Gideon Welles as late as 
44 June 25 , 1868 , professed to see some hope for that developement . 
Johnson might have had a chance to secure the Democratic nomination , but 
his steadfast refusal to surrender the patronage system to the Democrats 
was one of the factors which deprived him of it .
45 
Concerning Andrew Johnson ' s  patronage activities in the period 
between the disastrous out come of the 1866 elections and the end of his 
administration on March 4 , 1869 , the only apparent conclusion one can 
to April 20 , 1867 , were receiving desired appointments or were urging 
confirmation for appointments in their respective districts . For exam­
ples from the Democratic side , see Rufus P .  Spaulding to John Sherman , 
January 8 ,  March 20 , 1867 , Sherman Papers ; Reverdy Johnson to Andrew 
Johnson , March 2 ,  1867 , Johnson Papers ;  E .  D .  Holbrook to John Sherman , 
March 11 , 1867 , Sherman Papers ; Charles A .  Eldredge to Andrew Johnson , 
April 6 ,  April 14 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .  From the Republican standpoint , 
see William Lawrence to John Sherman , March 9 ,  1867 , and Samuel Shella­
barger to Benj amin Wade and John Sherman , March 11 , 1867 , Sherman Papers .  
The original April 14 Eldredge to Johnson letter is in the National 
Archives . 
44 Beale , Diary, III , 391 . 
45charles H .  Coleman , The Election of 1868 : The Democratic Effort 
to Regain Control (New York , 1933 ) , 162-63-. - --
fairly reach is  that he largely reverted to the more conventional 
channels of patronage . This is not to sa;y that he was above personal 
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use of the system. He endeavored to find comfortable positions for at 
least the key men who had supported him in 1866 . McCulloch , Welles , and 
Seward remained secure in their posts , despite many attempts to unseat 
them. Although it naturally aroused criticism, Johnson attempted with 
varying degrees of success to place men such as Reverdy Johnson , Francis 
46 P .  Blair , Jr . , Henry J .  Ra;ymond , and Edgar Cowan in foreign posts . 
Yet , although estranged from the Republican party , appointment of a few 
close supporters to important situations was as far as he would go . He 
did not return to the Democratic fold , although most of what support he 
had after 1866 came from Democrats . Andrew Johnson for all practical 
purposes became a lame duck president after the 1866 elections , but he 
was still determined to chart his own political course . 
46For examples of the criticisms leveled against Johnson ' s  over­
seas appointments ,  see "The Week , "  Nation , January 24 , 1867 , pp . 61-62 ; 
editorial , New York Tribune , January 18 , 1868 . 
CHAPTER V 
THE INHERITED FAMILY 
In April , 1865 , Andrew Johnson inherited the presidency of the 
United States . With that exalted position went all of the trials and 
tribulations of a nation in the immediate aftermath of a long and bitter 
civil war , a problem which no other American chief of state has had to 
face . Added to this legacy was another--President Lincoln ' s  body of 
advisers , an official family composed of men of varied political opinions 
and experience .  
B,y virtue of its broad domestic as well as foreign responsibilities , 
the key position in the cabinet was that of secretary of state , the post 
held by William Henry Seward . With his close friend and adviser Thurlow 
Weed , Seward was a powerful but by 1865 somewhat declining figure in New 
York politics . Twice elected governor of that pivotal state , he was 
sent to the Senate as a Whig in 1848 .  Increasingly identifying himself 
in the 1850 ' s  with the growing anti-slavery sentiment in the North , he 
decided to cast his lot with the emerging Republican party . Denied that 
organization ' s  nomination for president in 1856 and again in 1860--the 
latter a particularly bitter blow--he eventually accepted Lincoln ' s  offer 
to head the State Department , believing that from that situation he both 
could and should dominate the administration .  After Lincoln thwarted 
this notion by proving himself master of his own house , Seward settled 
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down and became a valuable asset to his chief during the course of the 
1 war . 
Another cabinet post of great pro�nence , that of secretary of 
war , was in possession of Edwin McMasters Stanton , who had been a sur-
prise selection Lincoln made in early 1862 to replace Simon Cameron , a 
wily Pennsylvania politician who had become a polit ical liability . A 
former Ohio lawyer , Stanton had achieved a national reputation while 
practicing before the United States Supreme Court in the 1850 ' s .  A com-
mitted Union man , he , like Johnson , had supported Breckinridge for the 
presidency in 1860 in the belief that his election alone could save the 
Union . Possessed of only limited political experience but apparently 
adhering to Democratic principles , he became attorney-general in the 
Buchanan cabinet in December ,  1860 . Relegated once again to private 
life after Buchanan left office , he expressed nothing but contempt and 
hostility for the Lincoln government , but for some still largely unknown 
reason , Lincoln tapped him to be secretary of war . Although often 
charged with unwarranted interference with military operations , he served 
ably throughout the remainder of the war . Somewhere along the way , he 
embraced Radical principles and was accepted by the Radicals as one of 
their own , but he kept this allegiance quiet during Lincoln ' s  lifetime . 2 
loexter Perkins , nWilliam Henry Seward , n  D .  A .  B . , XVI , 615-19 . 
- - -
2A .  Howard Meneely , nEdwin McMasters Stanton , "  ibid . , XVII ,  517-
19 ; Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 264-67 . According to Meneely , Cameron 
later claimed that he influenced Lincoln ' s  decision to take Stanton into 
the cabinet . Dewitt flatly states that such was the cas e . One of Seward ' s  
biographers assigns t o  Seward a major role in the matter . See Glyndon 
G .  Van Deusen , William Henry Seward (New York , 1967 ) ,  324 . According to 
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The secretary of the treasury was an influential individual 
because of the lucrative revenue posts which were in his charge . Hugh 
McCulloch was the third person whom Lincoln had tried at that task but 
was as yet unproven at the time of his chief ' s  untimely demise . After 
holding important financial situations in Indiana , McCulloch had been 
appointed comptroller of the currency in 1863 by the then secretary of 
the treasury , Salmon P. Chase .  He remained i n  that position until chosen 
by Lincoln in March , 1865 , to succeed William Pitt Fessenden , who had 
replaced Chase but who now was mov ing into the Senat e . 3 
Gideon Welles was chosen secretary of the navy in 1861 and he was 
still in that position in 1865 . A former newspaper editor , Welles had 
served . in the Connect icut legislature as a Democrat between 1827 and 
1835 . During the Mexican War , he gained what later was to prove valuable 
experience by serving as chief of the Naval Bureau of Provisions and 
Clothing. Alienated from the Democrats by the slavery issue , he helped 
found the Republican party in Connecti cut and headed that state ' s  dele-
gation to the Republican national convention in 1860 . Following his 
appointment , he was constantly on guard to protect the prerogatives of 
his department against the attempted encroachments of both Seward and 
Stanton ; at the s ame t ime , he revealed his own capabilities as an 
Stanton ' s  latest biography , two key considerations in the decision were 
that Cameron favored him and that both Seward and Secretary . of · the Treas­
ury Chase , who agreed on very little , held high opinions of him. Benja­
min P .  Thomas and Harold M. Hyman , Stanton : The Life and Times of Lincoln ' s  
Secretary of War (New York , 1962 } ,  135-36 . 
- -- --
-
3 Alexander D .  Noyes , "Hugh McCulloch , "  D .  A .  ·B . , XII , 6-7 . 
117 
4 executive and made a definite contribution to the success of Union arms .  
James Speed had been made attorney-general about four months 
before Lincoln ' s  death . A native of the border state of Kentucky , 
Speed ' s  strong anti-slavery stand had allowed him to gain only limited 
political experience prior to the outbreak of the war . Elected to the 
state senate in 1861 as an ardent Union man , he became one of Lincoln ' s  
principal advisers on matters relating t o  that state . When Missourian 
Edward Bates wearied of the attorney-generalship and resigned in late 
1864 , Lincoln chose Speed as his successor . 5 
Montgomery Blair , Lincoln ' s  initial choice for postmaster-general , 
had served in that capacity until September , 1864 , when Radical Republi-
can agitation against him became too great for the president to ignore 
in an election year . He thus formally asked for Blair ' s  resignation at 
that point and selected former Ohio Governor William Dennison to replace 
him. 6 A lawyer ·  by profession ,  Dennison was one of the early Ohio members 
of the Republican party and was chairman of the Ohio delegation to the 
first Republican national convention in 1856 . Although the people of 
Ohio knew very little about him and generally considered his nomination 
as evidence of the lack of qualified candidates , he was elected governor 
in 1859 . His actions at the war ' s  outset were unpopular and he therefore 
4Howard K .  Beale , "Gideon Welles , "  ibid. , XIX , 629-31 ; Carman and 
Luthin , Lincoln � the Patronage , 16 . See also Richard S .  West , Jr . , 
Gideon Welles :  Lincoln ' s  � Department (New York , 1943 ) .  
5E .  Merton Coulter , "James Speed ,"  D .  A .  B . , XVII , 440 . 
6 Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 273-77 . 
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was not renominated in 1861 . 7 His most immediate service to the party 
prior to assuming the duties of postmaster-general was to organize a 
pro-Lincoln slate of Ohio delegates to the 1864 convention and then to 
serve as permanent chairman of that convention . 8 
Following his re-election in 1864 , President Lincoln decided to 
name a new secretary of the interior and settled upon United States 
Senator James Harlan of Iowa , a very close friend of the Lincoln family. 
The product of a frontier environment , Harlan had been both educator and 
lawyer . An ardent Whig and former Free-Boiler , he was elected to the 
Senate in 185 5 by an action that had to be reaffirmed by the Iowa legis-
lature two years later , since it had originally been done after one house . 
had adjourned . The Republican choice for a second term in 1860 , he sub-
sequently became an active supporter of Abraham Lincoln and his friend-
ship with the chief executive made his selection for a cabinet post vir­
tually a foregone conclusion . 9 The resignation of John P .  Usher , the 
incumbent secretary , was not to become effective until May 15 , 1865 , and 
Harlan therefore had not assumed his position at the time Johnson came 
10 to the presidency . 
These were the men whom Johnson bad to decide to retain . or to 
replace as his official advisers . Having been thrust into a situation 
7 Homer C .  Hockett , "William Dennison , "  D .  A .  B . , V ,  241 .  
8 Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the . Patronage , 278 . 
9Earle D .  Ros s , "James Harlan , 11 D .  A .  B . , VII I ,  268 . 
10 Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 311-12 . 
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to which he had not been elected , the new president apparently not only 
felt obliged to follow what he considered to be his predecessor ' s  poli-
cies but also to retain his official family , an understandable attitude 
but one that did not remain unchallenged . Some gentle prodding for 
changes took place at the outset of his administration .  While declaring 
that he had not "one word by way of advice , "  Senator Dixon , in a letter 
in early May , noted that should the chief executive be considering chan­
ges in his cabinet , Montgomery Blair should be given a position . 11 A 
few days later , Lewis D .  Campbell , one of the new president ' s  Ohio cron-
ies , expressed the opinion that the people seemed to pre�er that Seward 
and McCulloch be retained in their positions . "But i� the residue of 
the Cabinet were replaced , "  he added ,  "I think the country would gener-
12 ally approve of it . "  Such temperate suggestions went unheeded , and 
during the early months of 1866 , those seeking to give him counsel began 
to be more emphatic about the neces sity of cabinet changes . From Ohio , 
Campbell quickly saw the direction in which Congress was headed and 
warned his illustrious �iend that should "you retain the same council 
you have around you controlling the Executive patronage to promote their 
views and . not yours , I greatly fear the radi cals will rapidly increase 
in power and strength . "13 From Hartford , one of Gideon Welles ' regular 
correspondents declared that , as matters stood at that juncture , the 
11James Dixon to Johnson , May 5 ,  1865 , Johnson Papers . 
12 Campbell to Johnson , May 8 ,  1865 , ibid . 
13campbell to Johnson , January 19 , 1866 , ibid. 
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chief magistrate had enemies in his own official family as well as in 
federal offices throughout the nation . The simple answer to this problem 
was a "reconstructed Cabinet and the appointment of true friends to offi-
cial position . "  Such a move would rally the necessary support for a 
14 "Johnson party as strong as that which rallied around Andrew Jackson. "  
By May , it .was clear that the president had men of Radical senti-
ment within his official body of advisers , but despite urgings from his 
friends to show some decisiveness and rid himself of such untrustworthy 
men , Johnson made no move in that direction . In an exasperated mood , 
Thomas Ewing, Jr . , wrote to his influential father : "The President does 
not move . to sustain himself--whether from fear of some law being passed 
crippling his power of removal & appointment , or from constitutional 
inaction no one knows . I think it �s the latter . "15 The chief executive , 
however , had bis own reasons for not making the , cabinet removals which 
were so widely sought by his supporters . Although Radical newspapers 
were making much of the accession of men such as Harlan, Speed , and 
Stanton to their ranks , none of the persons in question had said anything 
to Johnson to indicate new loyalties , and he therefore could not be cer-
tain that they held such opinions . He preferred to believe that they 
were honorable men and wou+d voluntarily resign if they did .not believe 
in his policies . 16 
14Altred E .  Burr to Welles , April 27 ,  1866 , Welles Papers . 
15Ewing Jr . to Thomas Ewing , May 16 , 1866 , Ewing Family Papers . 
16 Beale , Diary,  II , 481-82 , 524-25 . 
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The: president ' s  assumption proved partly correct . The issuance 
of invitations to attend the National Union convention scheduled for 
August in Philadelphia had the effect of smoking out most of Johnson ' s  
opposition within his official family . In July , Speed , Dennison , and 
Harlan resigned . Speed and Dennison had been opposed to a lenient policy 
toward the South from the time Lincoln had shown a willingness to adopt 
that course . 17 Harlan apparently felt much the same way , although 
Johnson had to ask for his resignation . 18 
The chief execut ive filled the vacated positions with men whose 
loyalty to him was unquestionable . The Post Office Department went to 
Alexander Randall , who had been a prime mover in organizing the National 
Union drive to support Johnson . During his early political career in 
Wisconsin , Randall had manifested both Whig and Democratic leanings , but 
he gradually became identified with the Free-Soil element and then with 
the Republicans . Serving as governor of Wisconsin for two terms , he was 
in office when the war came . He worked energetically to enlist forces 
for the Union cause and sought a military commission upon . leaving office . 
Lincoln did not see fit to grant this desire , but he finally did make 
him first assistant postmaster-general in 1863 , a position from which he 
actively worked for Lincoln ' s  re-election and then proceeded to render 
valuable service to his chief ' s  succes sor . 19 
17 Carman and Luthin , Lincoln and the Patronage , 312-13 . 
18 Milton , Age of Hate , 340 . Radicals quite naturally clas sified 
these resignations as act s  of conscience . See Blaine , Twenty Years of 
Congress , II , 218-19 and Burke A .  Hinsdale (ed . ) ,  The Works of James 
Abram Garfield ( 2  vola . ,  Boston , 1882 ) , I ,  234 . 
19Joseph Schafer , "Alexander Williams Randall , "  D .  A.- B . , XV ,  344-
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The attorney-generalship was bestowed upon a man of much greater 
legal ability and reputat ion than Speed had possessed. An Ohio lawyer ,  
Henry Stanbery had for a time practiced law with Thomas Ewing and gradu­
ally became widely known . Elected attorney-general of Ohio in 1846 , he 
extended his practice into the United States courts and the Ohio Supreme 
Court , later in 185 3 ,  moving his law offices to Cincinnati where he sue-
cessfully pursued his profession until brought to the national scene in 
1866 . 20 
Former Senator Orville Hickman Browning of Illinois received the 
Interior Department appointment . Originally a Whig , Browning had served 
... . .  
in both houses of the Illinois legislature but lost bids for Congress in 
1843 , 1850 , and 1852 . He .became a Republican in the mid-1850 ' s  and 
watched rather enviously as a close friend , Abraham Lincoln , rapidly 
rose to the heights of success within the ranks of that party . Despite 
this political j ealousy , he served as an Illinois delegate to the 1860 
Republican convention and was instrumental in winning votes for Lincoln. 
Chosen by Governor Yates to fill Stephen A.  Douglas ' unexpired senatorial 
term, Browning drifted away from the Illinoisan in the White House over 
the issue of emancipation . Denied a term of his own when the Democrats 
gained control of the Illinois legislature in 1862 , Browning then moved 
to support Andrew Johnson and in May , 1866 , became his adviser on Illi­
nois patronage and an active participant in the National Union movement . 21 
20 A.  Howard Meneely , "Henry Stanbery ," ibid . , XVII , 498 . 
2�heodore C .  Pease , "Orville Hickman Browning , "  ibid . , III , 175-
76 . See also Maurice G. Baxter , Orville H. Browning : LiDCOln ' s  Friend 
and Critic ( Bloomington , Ind . , 1957 ) .  Thomas Ewing may have influenced 
Johnson ' s  selections of St anbery and Browning . Se� Ewing to Johnson , 
March 15 , 1866 , Johnson Papers . 
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Although a large number of removals were made subsequently by the 
22 new department heads , they failed to affect measurably the . outcome of 
the 1866 elections . Johnsonian proponents ,  even so , were ready for new 
changes by 1867 . The influential Blair family definitely wanted new 
patronage moves . Driven from Republican ranks by the Radi cals , they 
determined to organize a new party built around the . War Democrats , men 
who like the Blairs had supported Lincoln in 1864 but now found themselves 
without a party . Even beyond the 1866 campaign , th� Blairs persisted in 
their efforts .  They were particularly determined to have changes in the 
key positions of secretary of state and secretary of war and , if .need be 
in order to have them, they were willing to see the entire family re­
placed . 23 Indeed , early in 1867 , the elder Francis Preston Blair proposed 
exactly that move . His nominees were John A.  Andrew ( secretary of state ) ,  
philanthropist George Peabody ( secretary of the treasury } , Horace Greeley 
(postmaster-general ) ,  Governor Jacob D .  Cox of Ohio ( secretary of the 
interior ) , and Edgar Cowan ( attorney-general ) .  Ad interim appointments 
as secretary of war and secretary of the navy were to go to General Grant 
and Admiral David G .  Farragut , respectively . 24 Late in February , he 
22 Winston , Andrew Johnson , 363 ; Ralph Korngold , Thaddeus Stevens , 
A Being DarkJ.y Wise and Rudely Great (New York , 1955 ) ,  356 . 
23william E .  Smith , The Francis Preston Blair FamiJ.y in Politics 
(2 vols . ;  New York , 1933 ) ,  II , 329-33 passim. Montgomery Blair was an 
especially bitter foe of Seward and took every opportunity to denounce 
him , first privately (as an example , see Blair to Johnson , April 11 , 
1866 , Johnson Papers ) and then openly , in the hope that public opinion 
would force the New Yorker from office . Neither tactic worked .  Cox , 
Politics , Principle , and Prejudice , 66-67 . 
24Blair to Johnson , February 12 , 1867 , Johnson Papers .  
once again urged a clean sweep of the cabinet "as a . concession to the 
discontents of the country . "25 Johnson, however, could see no reason 
for such a move and the changes were not forthcoming. 26 
The Blairs were not the only persons trying to force cabinet 
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removals . In a February letter to his father, the yo�ger Ewing reported 
a great deal of pressure being brought to bear upon the president to 
reorganize his official family . The leader of this drive, according to 
Ewing, was Greeley . The object was to place universal suffrage men in 
the more important positions, and the individuals against whom the great­
est effort was being made were Seward, Stanton, Welles, and Randa11 . 27 
The pressure was intensified by conservative elements in various parts 
of the nation prior to the state elections of October and November . By 
that time, Seward, McCulloch, and Randall were being singled out as John­
son' s  greatest political liabilities . 28 Representative of this sentiment 
was an Indiana newspaper editor who asked what these men were doing for 
the president : "Do they appoint your friends to public positions? If · 
they do an exception to that rule is made in this section . "29 still 
Johnson held back and the changes were not made . 
25Blair to Johnson, February 24, 1867, ibid. 
2�ilton, Age of Hate, 386 . 
27Thomas Ewing, Jr . ,  to Thomas Ewing, February 19, 1867, Ewing 
Family Papers .  
2\ilton, � of Hate, 464 . 
29J .  B .  Stoll to Johnson, September 25, 1867, Johnson Papers . 
125 
The final great effort to bring about turnovers in the cabinet 
came in the immediate aftermath of the impeachment trial. The inducement 
placed before Johnson was the Democratic nomination for president, and 
the particular targets for attack were Seward and McCulloch. On the eve 
of the presidential balloting at the Democratic convention, Johnson was 
informed that his friends had labored arduously for his nomination, and 
that they felt "this evening that your success would have been beyond all 
doubt if you had not such a dead weight to carry, in your Cabinet, espe­
cially the State and Treasury Departments."30 Another Johnsonian Demo-
crat earlier had pleaded for changes on the grounds that such a move 
would make Johnson's strength among Democratic delegates "assume a formid­
able shape at once."31 To all such pleas, Johnson's only reply was a 
question: "Are we not doing well in carrying seven Cabinet officers, 
who were Republicans, in favor of all the measures that the Democrats 
profess to support?"32 Not even the prospect of a presidential nomination 
could force him to abandon those men who had stood by him during his 
time of tria1.33 
30R. W. Latham to Johnson, July 7 ,  1868, ibid. Latham earlier 
had lamented that cabinet changes made twelve or-even eight months before 
would have assured Johnson of the nomination. See Latham to Johnson, 
June 11, 1868, ibid. 
3laalph W. Newton to Johnson, June 24, 1868, ibid. For other 
letters holding forth the hope of nomination in return for cabinet chan­
ges, see William W. Warden to Johnson, June 29, July 1, 1868, ibid. 
32 . Johnson to Edmund Cooper, July 8, 1868, ibid. 
33one historian sympathetic to Johnson has declared that both 
Seward and McCulloch were "devious and uncandid in their treatment of 
the President." Milton, Age of Hate, 641. This charge, however, appears 
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The president ' s  loyalty to his executive officers was not recipro-
cated in every case . Perhaps Johnson ' s  ardent supporters were wrong in 
suspecting from t ime to t ime the fidelity of men like McCulloch and 
Seward , but as time passed , there was room for little doubt concerning 
War Secretary Edwin M .  Stanton . Almost from the time of Johnson ' s  eleva-
tion to the presidency , Stanton ' s  removal from office both was expected 
and called for by Johnsonians . As early as mid-June ,_ 1865 , the new chief 
was being warned that Stanton was treacherous and should be removed 
"while it is yet time" and the names of Frank P .  Blair , Jr . ,  and Cassius 
M. Clay were being suggested as replacements . 34 These remonstrances fell 
on deaf ears and Stanton remained in his place . 
Rumors of the secretary ' s  imminent resignation gradually faded , 
only to be given new life in early 1866 . The president received several 
letters in late January and early February urging that Stanton be replaced 
by Major General James B .  Steedman , a trusted pro-Johnson soldier-
politician .  Citing newspaper accounts of Stanton ' s  impending departure , 
grossly unfair , especially to Seward , who probably lost what political 
influence he yet had by standing by Johnson . Van Deusen , Seward , 482 . 
McCulloch ' s  major error was retaining in offi ce and protecting the decid­
edly Radical Commissioner of Internal Revenue , E .  A .  Rollins , who finally 
resigned in June , 1868 , after filling many revenue positions with Radi­
cals . McCulloch , however , was not a politician and this fact perhaps 
explains the reason for his slowness in sensing Rollins ' disloyalty . 
There appears to be little evidence that McCulloch himself was in any 
way disloyal to his chief . For some comments on the McCulloch-Rollins 
relationship , see Herbert S .  Schell , "Hugh McCulloch and the Treasury 
Department , 1865-1869 , "  Mississippi Valley Historical Review , XVII 
(December , 1930 ) ,  415 . 
34Letters from Herman Walther to Johnson , June 15 , 1865 ; James S .  
Rollins to Johnson , June 7 ,  1865 ; David Dudley Field t o  Johnson , June 8 ,  
1865 ; W .  W .  Jones to Johnson , June 20 , 1865 , Johnson Papers . 
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George H .  Pendleton , prominent Ohio politician ,  highly recommended 
Steedman as "an able , energetic , accomplished businessman , of great exe-
cutive ability" and predicted that in him Johnson would have "an able 
faithful trustworthy adviser of commanding influence . "35 The erratic 
editor of the New York Tribune also endorsed the general , calling him 
"one of the bravest and truest of our Union Volunteers ,  and a capable , 
devoted patriot . "36 
The reports of which these men had heard also died without any 
visible effect upon the war minister ' s  position , but as the year 1866 
moved toward the fateful congressional elections , his lack of loyalty 
became increasingly evident in the amount of official advertising given 
by the War Department to newspapers which violently opposed the president . 37 
Although Johnson tried to counter the effects of his secretary ' s actions 
by removing as much patronage as possible from his control and by attempt-
38 
ing to place military notices in organs friendly to the administrat ion , 
he allowed the man himself to retain his office . While other cabinet 
officials who were no longer in sympathy with the official policies of 
the executive offered their resignations in July , Stanton remained in 
35Pendleton to Johnson , January 28 , 1866 , ibid. 
36Horace Greeley to Johnson , January 28 , 1866 , ibid.  Dean Rich­
mond , Samuel J .  Tilden , Samuel Barlow , and . Augustus Schell were among 
others who wrote letters of endorsement for Steedman . 
37Milton , �o�ate , 324 . It _is of interest to note that 
while Stanton took such covert actions as cited , he assumed no open 
stand against Johnson ' s  policies and in fact continued the appearance of 
supporting the president ' s  stand until well into 1867 . Dewitt , Impeach­
ment and Trial , 267-69 . 
38 Thomas and Hyman , Stanton , 529 . 
his place . Secretary McCulloch later recorded his impression of the 
entire matter : 
He [ Stanton ] attended the Cabinet meetings , not as an adviser 
of the President , but as an opponent of the policy to which he 
had himself been committed , and the President lacked the nerve 
to dismiss him. The failure of the President to exercise his 
undoubted right to rid himself of a minister who differed with 
him upon very important questions , who had become personally 
obnoxious to him , and whom he regarded as an enemy and a spy , 
was a blunder for which there was no excuse , 39 
Whether Stanton was retained because the president lacked the . 
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nerve to replace him or was simply willing to give every benefit of the 
doubt to a man who had not the honesty to admit his true position , one 
thing was certain--the chief executive ' s  enemies knew that he had within 
the ranks of his own official family one of their own , and they thus 
moved to protect him from removal . Fearful that Johnson would make a 
wholesale sweep of hostile officeholders { including Stanton ) as soon as 
Congress adj ourned ,  the Radical members of the Thirty-ninth Congress set-
tled upon a course of action which later was described by James G .  Blaine , 
who had been of that persuasion : 
Against the early decision of the founders • • • against the 
repeatedly expressed judgment of ex-President Madison , against 
the equally emphatic judgment of Chief Justice Marshall , and 
above all , against the unbroken practice of the Government for 
seventy-eight years , the Republican leaders now determined to 
deprive the President of the power of removing Federal officers . 4° 
The measure which was designed to safeguard Radical incumbents in their 
respective offices was known as the Tenure of Office Act . Passed on 
39McCulloch , Men and Measures ,  391 . 
40Blaine , Twenty Years of Congress , II , 270 . 
March 2 ,  1867 , 41 in its final form, it had as its heart this clause :  
That every person holding any civil office t o  which he has 
been appointed , by and with the advice and consent of the Senate , 
and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such 
office and shall become duly qualified to act therein , is and 
shall be entitled to hold such office unt il a successor shall 
have been appointed by the President , with the advice and consent 
of the Senate , and duly qualified ; and that the Secretaries of 
State , of the Treasury , of War , of the Navy , and of the Interior , 
the Postmaster-General , and the Attorney-General shall hold 
their offices respectively for and during the t erm of the Presi­
dent by whom they may have been appointed and for one month 
thereafter , subj ect
4
to removal by and with the advice and con­
sent of the Senate . 2 
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The views of the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment concerning the Tenure of Office Act naturally were widely divergent . 
To the majority of the Radical-dominated Congress , the passage of the 
4
1March 2 was a red letter day in the Radical struggle against 
Johnson. On that day , not only did the Tenure of Office Act become law 
but also the First Reconstruction Act and the Army Appropriations Act . 
The latter , while providing as always for army salaries , included an 
unusual clause which called for the permanent stationing in Washington 
of the general-in-chief (Grant ) and decreed that all orders by the presi­
dent and the secretary of war had to be issued through him to be valid .  
The Tenure Act and this sect ion of the Army Act were designed t o  tie the 
chief executive ' s" hands polit ically and militarily . However , since Grant 
and Johnson worked in harmony until early 1868 , any suggested effect of 
this measure upon the actual course of reconstruction in 1867 is very 
much open to question . Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 111-12 ; 
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 482n . 
4�ichardson , Messages and Papers , VI , 492 . In the original 
measure , a provision to include cabinet members was excluded by the 
Senate , as it earlier had been by the House .  The latter body , however , 
experienced a change of heart when rumors concerning the imminent removal 
of Stanton once again began to make the rounds . Subsequently , before 
the Senate could complete action on the bill , the House voted to include 
cabinet members . The Senate , which was less dominated by the Radicals , 
refused to accept this move , but the House insisted upon the inclusion .  
A conference committee then worked out a compromise statement which 
included the cabinet in the manner des cribed . Radicals now assumed that 
their favorite was safe . Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 183-85 , 193-93 . 
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measure simply rectified a mistake made by the early fathers of the 
nation . The First Congress had recognized the power of removal by the 
executive largely because of the greatness  of the man who at that time 
occupied the office .  In subsequent years , however , that authority had 
been misused by lesser men to exalt the power of the executive branch , 
thus necessit ating remedial action in order to prevent a despotism. 43 
President Johnson could not be expected to regard the measure in 
question in such a favorable light . To him , it was flying in the face 
of all precedents--a flagrant attempt by Congress to usurp power which 
was rightfully his . Although the act had been designed in such a manner 
as to bring even the cabinet under its provisions in an obvious attempt 
to save Stanton from removal , all the members of that body condemned it , 
and the secretary of war even went so far as to help Seward write the 
presidential vet o . 44 That message , grounded upon the congressional 
debates of 1789 , pointed to the precedents which subsequently had been 
set : 
That the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the 
President. of the United States is a principle which has been not 
more distinctly declared by judicial authority and judicial com­
mentaries than it has been uniformly practiced upon by the 
legislative and executive departments of the Government . 45 
Established practices were traced through Lincoln , who ,  Congress was 
reminded , had displaced numerous officeholders "upon probable suspicion" 
43william A. Dunning , Es sS1's .2B. the Civil War and Reconstruction � 
Related Topics { New York , 1898 , 289 . 
44 �. , 288 ; Patrick , Reconstruction , 121 . 
45Richardson , Messages and Papers ,  VI , 493 . 
131 
of their disloyalty to the Union . 46 The presidential arguments were to 
no avail as the measure became law over his vet o .
47 
Several months passed before the president chose to give the 
Tenure Act a maj or test . During this time , Stanton became increasingly 
obnoxious to him. Following the passage of the act , which had been de-
signed in part to protect him, the secretary allowed his Radical proclivi-
ties to be ever more apparent . When the chief executive learned that 
his war secretary had personally written the second supplementary recon-
struction bill which had recently become law over his veto , he decided 
48 that the time had come to make some changes in the War Department . As 
the initial move in the same month that also was to see the removal of 
two top generals from their southern commands , Johnson asked for Stanton ' s  
resignation . When the secretary refused to surrender his post , the 
chief magistrate , against the advice of General Grant , suspended him from 
46The entire veto message may be found in ibid . , 493-98 . 
47That the Tenure of Office Act had been aimed exclusively at 
Johnson became clearly evident very shortly after Grant took office . A 
move was made to repeal the act and , although the Senate would not go 
along with this effort , a compromise was reached whereby Grant could re­
move officials during the recess of Congress , subject to Senate approval 
during the following session . The purpose ,  according to one senator , 
was "so that there might be no obstacle in the path of General Grant to 
the removal of the obnoxious officials who had adhered to Andrew Johnson . "  
George F .  Hoar , Autobiography of Seventy Years ( 2  vols . ,  New York , 1905 } ,  
II , 138 . In 1887 , Congress repealed the restrictions of both the Tenure 
Act and the Army Act . Claude B.  Cross , "The Removal Power of the Presi­
dent and the Test of Responsibility , "  Cornell Law Quarterly , XL (Fall , 
1954 }  ' 83-84 . 
48Milton , � of Hate , 447 ; Patrick , Reconstruction , 121 ; Dewitt , 
Impeachment and Trial , 270-71 . For some other considerations which may 
have played a role in the president ' s  decision ,  see McKitrick , Andrew 
Johnson , 497 . 
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office and placed Grant in the secretary ' s  pos ition ad interim. 49 
Although Grant felt that the Tenure Act covered Stanton , he nonetheless 
assumed the ad interim appointment . 
When Congress reconvened in December , Johnson sent to the Senate . 
a full report concerning the suspension , including his reasons for doing 
so . In it , he not only cited the secretary' s  defiance in refusing to 
resign his office but also the damaging facts that , while Stanton , in 
his reply to the order suspending him , had claimed coverage by the Tenure 
Act , his original reaction to the law had been an emphatic rej ection of 
it as unconstitutional and that he had helped draft the veto message . 
The president also pointed out that Stanton ' s  growing differences of 
opinion with the official views of the administration had caused disunity 
within the cabinet and stated his belief that , when a department head ' s  
views become s o  widely divergent from those of his superior , only "a 
severance of the official relationship" could remedy the situation effec­
tively . 50 The Senate did not find the president ' s  arguments convincing 
and on January 13 , 1868,  refused to accept the suspension . 
49For the exchange of correspondence among the three , see the 
following letters in the Johnson Papers : Grant to Johnson , August 1 ,  
1867 ; Johnson t o  Stanton , August 5 ,  1867 ; Stanton t o  Johnson , August 5 ,  
1867 ; Johnson to Stanton , August 12 , 1867 ; Stanton to Johnson , August 
12 , 1867 ; Johnson to Grant , August 12 , 1867 . By suspending { as opposed 
to removing) the secretary of war from office and subsequently submitting 
a report of his action to the Senate , Johnson seemed to be acting within 
prescribed limits set by the Tenure Act , a fact which later was to cause 
his defense attorneys some trouble during the course of the impeachment 
trial . 
50Richardson , Messages and Papers ,  VI , 589 . It may also be of 
some interest to note that Johnson charged that Stanton withheld vital 
information concerning the situation which resulted in the riot in New 
Orleans in 1866 . Ibid . , 590 . The entire text of Johnson ' s  December 12 
message is reprinted in ibid . , 583-94 . 
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The Senate ' s  refusal to concur caused Grant to act . On January 
14 , he notified Johnson that as of the evening of the previous day he no 
longer considered himself ad interim secretary of . war . 51 At a cabinet 
meeting on the same day , however , it was revealed that the president and 
the general had made a prior agreement to the effect that Grant would 
either retain the office or surrender it before the Senate acted in order 
to give the chief magistrate time to find someone who would remain in 
that position until the courts could test the constitutionality of the 
Tenure Act . 52 Although the general subsequently wrote his commander-in-
chief both denying that he had ever promised to surrender his post in 
advance of Stanton ' s  reinstatement and asserting that he had informed 
him prior to the Senate ' s  action that he would vacate the office if 
Stanton was reinstated by the Senate , 53 Johnson obviously had caught 
Grant in a lie , a fact to which the other cabinet members then attested . 
A later Radical probe halted short of revealing this perfidy because of 
fear of damaging Grant ' s  presidential aspirations , which already had had 
51Grant to Johnson , January 14 ,  1868 , Johnson Papers . 
52This comment is based upon the recollections of that meeting by 
the other cabinet members who re sponded to Johnson ' s  request to put them 
in writing . See Welles to Johnson , February 5 ,  1868 , Gideon Welles 
Collection ( Henry E .  Huntington Library ) ,  copy in Johnson Papers ; Brown­
ing to Johnson , February 6 ,  1868 , 0 .  H .  Browning Papers ( Illinois State 
Historical Library ) ,  copy in ibid . ; McCulloch to Johnson , February 6 ,  
1868 ; Randall t o  Johnson , February 6 ,  1868 ; Seward t o  Johnson , February 
6 ,  1868 , Johnson Papers .  
53Grant to Johnson , January 28 , 1868 , ibid . 
some of their luster knocked off by his acceptance of the ad interim 
position in the first place . 54  
Whether or not Grant had been perfidious in  his actions , the 
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point was that Stanton had been reinstated by the Senate , Grant had re-
turned that post to Stanton ' s  care , and the president was in the . same 
position he had occupied prior to the August suspension . Although his 
friends urged him to forget the wayward secretary , Johnson was deter-
mined to remove him from office .  His attempts t o  find a capable man to 
replace Stanton ad interim, however , found little enthusiastic response .  
One by one , prominent figures refused the appointment , and even the 
chief clerk of the War Department rejected an offer . In ·order to force 
the issue with Stanton , the chief executive finally had to settle for 
the vain and pompous adjutant general of the army , Brevet Major General 
Lorenzo Thomas . 55 On February 21 , 1868 , Johnson gave Thomas two papers--
one , to be delivered to Stanton , notified the War Department chief that 
he had been removed from his post and that he was to surrender custody 
of the office to Thomas ; the other , addressed to Thomas , authorized him 
to act as secretary of war ad interim. 56 Refusing to comply with the 
54Patrick , Reconstruct ion , 123 . Immediately after Grant ' s  accept­
ance of the secretaryship , the editor of the Radical-oriented Chicago 
Tribune , in a letter to one of the general ' s  key supporters for the presi­
dency , noted that one effect of the appointment had been to make Grant 
appear to many as "in some sense tainted with Johnsonism . "  Horace White 
to Elihu Washburne , August 13 , 1867 , Washburne Papers . 
55Patrick ,  Reconstruction , 124 . 
56Johnson to Stanton , February 21 , 1868 , Johnson Papers ; Dewitt , 
Impeachment and Trial , 344 . 
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order , Stanton had Thomas arrested . Before the case could be brought to 
trial , however , the Radicals , unwilling to see the Tenure Act tested in 
the courts , persuaded him to drop charges against the adjutant general , 
thereby denying the president the test case which he had worked so long 
and hard to produce . Instead , on February 24 , the House of Representa­
tives passed a resolution impeaching Andrew Johnson of high crimes and 
misdemeanors in office ,  basing this action mainly upon his apparent vio­
lation of the Tenure of Office Act by dismiss ing Stanton from office . 57 
57Patrick , Reconstruction , 124 . 
CHAPTER VI 
PRESIDENTIAL PATRONAGE ON TRIAL 
Between December 17 , 1866 , and January 13 , 1868 , several attempts 
were made to impeach the president . Efforts to prove charges ranging 
from plotting to place Tennes see under Confederate control while he was 
that state ' s· military governor to having a hand in Lincoln ' s  assassina-
1 tion all ended in embaras sing failure for Johnson ' s  antagonists . By 
February , 1868 , hopes of building a credible case against the chief exe-
cutive appeared dim indeed . 
Johnson ' s  unsuccessful attempt to remove Stanton from office gave 
new life to the stalled impeachment drive . For the first time , the 
president ' s  opponents had in this apparent violation of the Tenure of 
Office Act something solid upon which to construct a case against him, 
and they were determined to make the most of it . During the course of 
the extensive debate which preceded the vote on the impeachment resolu-
tion , several representatives expressed confidence that the chief execu-
tive ' s obvious violation of the law of the land was all that was necessary 
to justify impeachment . Rufus Spalding of Ohio smugly presented his 
opinion : 
Now, Mr .  Speaker , in � apprehension , if there be any effi­
c acy in an enactment of Congress ,  we are not called upon to 
ascertain • • •  whether the President has , in fact , committed a 
high misdemeanor , because Congres s has already ,  upon the face 
�e impeachment drives in this period are described in detail by 
Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 135-338 passim.  An excellent concise sum­
mary is given in McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 491-504 . 
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of its enactment , declared the alleged act of removal to be 
such . 2 
137 
Proclaiming that the House had a "complete ,  compact , and perfect case ," 
John F.  Farnsworth of Illinois saw no need for witnesses or further testi-
many , since the situation was "as clear and plain as if he confessed the 
crime . "3 Missouri ' s  William Pile was equally certain : "The provisions 
• are plain and unambiguous . The proof of the acts is documentary 
and conclusive . "4 "The case is a plain one , "  declared New Yorker Burt 
Van Horn , "and there can be but one conclusion arrived at by any candid 
mind . "5 Tenness ean William B. Stokes was emphatic : "Now , sir , there is 
no getting around or s liding out of this . He has bid defiance to an act 
of Congress ; he has done that which the law positively forbid him from 
doing. "6 John F .  Driggs of Michigan felt no need for debate : "Mr . 
Speaker , it is of no use to argue the question . We have before us the 
law ,  and upon the Speaker ' s  desk the President ' s  admission that he has 
violated the law. "7 
Some House members attempted to broaden the case somewhat by 
asserting that , by removing Stanton while the Senate was yet in session , 
the President had violated not only the Tenure Act but also the Constitu-
tion . Such was the burden of Thaddeus Steven ' s  comments in concluding 
the debate late on the afternoon of February 24 , 8 but he had been 
2 Cong. 
3Ibid. ' 
5Ibid. , 
7Ibid . ' 
Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 
1344 . 
1389 . 
1368 . 
sess . ,  1340 . 
4 Ibid . ' App . 156 . 
6 Ibid. ' 1395 . 
8 Ibid. ' 1400 . 
preceded by others arguing the same thing . Pile called for "the 
production of one single precedent for the exercise of such power . "9 
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Illinoisan Burton Cook held that even if the Tenure Act did not exist , 
Johnson had "exercised a power entirely unwarranted by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States . "10 James Moorhead of Pennsylvania viewed 
the president ' s  action as "no less  than open and defiant refusal to obey 
the law and the Constitution that he has solemnly sworn to support . "11 
Ohio ' s  John A .  Bingham , a dedicated Johnson foe , likewise pronounced the 
chief executive guilty of a violation of the Constitution and asserted 
that "in that particular he is subject to the penalties imposed upon him 
by the sixth section of the tenure-of-office act . "12 
While alleged executive violation both of the Tenure Act and of 
the Constitution may have been a sufficient case for some congressmen , 
others found that they were unable to limit themselves to such unimpor-
tant considerations . Ohioan James M .  Ashley , who had worked long and 
hard to bring about Johnson ' s  impeachment , was not afraid to let his true 
feelings be known : 
9Ibid . , App . 156 . There indeed was an almost exact precedent 
to Stanton ' s  case . In 1800 , President Adams had removed a protesting 
Timothy Pickering as secretary of state while the Senate was in session . 
Johnson ' s  counsel had hoped to keep this fact under wraps until the 
right time , but the president ruined this strategy by revealing it to 
a New York World reporter on March 9 .  Milton , � of �' 529 . 
10 Cong. Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 sess . , 1362 . 
11Ib " d  A 157 _J._. ,  PP · • 
12Ibid. , App . 160 . The penalities imposed by the section to 
which Bingham referred were a fine of $10 ,000 , or imprisonment up to 
five years , or both . 
I regard this as one of the smallest of the many offences of 
which this man has been guilty . If Mr .  Johnson had been guilty 
of no impeachable offence until his removal of Mr .  Stanton , no 
one believes that a majority of this House could be induced to 
vote for his impeachment now . l3 
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Indiana ' s  George W. Julian , one of the most radical of the Radicals , saw 
it much the s ame way : "It is true , the removal of the Secretary of War 
is relatively a small matter • and I believe it would be regarded as 
scarcely a sufficient ground for this proceeding , if not considered in 
the light of far greater previous offences . "14 Pennsylvanian John M .  
Broomall felt constrained t o  agree with these pronouncements :  
Now, I am not of the opinion that this last act of the 
President is the greatest one of his enormities . On the con­
trary , I am inclined to think that in its consequences it is 
among the smallest , a mere foiled attempt at dictatorship . l5 
Despite the valiant attempts of Johnson ' s  House friends to confine 
the debate to the issue at hand , i . e . , the president ' s  removal of Stanton 
16 as a violation of the Tenure Act , comments of men such as Ashley , 
Julian , and Broomall encouraged the spread of the argument to subjects 
far afield , and allowed all of the pent up feelings and suspi cions of 
the chief executive ' s  enemies to find expression . In words charged with 
emotion , Farnsworth asserted : 
Sir , this nation has been too long disgraced by this man , 
this accidental President , m.aa.e· so by the assassin ' s  pistol , 
13 �· ' 1360-61 . 14Ib ' d  _�_. , 1386 . 
15Ibid. , App . 158 . 
16 For some examples of the efforts o� pro-Johnson House members 
to defend the right of the president to remove Stanton from office , see 
the speeches of James Brooks , James B. Beck , William S .  Holman , Benjamin 
M .  Boyer , and Charles E .  Phelps . Ibid . , 1337-39 , 1349-51 , 1353-5 5 ,  1362-
65 , App . 244-47 . 
this man who ,  in an evil hour , was thrust upon the country .  
Too long has he been an incubus , and a disgrace to this great 
and glorious nat ion . Let him be removed . 11 
140 
Illinois ' at large representative John A .  Logan did not believe it neces-
sary to go into Johnson ' s  many offences , since they were "patent to the 
whole country . "  Citing particularly his appointment of "disreputable 
persons " to office , the congressman declared that the chief executive 
had done "every act which can be enumerated in the English language which 
i s  an obstruction to the prosperity of this nation and the preservation 
of the harmony of its people . "18 Ben Butler , another ardent Johnson 
antagonist , "mourn:t'ully" recalled the chief magistrate ' s  "change of pur-
pose , which became so painfully evident in the swmner of 1865" and li sted 
his many crimes from that point to "his attempt to draw into a conspiracy 
with himself the general officer of the Armies of the United States . "19 
"Now sir , what is the history of this man? , "  asked George S .  Boutwell of 
Massachusetts . After recalling for his hearers the drunken spectacle 
which Johnson had made of himself before the nation and the world during 
his inauguration as vice-president , he presented another question for 
their consideration : 
Is not he the man who , in violation of his oath of office , 
appointed men to places of trust and power througout the ten 
States of the South who could not take the oath of offi ce pre­
scribed by the law of the country?20 
17Ibid . ' 1347 . 18 �· ' 1353 . 19 Ibid . ' 1393 . 
20Ibid . , App . 161 . This remark was an obviou� reference to 
Johnson ' s  provis ional governors and other men appointed to fill federal 
offices in the southern states in 1865 . As was noted earlier , no com­
plaints were made concerning those appointments until the president ran 
afoul of the Radicals on other matters . 
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Kansan Sidney Clarke hinted at something much more dark than any of 
these things : "I believe him guilty of a deliberate conspiracy to de-
stray by treacherous plots the fruits of the victory which patriotic 
sacrifices had ·won . "21 Pennsylvanian William D .  "Pig-Iron" Kelly , who 
had been among the first congressmen to whom Johnson attempted to deny 
22 use of the patronage , made his remarks even more pointed . 
Possessed by the thought of the Presidency and the possible 
perpetuation of his power , there stood between him • • •  and the 
position in which it would take but his own selfish interest to 
persuade him that the perpetuation of his power was essential 
to the life of the nation , but one life , that of Abraham Lincoln , 
and that life , a few days after Mr .  Johnson was inaugurated as 
the President ' s  constitutional successor , violence removed 
1123 . . . 
. 
Whipped to a feverish frenzy by two days of debates which were 
punctuated by a weekend of restless activity , the House voted on Monday , 
February 24 ,  to impeach the president . The count was 126 to 47 with 
every Republican present voting for and every Democrat against the 
24 action . The Radical majority had managed to convince itself of the 
rightness of its cause and, in the minds of these men , there could be but 
one conclusion to the matter . Cried Boutwe+l prior to the vote : 
I cannot speak of the Senate , but by the House of Representa­
tives and by the country such demonstrations have already been 
made as must satisfy us that there is no question as to what 
21Ib . d  _�_. , 1390 .  
2�cKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 383 . 
23 Cong. Globe , 40 Cong. , 2 seas . , 1347 . 
24Ibid . , 1400 ; Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 373 . 
the judgment of the House is to be here and now , or that that 
judgment is finally to -be sustained by the judgment of the 
Senate . 25 
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Official impeachment articles were adopted by the House on March 
2 and 3 .  Nine of the eleven accusations dealt either directly or indir-
ectly with the president ' s  attempt to remove Stanton from office and to 
replace him with Lorenzo Thomas ad interim, labelling this effort a "high 
misdemeanor" and/or "high crime . "  The tenth article , one o-r Ben Butler ' s  
pet projects , cited several statements made by the chief executive during 
his 1866 "swing around the circle , "  charging that those remarks were in-
tended to "bring into disgrace , ridicule , hatred , contempt , and reproach 
the Congres s "  and calling them a "high misdemeanor . "  Article XI was a 
catch-all device which in abbreviated form rehashed most of the charges 
made in the first ten articles . 26 
Even as the House carried its case be-rore the Senate , and the 
trial entered its initial stages , both friendly and unfriendly sources 
suggested that the president use his official patronage to kill the im-
peachment drive . An old Tennessee friend and associate , Colonel Edmund 
Cooper , could not understand why the chief executive refused to avail 
himself of this possible way of salvation .  Some Radical senators inti-
mated that sagacious changes in the cabinet might prevent convi ction. 
25 6 Cong. Globe , 40 Cong . , 2 sess . , App . 1 0 .  This discussion of 
the proceedings in the House leading to Johnson ' s  impeachment is based 
upon Dewitt , Impeachment and Trial , 359-73 . 
26The complete text of each of the eleven impeachment articles 
may be . found in Senate , Trial , I ,  6-10 . The seven men who were to manage 
the House ' s  case before the Senate were elected on March 2 :  Butler , 
Stevens , Bingham, Boutwell , Logan , James F .  Wilson of Iowa , and Pennsyl­
vanian Thomas Williams . Ibid. , 4 .  
The chief magistrate , however , remained unmoved. He would not buy 
acquittal . 27 
When the impeachment trial finally did get under way late in 
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March , Ben But ler , in making the opening argument for the House , immedi-
ately moved to broaden the scope of the case considerably when he de­
clared the "plain and inevitable issue" to be nothing less than whether 
the president "without any re straint whatever" had the right to remove 
or suspend indefinitely from their positions executive officers and to 
28 replace them with "creatures of his own appointment . "  However , when 
the time came for the president ' s  counsel to make its opening statement , 
Benj amin Curtis , speaking on behalf of his colleagues , reminded those 
assembled that the only charges for which the chief executive was on 
trial were those expressed in the eleven articles . With them in question , 
he then narrowed the situation to one all-important consideration : 
Now , there is a question involved here . • • • That question 
is , whether Mr .  Stanton ' s  case comes under the tenure-of-office 
act . If it does not , if the true construction and effect of the 
tenure-of-office act when applied to the facts of his case ex­
cludes it , then it will be found by honorable senators • 
that a mortal wound has been inflicted upon them by that deci­
s ion . 29 
27Milton ,  Age of Hate , 527-28 , 533 ; St . George L .  Sioussat ( ed. ) ,  
"Notes of Colonel W.  G .  Moore , Private Secretary to President Johnson , 
1866-1868 , "  American Historical Review , XIX (October , 1913 ) , 125-26 , 
129 . 28 Senate , Trial , I ,  96 . 
29Ibid . , 378 . The president ' s  counsel was composed of Curtis , 
a former Uri'ited States Supreme Court justice , prominent New York attorney 
William M .  Evarts , who was destined to do the bulk of the work for the 
defense ,  Henry Stanbery , recently resigned as attorney-general in order 
to devote full t ime to the case , Ohio lawyer William S .  Groesbeck , and 
Judge Thomas A .  R .  Nelson , a Greenville native who was Johnson ' s  personal 
selection . 
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Curtis ' s  remarks indicated the line of defense the president ' s  
counsel intended to pursue , and Butler , in the course of his opening 
statement , had tried to anticipate the defense ' s  case in this connection . 
He first attempted to show that Stanton was covered by the Tenure Act , 
arguing that the term that Johnson was serving was in reality that of 
Lincoln : 
Whose presidential term is the respondent [Johnson ] now 
serving out? His own ,  or Mr .  Lincoln ' s? If his own , he is 
entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the murder , be­
cause each presidential term is four years by the Constitution .  
II 
He further contended that , if Stanton were not covered by the law ,  his 
commiss ion had expired either one month after March 4 ,  1865 , or if the 
act were not retroactive , on March 2 ,  1867 . In either case , the presi-
dent , by not commissioning the secretary in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Tenure Act ,  had violated that law and was thereby "guilty 
of a high misdemeanor . "30 
Having attempted to prove the chief magistrate guilty regardless 
of Stanton ' s  legal status , Butler then proceeded to indicate that the 
president already had recognized the validity of the Tenure Act by acting 
under its provisions . He recalled that initially Johnson had suspended 
Stanton and later had informed the Senate of this action and his reasons 
for having made such a move . By adopting this course , Butler contended 
that the chief executive had followed the procedures outlined by the 
30Ib ' d  __ J._. ' 102- 3 .  
measure in question and thereby had estopped himself from questioning 
the law ' s  validity . 3l 
In his statement , Curtis wasted no time in replying to these 
contentions . He ridiculed the manager ' s  play upon the word "term. " 
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Maintaining that the period of four years was a conditional rather thaQ 
absolute limit assigned by the Constitution , he contended that Lincoln ' s  
death had ended his tenure in office and launched the vice-president 
upon his own term. There was 
no more . propriety • • •  in calling the .time during which Mr . 
Johnson holds the office of President • • •  a ·part of Mr .  Lin­
coln ' s  term, than there would be propriety in saying that one 
sovereign who succeeded to another sovereign by death holds a 
part of his predecessor ' s  term. 32 
Turning his attention directly to Stanton ' s  right to hold his 
position under the Tenure Act , Curtis reminded the senators that there 
had been considerable debate in the Senate at the time of that measure ' s  
passage as t o  whether the provisions covered the holdovers from Lincoln ' s  
cabinet . He . carefully noted that one of the members of the j oint commit-
tee which had worked on the law had reported that such was not the case . 
"And now I ask the Senate ,"  continued the defense attorney , " . • • whether 
it is possible to hold that Mr . Stanton ' s  case is within the scope of 
that tenure-of-office act? I submit it is not possible . "33 
31Ibid . , 103 . 32Ibid . , 379 . 
33Ibid . , 382 . The senator to whom Curtis referred was John 
Sherman , who later would adjudge the president to be guilty as charged 
of violating the law.  For his reasoning , see ibid . , III , 3-16 . 
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After devoting some time to showing that the president had the 
right of removal based upon precedents dating from the legislative action 
of 1789 ,34 Curtis turned his attention to the question of estoppel and 
quickly demolished that point . Contending that the president ' s  actions 
in suspending Stanton and reporting to the Senate had been done to pre-
vent a collision with the law if at all possible , he ridiculed the idea 
of an estoppel in this case at any rate : 
That the President of the United States should be impeached 
and removed from office , not by reason of the truth of his case , 
but because he is estopped from telling it , would be a spectacle 
for gods and men . Undoubtedly it would have a place in history 
which it is not necessary for me to attempt to foreshadow. 35 
Excluding intermissions , the time which expired between Butler ' s  
opening argument and the end of testimony was only sixteen days . During 
this time , all of the articles were given considerable airing and both 
sides went to great lengths to produce evidence that the president both 
could and had or had not used his removal powers excessively . 36 Still , 
in the final analysis , as the time for closing arguments came around , 
the central question remained as Curtis had posed it at the beginning--
34After referring to the congressional debates and subsequent 
action taken by Congress in 1789 , Curtis declared,  "Now , it is a rule 
long settled • • • that when such contemporary exposition has been made 
of a law,  and it has been followed by an ·  actual and practical construc­
tion in accordance with that contemporary exposition , continued during 
a long period of time and applied to great numbers of cases , it is after­
ward too late to call in question the correctness of such a construction . "  
Ibid . , I ,  388 . 
35Ibid . , 394-96 . 
36 Any perusal of Senate , Trial , I ,  reveals numerous charts , lists , 
documents , etc . , purporting to help prove either one contention or the 
other as noted and to show that Stanton ' s  case either was or was not 
unique . 
whether Stanton was covered by the provisions of the Tenure of Office 
Act . As they had done throughout the course of the trial , the House 
managers contended that he was . 37 Clinging to Butler ' s  reasoning set 
forth in the opening argument , they insisted that Johnson was filling 
out Lincoln ' s  term and not his own and that Stanton , therefore , as 
Lincoln ' s  appointee , was covered by the law.  Manager Boutwell put it 
simply : 
It was not a new office ;  it was not a new term. He succeeded 
to Mr .  Lincoln ' s  office , and for the remainder of Mr .  Lincoln ' s  
term of office . He is serving out Mr .  Lincoln ' s  term as Presi­
dent . The law says that the Secretaries shall hold their offi­
ces respectively for and during the term of the President by 
whom they may have been appointe� . • • • Mr .  Stailton was appointed by Mr·. Lincoln . . • • 3 
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In replying to the managers ' argument , the defense counsels took 
several different stands . Nelson was content to refer his listeners to 
the views expressed by Curtis in the opening argument . 39 Groesbeck , 
while likewise contending that Johnson was serving his own term, added 
the novel thought that , even if it were Lincoln ' s  term, Stanton was a 
holdover from that president ' s  previous term and that he both could and 
40 would have removed the secretary during the present term. Stanbery 
agreed with his colleague : "Mr . Stanton never had any tenure of office 
37Four managers spoke in closing arguments :  Boutwell , Williams , 
Stevens , and Bingham. In addition , Logan , acting under a privilege voted 
by the Senate , filed a statement . 
38senate , Trial , II , 93 . For the 
see ibid . , 49 , 221-22 � 236 , 450-51 .  
statements of other managers , 
39Ibid . , 172 . 
40 �· , 194 .  
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under the tenure-of-office act for the current presidential ter.m , never 
having been appointed for that ter.m by either Mr .  Lincoln or Mr .  Johnson . "41 
As had Curtis , Evarts reminded the senators that , at the time of the 
Tenure Act ' s  passage , the explanation had been given to the Senate that 
cabinet members such as Stanton were not meant to be included in the 
measure . This point had been made with no contradiction at that time 
amid an atmosphere of seeming agreement • The defense counsel then chided 
his senatorial audience : 
And I would like to know who it is in this honorable Senate 
that will bear the issue of the scrutiny , of the revising people 
of the United States on a removal from office of the Pres ident 
for his removal of an officer that the Senate has thus d�clared 
not to be within the protection of the civil-tenure act . 42 · 
At the outset of the trial , manager Butler had declared the maj or 
issue to be a scrutiny of the entire matter of the right of the president 
to remove executive officers from their respective positions . In closing , 
his fellow managers gave considerable attention to this facet . In con-
sidering the spectacle of a president able to make removals at will , 
Logan demanded : "If the Congress of the United States has no right • 
to fix the tenure to certain offices , and exercise their j oint authority 
in appointments as well as removals from office , what restriction is 
there on the President ' s  power? "43 Also striking at the idea . of tenure , 
at the pleasure of the chief executive , Boutwell could not bring himself 
to believe that the framers of the Constitution would have given the 
41Ib . d  __ J._. ' 
43Ib " d  __ J._. ' 
369 . 
42 . 
president power "to corrupt the civil , military , and naval officers of 
the country by rendering them absolutely dependent for their positions 
and emoluments upon his will . u44 The other managers vigorously contended 
that , while precedent had allowed the chief magistrate to make removals 
as he willed in the past , the Tenure of Office Act had changed that situ-
ation . Williams called the past practice one that had grown out of "an 
early and erroneous construction" of the Constitution . 45 "All the acts 
from 1789 down to 1867 bear witness of one thing , "  urged Bingham, "and 
that is that the Congress of the United States have fUll power under the 
Constitution by law to confer upon the President the power of temporary 
or permanent removal or withhold it . "46 Congress  had pas sed a law on 
March 2 ,  1867 , and , regardless of past practice , it was the president ' s  
duty to abide by that law .  Both Bingham and Stevens were adamant on 
this point . 47 
In reply to these arguments , Johnson ' s  defense attorneys cited 
the precedents that had developed during the almost eighty years since 
1789 . They asserted that Congress now had no constitutional right to 
change the s ituation .  " I  thus present to you , "  declared Nelson , "what 
I may call an unbroken current of authority in favor of the proposition 
that not only the civil-tenure bill is unconstitutional , but that the 
President had the right to remove from office . " 48 The important question 
point . 
45 . Ibid. , 236 . 
46Ibid. , 442 . 44Ibid . ' 80 . 
47Almost all of Bingham' s  lengthy speech was built around this 
For representative comments by Stevens , see ibid . , 223 . 
48Ibid .  , 162 . 
to Groesbeck was , 
Is this Senate prepared to drag a President in here and 
convict him of crime because he believed as every other Presi­
dent believed , as the Supreme Court bel�eved , as thirty-eight of the thirty-nine Congresses believed? 9 
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Evarts charged that Congress , unable to find "adequate support for the 
pretension that the Senate could claim a share in the distinct act of 
removal , "  deliberately changed the law to its advantage . 50 Stanbery made 
it clear that he believed that the chief executive had the constitutional 
power to remove Stanton . "Whenever there is an unfaithful or improper 
officer , "  asserted the former attorney-general , "the President of the 
United States has not only the power but it is his duty to remove him. "51 
Nothing short of a constitutional amendment could alter that situation . 52 
As is well known , the attempt to convict Andrew Johnson of the 
impeachment charges lodged against him failed by one vote . All of the 
thirty-five senators who voted "guilty" were Republicans . Of the nine-
teen "not guilty" verdicts , twelve had been certain from the outset--
nine held by the only Democrats in the Senate and three possessed by the 
conservative-oriented Dixon , Doolittle , and Daniel Norton. The remaining 
seven were cast by heretofore accepted Republicans who braved the wrath 
of their colleagues to cast their ballots for acquitta1 . 53 
Those senators who desired to do so were allowed to file opinions 
explaining why they voted as they did. Most of the thirty-five men who 
. ' 
· -
49Ibid . ' 206 . 
51Ibid . ' 381 . 
50Ib ' d  _J._. '  
52Ib ' d  _J._. '  
310 . 
382 . 
53The seven were Fessenden (Maine ) ,  Joseph S .  Fowler (Tennessee ) ,  
James W.  Grimes ( Iowa ) , John B .  Henderson (Missouri ) ,  Edmund Ross {Kansas ) ,  
Trumbull ( Iilinois ) ,  and Peter Van Winkle (West Virginia) . 
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voted against the chief executive apparently had made their decisions to 
do so prior to the trial , and those filing opinions therefore expressed 
such views toward the patronage powers of the president in general and 
the Tenure Act in particular as could be expected . Concerning the latter 
topic , the accepted view was that which had been advanced in the House ' s  
case--Stanton was within that measure , it was the law of the land , and 
the president , by violating it , was guilty as charged . 54 In a somewhat 
different approach , Senator Howe of Wisconsin conceded that the war min-
ister was not within the provisions of the act , but at the same time he 
asserted his belief that Johnson ' s  attempt to remove him was "an abuse 
of authority" and as such constituted an impeachable offence .  "To remove 
a good man from office and to replace him with a bad man , "  he stated, 
"seems to  me an offence against the public interests , which , if it go 
unrebuked , will excuse any possible offence that leaves the President 
outside of a penitent iary . "55 
In addit ion to finding the president guilty of an impeachable 
crime in his dealings with Stanton and to denouncing the idea that he 
alone posses sed the right of remova1 , 56 a few senators elected to criti-
cize the chief executive ' s  use of the patronage in general . Massachusetts ' s  
54For examples of this view , see the opinions of Senators Howard , 
Yates , Stewart , Sumner , and Williams , in Senate , Trial , III , 38-39 , 
104-6 , 152-53 , 261-6 3 ,  348-49 . 
55 Ibid.  ' 69 ' 72 . 
56For some representative views on this latter point see the com­
ments of Senators Howe , Justin S .  Morrill , St ewart , and Harlan . Ibid. , 
64-65 , 137 , 152-53 , 233 . 
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two Senators were most vindictive . "To defeat the will of the people ," 
cried Henry Wilson , "the President , in the interest of disloyalty , in-
equality , and injustice , sought to use the corrupt and corrupting influ­
ences of executive patronage . "57 Charging in effect that the president 
during the period of executive reconstruction in the South had turned 
public offices there over to rebels and traitors , 58 Charles Sumner also 
lashed out at other aspects of the chief magistrate ' s  use of the patron-
age system, 
The power of removal • • • was seized as an engine of tyranny 
and openly employed to maintain his wicked purposes by the sacri­
fice of good citizens who would not consent to be his tools . In­
competent and dishonest creatures ,  whose only recommendation was 
that they echoed his voice , were appointed to office • • • •  59 
Among those senators who chose to vote for the chief executive ' s  
acquittal , there was a tendency to think alike . Almost all of them cited 
the precedents upon which the president ' s  removal power was based , but 
at the same t ime they tended to fight shy of the idea that the Tenure 
Act was unconstitutional , as Johnson ' s  defense had maintained . There 
was almost unanimous agreement , however ,  that Stanton was excluded from 
that measure . Ten of the nineteen men chose to file opinions , and of 
these only Van Winkle , one of the seven "recusant senators , "  failed to 
concur on this point . 60 In agreeing that Stanton was excluded from the 
57 Ibid. ' 217 . 58 Ibid. ' 257-58 . 59 Ibid . ' 258 . 
6°For aspects of Van Winkle ' s  argument , see ibid.  , 147 . For the 
nine others , see ibid. ,  20-21 (Fessenden ) ,  52-53 (Johnson ) ,  118 (George 
Vickers ) ,  170 (Gar;e-tt Davis ) ,  196 (Fowler ) ,  244 (Doolittle ) ,  301-2 
( Henderson ) ,  321-22 (Trumbull ) ,  331-33 (Grimes ) .  
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Tenure Act , Doolittle commented, "I think that opinion will command the 
assent of nine-tenths of the legal profession of the whole country . "61 
While intending to use the Tenure of Office Act to deny the president 
the use of the patronage system, the . Radicals had left this one small 
loophole and then compounded their mistake by trying to build an impeach-
ment case around it . This error allowed Andrew Johnson to avoid becoming 
the first and only American president to be removed from office for high 
crimes and misdemeanors . 
Sensing the failure of the impeachment effort even before the 
final vote was taken , the New York Times gave an apprais al  of the situ-
ation with which succeeding generations have generally agreed. Pushing 
the point that impeachment had been urged upon the . Republican party by 
its extremist element , the Times declared that that effort had been "the 
reckless device of the Radical section of that party , intended to put 
the patronage of the Nation into its hands and to give it the absolute 
and complete control of the Republican sentiment and the policy of the 
country. "62 Denied final success in their effort and foreseeing new 
possibilities with the coming of Grant to the presidential office , the 
Radicals were content to allow Johnson to rid himself of Stanton . He 
61Ibid . , 244.  
62Editorial , New York Times , May 13 , 1968 . 
then passed his last few months in office in relative peace , although 
the Senate continued to reject some of his nominations . 63 
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63on April 24 , Johnson had submitted to the Senate the name of 
Brevet Major General John M.  Schofield , the former First District com­
mander , as his nominee for the position of secretary of war . This move 
apparently was encouraged by Evarts , who saw the nomination of the moder­
ate Schofield as a way to assure Republican moderates that , if  they 
voted for Johnson ' s  acquittal , the president would not seek revenge upon 
the Radicals . Jam�s Lee McDonough and William T .  Alderson , "Republican 
Politics and the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson , "  Tennessee Historical 
Quarter].y, XXVI ( Summer , 1967 ) , 177-83 . Schofield subsequently was 
accepted by the Senate for the secretaryship . That body als o  accepted 
Evarts as the new attorney-general after rejecting Johnson ' s  renomination 
of Stanbery . Milton , Age of Hate , 634 . 
CHAPTER VII 
IN SEARCH OF A POLICY 
In attempting to understand Andrew Johnson ' s  use of the patronage , 
there is a strong temptation to agree with one writer who ,  while. studying 
another aspect of the era , at one point exclaimed in exasperation that 
"searching for the motives that impelled Andrew Johnson is at times like 
searching for a propulsion mechanism in a fogbank. . "1 That search can be 
somewhat less difficult , however , if  two terms as· they related to the 
seventeenth president are kept firmly in mind : democracy (both in the 
party and historic sense ) and individualism. 
During the course of the impeachment trial , Thaddeus Stevens 
presented a theme whi ch was repeated both before and after that time : 
betrayal of the Republican party . "After the death of Mr . Lincoln , "  
asserted the House manager , "Andrew Johnson had changed his whole code 
of politics and policy , and instead of obeying the will of those who put 
him into power , he determined to create a party for himself , to carry 
out his own ambitious purposes . "2 Such statements as this one were based 
upon a questionable assumption , namely , that Johnson owed allegiance to 
the Republican party and was obliged to work within its organization . 3 
1 Sefton , � and Reconstruction , 117 . 2 Senate , Trial , II , 228-29 . 
3one recent s cholar seemed to be adopting much the same line of 
reasoning when he declared that one of the purposes of his work was to 
show how Andrew Johnson "threw away his own power • • • as party leader . "  
McKitrick , Andrew Johnson , 14 . 
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Yet the fact stands that he was not a Republican , had never been a 
Republic an ,  and never claimed to be a Republican ,  not even in 1864 when 
he was selected as Lincoln ' s  running-mate on the National Union {not 
Republican) ticket . "Who is the President of the United States? , " 
thundered T .  A .  R .  Nelson during the 1868 trial : 
A democrat of the straightest of strict constructionists ;  an 
old Jacksonian , Jeffersonian democrat ; a man who proclaimed his 
democracy in the very letter of acceptance which he wrote at the 
time when he was nominated for the Vice-Presidency ; a man who 
told you· and who told
4
the whole country in that letter that he 
was a democrat • • • •  
Nelson was right . The issue of seces sion had forced Andrew 
Johnson to part company with the bulk of his party in . l860-61 and , as a 
senator and military governor , he had stood strong f'or the Union through-
out the course of the war . He remained at heart , however , a Democrat 
and at the . war ' s  end he was ready to forgive and forget .and to get on 
with politics as usual . The problem was that the divisions caused by 
the war had sapped greatly the strength of the Democratic organization , 
and the one sure way to revive it was to get the southern states , the 
traditional stronghold of the Democracy , restored to the Union as " quickly 
as possible . For that reason , perhaps the Radical charges that the aim 
of presidential reconstruction was to do just that should not be dis-
missed as lightly as some pro-Johnson historians have tended to do . 
Remember�ng Nelson ' s  point that Johnson was a Democrat of the 
Jacksonian persuasion goes a long way in explaining those changes in 
4senate , Trial , II , 123 . 
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officeholding which he did make , or at least attempted to make , while 
president . If he indeed was working on the assumption of resuming politi-
cal practices as they had been before the war , patronage changes were to 
be expected. Perhaps then his often quoted remarks about kicking out 
officeholders which were made at Cleveland and St . Louis during the fam-
ous "swing around the circle" have been viewed in the wrong light . 
Rather than looking at them solely in the context of the Radical- -
Conservative struggle than taking place , they should be seen in the way 
Johnson explained them at the time . Here were men who had been in office 
for four or five years or more . Under the Jacksonian standards to which 
Johnson subscribed , they had enj oyed the emoluments of office long enough 
and others now should have the same chance . Of course , the times were 
not normal and Radical politicians were astonished that the chief execu-
tive should try to turn out of office men . of proven Union and party 
loyalty. What did not occur to them was that he might be acting under 
another set of values and that they should be surprised not that he was 
attempting to bring about changes among officeholders but rather that he 
was not seeking to make more changes than he did.  Only consideration of 
the special political conditions created by the immediate postwar situ-
ation which presented few viable alternatives probably kept him from 
adopting a more proscriptive patronage policy . 5 
5one reconstruction historian has accused Johnson of practicing 
"the politics of nostalgia . " He contends that the president was living 
in a static .world in which the ideas of Jefferson and Jackson were suffi­
cient guides and the Democratic party was still the best one to lead the 
nation . Stampp , Era of Reconstruction , 54 . For comments on Johnson ' s  
Jacksonian convictions , see Chapter II . 
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Johnson ' s  patronage moves , as well as his actions in other areas , 
cannot be explained by saying simply that he was a Democrat in the party 
sense . He also believed in historic democracy , a phenomenon that calls 
for faith in the people , believing that they will express their wishes 
through the voice of the majority and that that voice will be saying 
what is .best for the society as a whole . Andrew Johnson had that faith 
and it helped dictate his actions throughout his political career. 
As ·was noted in an earlier chapter , Johnson at times worked out-
side the bounds of the Democratic party . The reason was that he so 
identified himself with the people that he , like Jackson , tended to 
equate his aims and desires with those of the people and thus with 
democracy . If the result then ran counter to what the other Democratic 
party leaders wanted , he simply took his case to the people in the be-
lief that they would sustain him . During his early political career , 
this concern for what he felt the people wanted helped him to build an 
eager following , first among the Democrats of Greene County and then 
those of the First Congressional District . 6 These people apparently 
tended to view him as the Democratic party and vice versa .  In .the 1850 ' s ,  
he was successful in transferring this concept to the state level and thus 
became the gubernatorial candidate of the rank-and-file of the party in 
opposition to the designs of the party leaders . 7 It was only natural 
6 Temple , Notable Men , 369 , 371 ; Graf and Haskins , Johnson Papers ,  
I ,  xxvii .  
7For details , see Abernethy , From Frontier to Plantation , 314-16 . 
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therefore that in early 1861 he should take the attitude that the only 
way to save Tennessee for the Union was to build a following around him­
self and he used Lincoln ' s  patronage accordingly . There was little in 
his subsequent actions as military governor to indicate that he underwent 
any fundamental change in heart immediately prior to becoming president . 
It was then with carefully cultivated prior notions that Andrew 
Johnson ascended to the presidency in 1865 .  Within twelve months , he 
found his program stalled and , as he had done many times in Tennessee 
politics , he turned to the people to sustain him. Because . needed support 
on several occasions had been rallied by building an organization centered 
around himself , he was not averse to the idea of the National Union move­
ment when it was developed by his adherents . 
While encouraging the National Union effort , Johnson soon 
bewildered his followers by refusing to use the one weapon which they 
considered vital to building a party to sustain him, the federal patron­
age . Thi·s bafflement led both friend and foe , both then and later , to 
charge him with a fatal procrastination or constitutional inaction .  
Those who did so , however , were probably greatly underestimating him. 
It never occurred to them that he simply might comprehend some things 
which his supporters did not • The problems presented by use of the 
patronage system to build a new party were of such magnitude that any 
possible advantage that could be gained was more than offset by the evil 
consequences caused by turning large numbers of people out of office in 
an election year . No more than Tennessee had been saved for the Union 
in 1861 by the massive application of federal patronage could the North 
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have been won for Andrew Johnson in 1866 by the same means . He 
apparently sensed this fact and the general proscription which many of 
his followers so vociferously wanted did not take place . Such tampering 
with the system as did occur largely ceased after the desires of the 
people had been voiced through the 1866 balloting. 
Andrew Johnson ' s  democracy was not the only thing which directed 
his presidential activities . Indeed ,  perhaps his political convictions 
were net as important in determining his course of action as was the 
fact that he was very decidedly an individualist . The nineteenth century 
abounded in examples .of the rugged individualism to which so many Ameri� 
can politicians in this twentieth century still pay lip-service . B,y 
virtue of the plebeian background of which he was so proud and his many­
sided personality , the seventeenth president was a prime example . 
What were some of the characteristics of his personality? 
Honesty , integrity , courage , and singleness of purpose have been empha­
sized by his friends . Egotism,  obstinacy , and bull-headedness have been 
the terms with which his detractors have replied. Yet , to attempt to 
isolate and present one set of attitudes or the . other would be doing 
Andrew Johnson a disservice because he was a complex person who on occa­
sion manifested all of these traits .  
The decisively pro-Union speeches of a southern senator in 1860-
61 ,  the activities of a military governor in often hostile surroundings 
between 1862 and 1865 , a willingness to run the risk of impeachment in 
an attempt to test the constitutionality of a questionable law ,  an un­
ruffled , business-as-usual attitude while on trial--such things as these 
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bore testimony to Johnson ' s  political courage . Devotion to the Consti­
tution and to the Union of all the states was the guiding principle of 
his presidential administration . Honesty and integrity were the hallmarks 
of his dealings with the people who came into contact with him. 
To identify honesty and integrity prominently with Andrew Johnson 
is to run the risk of sounding suspiciously like a Stryker or Winston . 
There is much about his patronage activities , however , that can satisfac­
torily be . explained only in the light of these admirable qualities . 
Johnson was an open and avowed Democrat who had been placed in the second 
spot on what proved to be a successful coalition (National Union ) ticket . 
The Republican who had headed that ballot suddenly lost his life shortly 
after taking office , thus making Johnson the nominal head of an organi­
zation which .had as its other prominent leaders Republicans who were , or 
increasingly became , of Radical persuasion . All went well at first , but 
as the complexities of the reconstruction situation began to assert them­
selves , he found himself more and more out of step with the Radicals . 
In 1866 , an abortive attempt was made to build a thi�d party centered 
around him. What feasible alternative then was left? The logical answer 
obviously would have been to turn to his old party and use the executive 
patronage at his command to increase that party ' s  influence on the 
national level . The Democratic leaders both expected and implored him 
to do so .  Yet , he steadfastly refused to  make such a move , and this 
� action or inaction probably cost him the Democratic presidential nod in 
1868 .
8 What political practicality dictated, honesty and integrity 
prevented . The 1864 Democratic national slate of candidates had been 
rej ected by the voters .  Although Johnson himself was a Democrat , he 
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had not been elected to office as such , and he therefore would not conduct 
himself as a Democratic president . 
Because the president possessed these commendable qualities and 
conducted his activities accordingly , he made the rather fallacious 
assumption that those with whom he dealt also had them. This attitude 
caused him to hesitate about asking for the resignations of cabinet mem-
bers who had deserted to the Radical cause but had not openly declared 
such sentiments to him. It also led him to turn a deaf ear to the char-
ges of corruption in office that began to be heard in the latter part 
of his administration .  
One of the characteristics of U .  S .  Grant ' s  administration was 
corruption in public office . What sometimes is overlooked is the fact 
that some of the scandals which came to light in the Grant era partially 
developed during the Johnson administration .  A particularly noteworthy 
example was the notorious whiskey frauds which became fUlly evident 
during Grant ' s  time . Reports of such activities were circulating openly 
at least as early as 1868 .  In taking note of a congressional report 
citing corruption in the collection of taxes from whiskey sales , the New 
8 
The New York Times , prior to the Democratic convention , saw 
little chance for Johnson to secure the nomination . The reason was sim­
ple : "He has never surrendered the patronage of his office to the con­
trol of the party . He has never made its leaders his special advisers 
or allowed .them to dictate either his policy or his action . " Editorial ,  
New York Times , June 24 , 1868 . 
163 
York Tribune in an undoubtedly partisan attack , charged "The Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue , the Secretary of the Treasury , have repeatedly urged 
the dismissal of dishonest revenue officers , but the President protects 
them. "9 In discussing the activities of the so-called "whiskey ring" in 
particular and corruption in general , the Times pointed to a powerful 
lobby present in Washington with the purpose of securing appointments .  
Asserted that organ : 
We do not · suppose the President is ever consciously influ­
enced by these men , but it is a fact which must be admitted that 
the business of office brokerage has increased to a shameful 
extent during President Johnson ' s  administration . And it must 
also be acknowledged that the men who engage in it are frequent­
ers of the White House , and do have , or profess to have , inter­
views with the President on the subJ ect of appointments to ' 
office . lO 
No one who has made a detailed study of .Johnson ' s  life can maintain that 
he was corrupt or that he knowingly would help corruption prosper. The 
evidence of official infidelity cannot properly be laid at his doorstep 
or even perhaps at those of his immediate advisers , but his obvious lack 
of knowledge and experience with the conduct of patronage on the national 
level undoubtedly permitted persons of questionable character to gain 
public office in 1865 and 1866 and helped pave the way for later frauds . 
Courage , singleness of purpose , honesty and int�grity constituted 
9Editorial , New York Tribune , March 13 , 1868 . Rumors concerning 
the existence of a "whiskey ring" actually had been circulating since 
the last years of the Lincoln administration . Patrick , Reconstruction , 
188 . 
. 
10Editorial , New York Times , June 27 , 1868 . There apparently was 
a great deal of pardon brokerage in the aftermath of Johnson ' s  1865 
amnesty proclamation , but evidence to support the Times charge of office 
brokerage is scanty . 
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one aspect of Johnson ' s  individuality , but there was the other side . An 
inordinate pride in his own background led to a tendency toward great 
self-esteem. This egotism was evident in his absolute confidence that 
he was right and Congress was wrong about reconstruction . It can be 
seen on the patronage level in the official advisers with whom he sur� 
rounded himself . The holdovers from Lincoln ' s  cabinet for whom he dis-
played the greatest personal affection , Welles and Seward, tended almost 
always to agree with him. The men whom he brought into his cabinet in 
1866 had shown an unswerving loyalty toward him and would say only what 
he wanted to hear . One key consideration concerning his desire to replace 
Stanton was that the secretary was unwilling to follow his lead on the 
major issue of the day . 
Johnson ' s  obstinacy and bull-headedness encourages the conclusion 
that some of his actions can be explained only as having been dictated 
by "simple cussedness . "11 Certainly , many of his exasperated followers 
must have felt inclined toward such a theory to explain why he refused 
to use the patronage in 1866 . The Democratic leaders probably felt that 
was the only explanation that could be offered for his refusal to sur-
render the system to them in the latter part of his term of office . It · 
seems to be about the only thing to say about his determination to 
11This term . was the only explanation one . historian could find 
to explain why Johnson would ask Congress in December , 1867 , publicly 
to commend General Hancock for having issued an order in the Fitth .Dis­
trict declaring that the civil government was supreme over the military , 
an attitude directly opposite to the one expressed by the second supple­
mentary reconstruction act . McKitrick ,  Andrew Johnson , 499-500 . 
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rid himself of Stanton despite the advice of almost all of those close 
to him. 
After the Senate reinstated the secretary to his position in 
January , 1868 , Grant returned the office to him. This action left him 
in possession of the official place of the secretary of war in the War 
Department building but of little else . He dared not · attend cabinet 
meetings , and he could not function properly wit�out presidential recog­
nition of his status . Yet , simply his physical possession of the war 
minister ' s  offices seemed to infuriate Johnson and made him determined 
to do something about it . To do so,  he had to defy the Tenure of Office 
Act and the Senate ' s  official January action , which he did.  In the 
ensuing drama of his impeachment and trial , he had on his side precedent ; 
the House had law . In this context , the latter had the better part of 
it , but the president escaped conviction because a sufficient number of 
senators were unable to bring themselves to believe that the provision 
covering the cabinet could be extended to Stanton and the other Lincoln 
holdovers . Stanton then was forced to quit his position and that one 
fact might have been to Johnson the most satisfying part of the whole 
affair . 
In viewing Johnson ' s  patronage activities as a whole , it must be 
concluded that his policy was pragmatic and variable rather than con­
crete and definite . Decisions apparently were made on the demands of 
the immediate situation and of the case in question rather than in line 
with a defined policy. The president ' s  own political position and strong 
individualistic turn dictated this stance . A Jacksonian Democrat by 
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political persuasion , the to-be-expected impulse to practice rotation 
in office was thwarted by the unusual political circumstances following 
the war in which one party was seriously weakened because of its compro-
mising stand during that conflict , and the other was united in the desire 
to extract guarantees before the situation was returned to normal . Pre-
vented by his own honesty and integrity from giving patronage aid to the 
Democratic party , his unwillingness or inability to compromise with the 
Radical wing of the Republican party drove him into an increasingly iso-
lated position . This self-imposed isolation was described by the New 
York Times shortly after his acquittal : 
He has been in the main independent of all outside dictation 
and advice ; probably we have never had in this country before , 
a President who deterred to the opinions of others so little , 
and who had such unconquerable faith in his own , as Mr .  Johnson . l2 
Andrew Johnson probably was not displeased with this evaluation of his 
presidential career. 
12Editorial , New York Times , June 24 , 1868 . 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE I 
REMOVALS UNDER JOHNSON , 1866-1867a 
Ministers , etc .  
Secretaries of Legations 
Consuls 
Attorneys 
Marshals 
Collectors of Customs 
Surveyors of CUstoms 
Naval Officers 
Appraisers of Merchandise 
Inspectors of Steamships 
General Land Office 
Surveyor-General 
Registers of Land Offices 
Receivers of Public Monies 
Territorial Officials 
Indian Agents , etc . 
Treasury & Mint Officials 
Pension Agents 
Internal Revenue Assessors 
Internal Revenue Collectors 
Postmasters 
D .  C .  Officials 
Commissioners of Agriculture 
TOTALS 
2 
1 
8 
2 
3 
10 
9 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
103 
92 
82 
2 
1 
328 
1 
1 
1 
71 
75  
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
9 
20 
1 
3 
1 
12 
8 
3 
1 
3 
2 
24 
20 
19 
4 
6 
1 
91 
aThese figures are based upon the nominating messages received by 
the Senate between December 3 ,  1866 , and April 20 , 1867 ,  and thus to a 
large degree are reflective of removals. made by Johnson during the course 
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TABLE I ( continued ) 
of the 1866 congressional campaign . The sourc� for . these figures is 
the United States Senate Executive Journal , XV, 1-784 . 
177 
bin some nominating messages , Johnson mentioned the name of the . 
person being replaced but did not state the reason (death , resignation , 
removal , etc . ) for the vacancy . 
�is figure should be almost wholly discounted because most of 
these persons had only temporary commissions and were probably replace­
ments for undesirable assessors /collectors whose proposed successors had 
been rejected by the lame duck Thirty-ninth Congress . Also , several 
positions in this group undoubtedly were counted more than once because 
of the confu�ed wording of executive messages to the Fortieth Congress 
concerning persons in this category . Apparently , each time a replacement 
for the temporary appointee was rejected or withdrawn , the next nominat­
ing message , instead of following the normal practice of referring to 
the last person nominated and his fate (rejected, withdrawn , etc . ) ,  
referred to the temporary appointee . For these reasons , this figure is 
not a part of the totals given in Chapter III or above . 
TABLE II 
SENATE ACTION ON JOHNSON NOMINATIONS , 
DECEMBER 3 ,  1866-APRIL 20 , 1867a 
Ministers , etc .  
Secretaries of Legations 
Consuls 
Attorneys 
Marshals 
Collectors of Customs 
Surveyors of Customs 
Naval Officers (incl . Storekeepers ) 
Appraisers of Merchandise 
Inspectors of Steamships 
General Land Office 
Surveyor-Ge�eral 
Registers of Land Offices 
Receivers of Public Monies 
Territorial Officials 
Indian Agents , etc .  
Treasury & Mint Officials 
Pension Agents 
Internal Revenue Assessors 
Internal Revenue Collectors 
Postmasters 
D . C .  Officials 
Others 
TOTALS 
Confirmed 
8 
6 
70 
27 
25 
36 
29 
ll 
6 
4 
5 
7 
34 
44 
8 
25 
9 
23 
115 
113 
439 
15 
10 
1069 
Rej ected 
8 
15 
19 
15 
25 
32 
15 
2 
1 
2 
19 
20 
8 
14 
1 
20 
157 
148 
337 
15 
4 
877 
178 
�hese figures are based upon a personal count of the persons 
listed in the index of the United States Executive Journal as having 
been nominated for various executive positions . They will not coincide 
with those given in Table I because vacancies occurred for many reasons 
other than removal ( death , resignation , transfer , etc . ) .  
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